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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary globalisation processes witness the articulation of an allegedly 
homogeneous totality that has coalesced in direct opposition to the very 
globalisation processes that have enabled it. This totality is commonly labelled 
‘our people’ and reunites the citizens inhabiting the political–social–cultural space 
of a specific polity. Radical right populist parties – claiming to defend the political 
interests of the people – have gained increasing visibility and acceptance across 
Europe. Particularly salient among the symbols these parties have employed to 
portray their ideological stances is the depiction of the people as the tightly–knit 
family, under the guardianship of a man/father/leader, sheltered together under 
their home’s protective roof. However, there is a lack of gender–sensitive research 
on radical right populist ideology.  
The present study consequently aims to uncover the means through which both 
concepts – that of family, and respectively people – are discursively gendered, in 
the sense that they reify gender–based distinctions, thereby naturalising the 
traditional hierarchal gender binary. The dissertation focuses on two case studies: 
the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM) and the Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). It examines how the leaders of radical 
right populist parties in Romania and in Sweden explain discursively with the aid 
of conceptual structures – particularly, the conceptual metaphor of THE NATION IS A 
FAMILY and adjoining metaphorical clusters – their ideological conception of the 
hierarchical gender binary.  
The present study represents in other words an interdisciplinary dialogue 
between political science – particularly the study of radical right populism; 
communication studies – mainly the relationship between the radical right 
populist leader and contemporary media logic; conceptual metaphor theory – 
especially the critical analysis of conceptual metaphors, enriched with a 
genealogical perspective; from a decidedly feminist vantage point. 
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1 FOR FOLK – FOR FAMILY: STUDYING RADICAL RIGHT 
POPULISM FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 
‘The Family’, an interwar painting, portrays a group of six characters in a pastoral 
setting. At the centre two young adults: fair–haired and blue–eyed the man and a 
woman seem to form a married couple – thereby the title. They are depicted 
seated, against the backdrop of what the viewer might interpret as their home. The 
two are encircled by three children, apparently their offspring, also fair–haired 
and blue–eyed. The sixth character, a baby, is breastfed by the woman under her 
husband’s proud gaze, who embraces protectively both the mother and eldest 
daughter. The latter seems to concentrate on how her mother is nursing the new 
family member, which can be interpreted as an omen of her own motherhood. At 
their feet, oblivious of the ritual caregiving unfolding above, a young boy is 
concentrated on moulding the earth with his bare hands. His younger sister 
watches his hands attentively and holds protectively a doll, in a move which 
mirrors closely that of her mother’s nursing of the infant. The characters identified 
as feminine – the young mother and her presumably two daughters – appear in 
positions of caring, contemplation, and expectancy, thereby passively accepting 
the effects of- and assisting in- the actions of the masculine characters – the father 
and his son – who protect and create. In addition, both the young mother and her 
daughters are wearing blue garments – a Marian symbol of purity and reverence, 
whilst the father and boy wear clothes in earthly hues. This glimpse into the 
idealised family life takes place, as already mentioned, with the family home 
serving as background. The half–timbered thatched–roofed house and rich 
vegetation that frame in the characters suggest a bucolic setting. While rich in 
symbolism, the painting is sanitised from clear historical references and any 
manifestations of complex modernity (in terms of eluding any references to 
urbanisation and industrialisation; class hierarchies and waged exploitation; to 
women’s emancipation and their joining the labour force, or the presence of an 
ethnic Other within the national borders). Instead, a vigorous sunflower – a 
symbol of closeness to the divinity – is turned towards the infant over the 
woman’s right shoulder, a woven basket overflown with golden fruits – a symbol 
of fertility and abundance – lies at the feet of the young mother, whilst a spade – 
the symbol of the Adamic punishment to toil the land, but also referring to the 
foundation of a new edifice – rests in the grass nearby the boy.  
‘The Family’, painted by Wolfgang Willrich, appears to synthesise the artist’s 
envisioned and ideologically grounded solution for a people at the crossroads: to 
craft a common future on the rubble left by a devastating event – the First World 
War; to rebuild solidarity and trust among the antagonised classes within a highly 
divided society – the late Weimar Republic; to identify the cause of downfall and 
pursue the project of building a pure novel society – the emergence of national 
socialism. ‘The Family’ indicates Willrich’s unambiguous option for an 
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exclusionary interpretation of the völkische Bewegung (völkisch, or better said 
folksy movement), which idealised the Volk (German cognate of the English 
people, incorporating strong ethnic and territorial aspects), and incorporated not 
only anti–capitalist, but also anti–communist, anti–immigration, and even anti–
parliamentarian attitudes. Willrich’s work appears, in this context, to express ‘the 
politics of cultural despair’ that marked the ‘estrangement from modernity and 
dissatisfaction with the maladies of mass society’ that characterised the late years 
of Weimar Republic (Arieli–Horowitz, 2001: 752). Even more so, I argue that it 
resonates strongly with the national socialist ideology. This regarded the 
traditional family – with emphasis on patriarchal gender roles, reflecting men’s 
uncontested dominance both outside and within the family home, and women’s 
role as subordinated reproductive vessels of the nation – as a necessary 
counterweight to the social corruption of modern democracy. This included falling 
birth rates, late marriages, increase of divorce rates, and increase in percentage of 
women in salaried work outside the home. Additionally, depicting the traditional 
family – fertile, uncorrupted, and pure – as key to the survival of the nation fitted 
the agenda of racialised supremacist domination – ensuring the numerical 
superiority of German people in their battle with those dismissively regarded as 
belonging to ‘inferior races’ (cf. Theweleit, 2007a; 2007b). 
This is not to say, however, that national socialism or other radical right 
ideologies have had a monopoly over references about the importance of 
traditional family constructions1 for the survival and reproduction of a people 
understood as a political community. What needs to be noted here is that, as aptly 
observed by feminist scholars, membership in the political community is based on 
birth, and membership in the family is based on the law emanating from and 
enforced within said political community2 (Stevens, 1999: 52). Even more so, 
1 Already in the eighteenth century, Jean–Jacque Rousseau had commented on the political nature 
of family, noting that it ‘is the first model of political societies. The head of society corresponds to 
the position of the father; whereas the people, themselves, correspond to the image of the 
children.’ (Rousseau in Thomas, 2006: 10) (Italics – mine) On the other hand, Johann Gottfried 
Herder had regarded the nation as an enlarged family, based on a spatial and temporal organicist 
view of a people that ‘can maintain its national character for a thousand of years… For a people is a 
natural growth like a family, only spread more widely’ (Herder in Freeden, 1998b: 762) (Italics – 
mine). In turn, Friedrich Engels had indicated the interconnection between economic relations 
within the state and family relations, especially with regard to women’s exploitation, arguing that 
‘the first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the 
antagonism between man and woman in monogamian marriage, and the first class oppression 
with that of the female sex by the male.’ (Engels in Carver, 2004: 244) One should not forget, 
however, that the definition of, and place given to the family construct in any given society has 
always been dependent on that specific context; in a sense, the family and society (as well as the 
national project) around it have always been interdependent and contingent conceptual constructs 
(cf. Stevens, 1999). 
2 Illustratively, ‘alien’ – the word denoting a person not belonging to the family constituting the 
political community – has a Latin etymology, aliēnum (neuter) meaning ‘foreign by birth’, 
‘unfamiliar’. An online free dictionary readily indicates that in modern usage in English entails 
both ‘a person owing political allegiance to another country’, and ‘a person from another very 
different family, people, or place’ (www.thefreedictionary.com). 
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appeals to the people as denominator for the political community, which is 
envisaged to be rooted in or at least modelled upon the family construct, are 
common across the political spectrum. In contrast to its usage in other political 
contexts, radical right populist ideology appropriates a very narrow definition of 
the concept and it does so, I maintain, assuming a decidedly patriarchal version of 
it. One should neither rush to conclude that contemporary radical right populism, 
in its various manifestations across Europe, is one and the same as early national 
socialism – there are, however, a series of inescapable similarities and a certain air 
of familiarity between the two (Derks, 2006: 182; Ignazi, 2003: 32–33; Zaslove, 
2009: 310); but I delve into these at length in the coming chapters of the present 
study. 
What I want to emphasise here, drawing a parallel to the period I just made 
reference to above, is that the contemporary globalising processes have also been 
accompanied by the emergence of certain political parties, which I herein label 
radical right populist parties. The radical right populist parties have argued for a 
radical departure from intricate forms of government – generally dismissed as 
harbingers of corruption and degeneration, thereby alienating the people, 
employed as a shorthand for common citizenry – and militated in turn for the 
unmediated dictatorial rule of the popular majority – its simplicity being 
presented as a symbol of ‘realness’, innocence, and ‘purity’3. It is suffice to say, at 
this stage, that I consider such terms as estrangement and dissatisfaction of 
cardinal importance, if one were to consider the present political–socio–cultural–
economic situation across Europe in the context of accelerated globalisation 
processes. These processes are often described as unstoppable and uncontrollable. 
The opposition to these processes has been coalesced around the ‘our people’ 
construct, which lies at the heart of radical right populist parties4. 
3 For a preliminary definition of such political manifestations, one that is both comprehensive yet 
also restrained from too narrow a focus on a specific social content, a suitable starting point would 
be Donald MacRae’s (1969) classical conceptualisation on the topic – provided the aforesaid 
excessive emphasis on particularism is eliminated. Radical right populism thereby entails a 
situation in which: 
[A] segment of society asserts as its charter of political action its belief in a community and 
(usually) a Volk as uniquely virtuous, it is egalitarian and against all and any elite, looks to 
a mythical past to regenerate the present and confounds usurpation and alien conspiracy, 
refuses to accept any doctrine of social, political, or historical inevitability and, in 
consequence, turns to belief in an instant, imminent apocalypse mediated by the charisma 
of heroic leaders and legislators – a kind of new Lycurgus. 
(MacRae, 1969: 162) (Italics in original) 
4 Contemporary globalisation processes bring forth, in fact, the crystallisation of such an allegedly 
homogeneous totality, generally labelled ‘our people’ – reuniting the citizens inhabiting the 
political–social–cultural space delimited by state borders – that gains consistency through the 
reification of its ‘opposition’ to the globalising processes that enabled it in the first place. The 
people, in this context, embody a specific ideological response to the aforementioned processes; it 
represents, in other words, an attempt to ‘neutralise’ the effects of globalisation on its own territory 
(Şandru, 2010: 294). 
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What is noteworthy here is that the rise of such parties has taken different 
paths across Europe. Having registered various levels of success in politics at 
national level – in countries that oftentimes have been regarded as the core of 
European Union (EU), such as Belgium, France, Italy, or the Netherlands – 
several radical right populist parties have even succeeded in making an impact on 
EU politics, crafting in January 2007 a political alliance in the European 
Parliament, titled ‘Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty’ (ITS)5. These political forces 
seem to have become a common sight in national politics across the continent, 
even in the European periphery, understood both geographically – Northern 
Europe, for instance –, and politico–economically – Central and Eastern Europe, 
for example.  
Illustratively, the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM) has 
been a constant political presence since the violent unseating of the Ceauşescu 
regime and the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy in Romania; the 
PRM’s agenda has strong anti–Semitic, anti–Hungarian, anti–Romani, and anti–
establishment populist appeals. In the 2000 Parliamentary elections, the PRM 
registered its best electoral score to date, polling 19.5 percent of the votes for the 
Lower Chamber of Romanian Parliament, and 21 percent for the Upper Chamber, 
thereby becoming the main opposition party during that parliamentary cycle 
(Popescu, 2003: 331). Arguably, the PRM representatives in the European 
Parliament have played an important role in founding the ITS, providing the 
necessary number of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from different 
EU member states for the group to be acknowledged officially. 
Northern Europe has witnessed as well the emergence of radical right populist 
parties. Rising constantly in the electoral preferences in Finland, the (True) Finns 
(Party) (Perussuomalaiset, PS/Sannfinländarna, SF)6 has pursued an agenda of 
value–conservatism, anti–establishment, anti–immigration, and Euro–scepticism 
(Norocel, 2009: 243). The PS/SF recorded 4.1 percent in the 2007 Finnish 
Parliamentary elections and subsequently polled 19.1 percent in the 2011 
Parliamentary elections, becoming the main opposition party (Nurmi & Nurmi, 
2012: 236). Even in Sweden, long regarded as immune to such political 
5 The group consisted initially of 20 MEPs: seven MEPs from the French National Front (le Front 
National, FN); five MEPs from the PRM; three MEPs from the Belgian Flemish Interest (Vlaams 
Belang, VB); one MEP from the Bulgarian National Union Attack (Национален съюз Атака, 
Ataka); two Italian MEPs, one from the Mussolini List (Lista Mussolini, LM), and one from the 
Tricolour Flame (Fiamma Tricolore, FT); two independent MEPs, one from Austria and one from 
the United Kingdom (Mahony, 09.01.2007). However, the group disbanded in November 2007, as 
a result of, ironically, xenophobic slurs addressed by the group’s Italian MEPs to their Romanian 
counterparts (Mahony, 14.11.2007). 
6 The established though informal English version of the party’s name has been that of ‘True 
Finns’, in which ‘true’ is conterminous with ‘common’ or ‘ordinary’. In August 2011 the PS/SF 
chose the appellation ‘the Finns (Party)’ (YLE, 21.08.2011). Such a choice for the party name’s 
English translation lies closely to the common appellation of the country’s inhabitants in 
international contexts – the Finns – and in a sense may be regarded as an indication of the party’s 
ambition to represent the entirety of Finnish people. In order to avoid such analytical ambiguity, I 
chose herein to refer to the party as the PS/SF. 
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manifestations, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) have received 
5.7 percent of the votes in the 2010 Swedish Parliamentary elections, thereby 
gaining parliamentary representation (Widfeldt, 2011: 586). The SD considers 
itself a nationalist party pursuing a value–conservative agenda and it constantly 
battles with a past tainted by close collaboration with openly undemocratic, neo–
Nazi, and other extreme–right fringe groupings (Mattsson, 2009). Halfway 
through their mandate in the Swedish Parliament, the SD has continued its 
upward trajectory. It entered 2013 witnessing 9.2 percent support in opinion 
polls, and a chair whose leadership has been consolidated, despite internal 
struggles and increased media monitoring (Demoskop, 12.01.2013). It is precisely 
the manifestation of radical right populist ideology in Romania (namely the PRM), 
respectively in Sweden (the SD) that constitute the object of present study. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, several prominent members among these parties have 
criticised contemporary artistic manifestations (cf. Kvist, 2012: 22; Roijer, 2007: 
9). The iconoclasm of contemporary modern art, understood as the active 
interrogation on the meanings of the artistic act, and the continuous strive to push 
further the boundaries of contemporary artistic expressions, has been oftentimes 
met with fierce criticism from the representatives of these political forces. What is 
preferred, in turn, are sanitised representations of ‘perennial symbols’ among 
which the traditional heteronormative family – understood here as the normative 
stance according to which family life is consumed within a (legally sanctioned) 
monogamous union between a man and a woman that has led to the procreation 
of a numerous offspring – is of exceptional symbolic value. A case in point, 
particularly salient among the symbols these parties have generally employed is 
the depiction of the people as the tightly–knit family – under the guardianship of 
a man/father/leader – which is sheltered together under their home’s protective 
roof. 
Before going any further, a few clarifications are necessary. The understanding 
of gender at work in the present study subscribes to the definition put forward by 
Terrell Carver (2004), which in turn acknowledges the seminal contribution of 
Judith Butler (1990; 1993; 1995) to the development of contemporary feminist 
scholarship. His working definition of gender is ‘ways that sex and sexuality 
become political’ (Carver, 2004: 4), whereby underlining its incomplete, in–the–
making aspect. Gender is thereby a politically productive device for the social 
division of power. Or, as explicated by Butler, gender is to be regarded as a 
continuous process of one individual’s performative7 of masculinity/ femininity, 
with little, if any, connection to that individual’s biological sex (Butler, 1993: 95; 
1995: 138). According to Carver, such an approach to theorising gender ‘is 
7 In here I employ the term ‘performative of gender’ or ‘gender performative’ with the purpose of 
emphasising the contingent, fluid, and negotiated nature of gender. I also make a distinction 
between the conceptualisation of gender as ‘performative’ and ‘performance’, as understood in 
theatre studies, following Butler’s earlier work (Butler, 1993). A detailed discussion on the term’s 
usage in the present study is provided in section 3.1. 
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intended to alert readers to the ways that the term can be useful in identifying 
power–relations that are binary and hierarchical’ (Carver, 2004: 4). Being aware 
of the structure and extent of such gender hierarchy enables researchers ‘to 
examine both how social constructions of masculinity and femininity shape our 
ways of thinking and knowing how women’s and men’s lives are patterned 
differently as a consequence of gendered practices’ (Peterson & Runyan, 1993: 
190). The binary aspect of gender has been further emphasised by Carver. He has 
argued that when researching men, one inescapably discusses women (and the 
other way around), since gender ‘is organised around a binary, and in asserting 
what is the case on one side, there is no escape from some implication from what 
obtains with respect to the other’ (Carver, 2004: 235). In this context, the analysis 
of traditional heteronormative family construction offers valuable insights into the 
power relations that enable the reification of the hierarchical gender binary. 
On this matter, returning briefly to the painting discussed above, the 
protagonists and their performative of their genders (for instance, the adult 
woman incarnating the motherly ideal of femininity: breastfeeding her newborn 
child, and invested with Marian attributes, whilst the man embodying the ideal 
family father: protectively watching his offspring being taken care of by his wife) 
dutifully submit to the traditional gender binary that posits women as subservient 
vessels for reproduction of the family. For this study we may also generically 
substitute the community of the people, under the watchful guardianship of their 
men, for the family. With this in mind, my endeavour is to uncover the means 
through which both concepts – that of family, and respectively people – are 
discursively gendered, in the sense that they reify gender–based distinctions, 
thereby naturalising the traditional hierarchal gender binary as described above. 
So far, I have teased out the ideological underpinnings at work in ‘the Family’ 
painting, and having in mind that paintings may be considered visual discursive 
manifestations, this could be considered a sketch of a tentative analysis of the 
wider manifestation of ideology through discourse8. It is precisely the connection 
between the gender binary and ideology, and especially the performative of 
masculinities and femininities, which underpin the radical right populist ideology 
in its discursive manifestation that will be discussed at length in the present study. 
Consequently, the following section addresses the conceptualisation of ideology, 
positioning the present study in the post–Marxist context of the ‘linguistic turn’, 
thereby acknowledging the role of language – understood to incorporate text, 
symbols, discourse, and meaning – as constitutive of the reality it tries to 
represent and describe (Carver, 2009: 470; Norval, 2000: 316–317). Furthermore, 
the next section explicates the aims and research questions that are addressed in 
8 At the moment it suffices to mention that discourse, very generally, is understood to subsume 
language use, text, talk, and communication (be it verbal or visual), thereby following the 
minimalist definition suggested by an influential scholar of discourse (van Dijk, 1998: 6). In the 
present investigation, however, I employ a more narrow definition of discourse, which is detailed 
in the following section. 
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the present thesis. The inherent limitations of this academic endeavour are then 
indicated (in terms of cases to be analysed, timeframes, and languages). The 
present chapter is then concluded with a concise presentation of the disposition of 
present study. 
1.1 THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: RADICAL RIGHT 
POPULISM  
The concept of ideology, akin to other constructs that researchers have reverently 
assigned a key position in structuring the study of political life – consider, for 
instance, such concepts as ‘discourse’, ‘people’, ‘power’, to name just a few – has 
proven to be rather vague and difficult to fully encapsulate in a comprehensive yet 
concise definition. When first brought to academic attention in the eighteenth 
century France, ideology was envisaged to denote the ‘science of ideas’. Its initial 
meaning has been nonetheless altered, and has later come to embody a stark 
polarisation between a collective ‘Us’, and a common opponent ‘Them’, oftentimes 
with a negative connotation, in the sense that ‘Ours is the Truth, Theirs is the 
Ideology’ (van Dijk, 1998: 2). When characterised as ‘false consciousness’, as 
Friedrich Engels referred to it (Carver, 1995: 8; van Dijk, 2006: 117), ideology 
entailed ‘a system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs, 
typically associated with our […] political opponents’ (van Dijk, 1998: 2). These 
negative definitions notwithstanding, most scholars appear to agree on the 
usefulness of employing the concept of ideology in studying contemporary 
contexts9, since ideology operates through providing ‘monolithic certainties’, 
which enable the decision making process, in the context of multiplying diversity 
as a direct effect of globalising processes (Canovan, 2002: 30; Carver, 2009: 462; 
Freeden, 1998a: 76–77; Şandru, 2010: 275–278). 
In a similar manner, the concept of political ideology at work in the present 
study enables the analysis of ‘the interaction between ideas and politics, especially 
systems of ideas that make claims, whether justificatory or hortatory’ (Carver, 
1995: 10). More clearly, I subscribe to the academic tradition that regards ideology 
as a coherent system of meaning comprising a set of ideas, understood as 
founding principles, symbols, and myths (Canovan, 2002: 29–30; Carver, 1995: 
4–11; Charteris–Black, 2009: 140–144; Freeden 1998a: 50–54; Lazar, 2005: 6–9; 
9 It should be noted, however, that the present study employs ideology in a manner more akin to 
that present in the works of Carver (1995; 2009) and Freeden (1998a; 1998b). While not 
dismissive of their conceptual usefulness, I do not engage in a dialogue with those psychoanalytic 
accounts of ideology (cf. Laclau, 1990; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Žižek, 1989) – for a comprehensive 
review of the differences and communalities between the aforementioned approaches to the study 
of ideology, see Norval (2000). 
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Stanley, 2008: 98; Şandru, 2010: 157; van Dijk, 2006: 120–121). Importantly, the 
system of meaning that a certain political ideology represents is generally 
appropriated by a specific political party – or political grouping – within a given 
society, and employed to produce and reify shared ideas, which in turn enable the 
said party to legitimise its existence both in relation to its members (the in–group) 
but also to other political actors (the out–group). 
Returning to the matter at stake, the definition of radical right populist 
ideology at work in the present study acknowledges that its ideological production 
is indicative of a thin–centred ideology, in a similar fashion to nationalism (cf. 
Canovan, 1999; Freeden, 1998b; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). The ineliminable 
components of radical right populist ideology are the identification of a 
Manichean opposition between a ‘corrupt elite’ and a ‘pure people’. The said 
people of radical right populist ideology is not only pure, but also constitutes an 
indivisible whole, whose sovereign will finds its most appropriate manifestation in 
the figure of a respected leader. What is worth underlining here is that the 
aforementioned purity of people, and the intrinsically interrelated fear of 
pollution, rests on exclusivist definitions of the ‘rightful’ inhabitants of a certain 
nation–state, in a decidedly nativist nationalist manner (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 
323; Betz & Meret, 2009: 318; Canovan, 2002: 34; Meret & Siim, 2013: 93; 
Mudde, 2007: 19). This has a key economic aspect – namely, welfare chauvinism 
– which delineates the ‘pure’ people and their birthright to the nation–state’s 
welfare infrastructure from those underserving Others: a dynamic category that 
may include allegedly parasitical social groups, resented ethnic/‘racial’, religious, 
and/or sexual minorities, along a logic of nationalist solidarity (Derks, 2006: 181–
182; Mudde, 2007: 136–137; Zaslove, 2009: 314–315). A caveat: this is only a 
preliminary definition of radical right populist ideology, since such a theorisation 
is manifestly gender–blind; however, I address this issue later, by bringing gender 
into the study of radical right populism with the help of feminist scholarship on 
nationalism (cf. Anand, 2008; Cusak, 2000; Mulinari, 2010; Peterson, 1999; Petö, 
2006; 2010; Yuval–Davis, 1980; 1997). 
Several researchers have maintained in this context that ideology, as a form of 
political thought, enables the leaders of a political party to connect with their 
faithful (cf. Canovan, 2002; Charteris–Black, 2009; Freeden, 1998a; Şandru, 
2010). Put differently, in the framework of contemporary democratic multi–party 
regimes, the distance between the people, understood as the citizenry searching 
for appropriate representatives for their political interests, and political leaders, 
searching to be elected and represent ‘their people’ as being the people, is bridged 
by ideology, which in fact provides ‘a simplified map of the political world and 
motivate[s] their followers by bestowing an almost religious significance on 
political doctrines and symbols’ (Canovan, 2002: 29). 
An immediate consequence of ideology functioning as a bridge between a 
political party and its possible electorate is its dependence upon social and 
historical circumstances, displaying a significant degree of geographical variation 
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(Freeden, 1998a: 54; Stanley, 2008: 98; Şandru, 2010: 221). More clearly, political 
ideology is contingent upon the specificities of the countries in which its 
manifestation is examined, both in terms of historical context and political, social, 
cultural and economic particularities of each country selected for investigation. 
The ideological production may therefore be regarded as a continuous process, 
through which interested political actors create, borrow, and accommodate 
consecrated ideas, within the framework of generally permissible and legitimated 
meanings of the ideology. Consequently, an ideology may ‘follow a developmental 
sequence during which its components will subtly change. Over a long period of 
time […] its core may shed or acquire concepts, and its morphology may undergo 
some transformation.’ (Freeden, 1998a: 89) Particularly this developmental 
sequence of ideological production and its inherent contingency upon specific 
historical and social conditions are of interest in the present study. 
1.1.1 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, DISCOURSE, AND LANGUAGE: ENTER 
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS  
One should bear in mind that ideology finds in discourse the most appropriate 
medium for its manifestation and reproduction. At this point, some theoretical 
explanations are required. The conceptualisation of discourse that I employ in the 
present study follows Teun van Dijk’s multidisciplinary perspective, which in turn 
‘combines an analysis of linguistic, cognitive, social and cultural aspects of text 
and talk in context, and does so from a critical, socio–political perspective’ (van 
Dijk, 1998: 193). Discourse has nonetheless a restrictive meaning here, in that it 
concerns only verbal and written means of expression, thereby excluding other 
semiotic codes – such as motion pictures, or different forms of non–verbal 
communication (Fairclough, 2003: 1–11; Koller, 2009: 121; van Dijk, 1998: 193–
199; Wodak, 2006: 180–181). 
With this in mind, here discourse entails a multi–layered definition. At first, 
discourse is understood as a written communicative event that positions the 
definition of discourse at the level of daily practice. For example, such a 
communicative act minimally involves a writer/speaker (of interest here are 
political leaders) and a receptive audience. Maintaining the same line of 
reasoning, the leaders’ envisaged followers are ‘their people’; this category also 
allows for the presence of an external observer, namely the researcher. It also 
presumes a particular context: for instance this could be what is written in the 
pages of the party organ during a certain timeframe. In addition, such a written 
discourse is required to be globally coherent. As such, the discourse of a certain 
political leader has to form a meaning unit – more clearly, a coherent system of 
meaning – ‘not only a physical unit of continuous expression’ (van Dijk, 1998: 
195). These aspects notwithstanding, discourse entails even a more abstract level, 
as text of a social domain or genre (topically here, political discourse), though it 
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entails ‘a socially constituted set of such genres, associated with a social domain’ 
(van Dijk, 1998: 196). 
An important observation, in relation to the matter at stake, is that discourse 
itself is not a mere vessel that transports ideological messages from the ideologues 
to receptive audiences, but actually is a constitutive part of the ideological 
construct10. In other words, the language – which can be broken down further into 
words, grammar, and structure – employed by the party chair to convey radical 
right populist discourse to the targeted audience is not innocent. Some of the 
words employed by the party chair might also be used by, for instance, a trade 
union leader but the meaning given to these words, and the conceptual framework 
they call into mind, are very specific and pertain to the manner in which the 
radical right ideology makes sense of the ‘real world’. More clearly I regard 
language, which enables the manifestation, transfer, and communication of 
gendered meaning through discourse, as a major means for the circulation of 
ideology within a given political setting since language is a constitutive 
environment for the crafting of gendered political identities, and naturalising 
certain ideological representations of men and women as ‘natural truths’, and 
‘common sense’ (cf. Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 492; Cameron, 2006: 148; Holborow, 
2007: 53; Lazar, 2005: 11–14; Norval, 2000: 316; Weiss & Wodak, 2007: 15). 
Among these ideological representations, one of particular interest here is the 
depiction of the family as ‘naturally’ consisting of a man (oftentimes, though not 
always explicitly, acknowledged as the head of said family unit) and a woman 
(implicitly, as a matter of ‘common sense’, relegated a subordinate and dependant 
position) involved in a (legally sanctioned) monogamous heterosexual union, 
which results in (numerous) offspring. The family thus ideologically construed 
may be then used for political ends, for example, extrapolating the binary 
gendered hierarchy described above, with the help of metaphorical constructions, 
to organise the social relations of an entire people within a given country. 
At the level of discourse, then, metaphor, both in its most tangible form as 
metaphorical expression easily distinguishable in text but also in its abstract 
cognitive form that requires specific awareness of particular conceptual structures 
at work in language, represents ‘one of a number of linguistic, cognitive and 
symbolic resources employed by political leaders for communicating ideology’ 
(Charteris–Black, 2009: 143). On this matter it is worth noting that the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which is concerned with the study of metaphor in 
language very much like Critical Discourse Analysis, represents a research 
paradigm in the study of language, reuniting several distinct but cognate research 
10 Affirming the mutually constitutive relationship between discourse and ideology, I operate a key 
theoretical delimitation for the study of radical right populism. In other words, I maintain that 
radical right populism is more than just a style of doing politics (Deegan–Krause & Haughton, 
2009), or a normative judgement (cf. Laclau, 2005; Leaman, 2004; Rupnik, 2007). Positioning 
radical right populism as a self–sufficient, albeit thin–centred political ideology, I have indicated 
that the analysis of selected empirical material has been undertaken from this theoretical 
standpoint. 
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programmes. In this sense, a critical investigation of conceptual metaphors – in 
the context of the present study those conceptual structures that directly pertain 
to the national community construed along a family logic, and the gendered 
hierarchy at work in such a construct – entails an approach that builds on the 
productive extension of the discourse’s ability to do ideological work, which 
characterises Critical Discourse Analysis. In other words, it marks the emergence 
of Critical Conceptual Metaphor Theory in the study of conceptual structures (cf. 
Charteris–Black, 2004; 2011; Hart, 2010; Semino, 2008). 
1.1.2 A GENEALOGY OF GENDERED CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS: AIMS 
AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The present investigation, which aims to unveil the ideological support provided 
by certain conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses, may 
be regarded as an effort to widen the critical discourse analysis tradition, which 
primarily questions how power relations are constituted, consolidated, and reified 
through discourse (Fairclough, 2003: 75–77; Hart, 2010: 6–8; Stenvoll, 2008: 
36–37; van Dijk, 1998: 164; Wodak, 2006: 179–181; Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 13–
15). The present study also entails a further expansion of the analysis of ‘gender, 
power, and ideology in discourse’ that characterises feminist critical discourse 
analysis (Lazar, 2005) in the direction of examining gendered conceptual 
metaphors (Ahrens & Lee, 2009). 
What sets it apart, however, is particularly the preoccupation with the 
gendered aspect of such conceptual structures, thereby representing an 
interdisciplinary dialogue between political science – especially the study of 
radical right populism; communication studies – mainly the relationship between 
the radical right populist leader and contemporary media logic; and conceptual 
metaphor theory – particularly the critical analysis of conceptual metaphors; from 
a decidedly feminist perspective. It aims to account for the ideological work the 
aforementioned metaphorical structures do in depicting, reifying, and 
productively preserving across time patriarchal gendered hierarchies – with the 
traditional heteronormative family as the ideal – in the context of radical right 
populist discourses. To afford more clarity to the present study, the following 
closely interrelated research questions are posed: 
• How does radical right populist ideology work through discourse to 
give specific expression to the hierarchical gender binary? The focus 
here is on the discursive means afforded to ideology to create and reify 
the hierarchical gender binary. In other words, it is not only a matter of 
researching how the hierarchical gender binary is reproduced in radical 
right populist discourse; rather, it reflects the importance of the 
ideological construct behind the discourse that does that. So my effort is 
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to highlight ideology as central, and discourse as a means of its 
manifestation.  
• Considering the appropriation of the heteronormative family construct 
to that of the people in radical right populist discourses with the aid of 
conceptual metaphors11, I concentrate on two cases: the radical right 
populist parties in Romania and Sweden. With this in mind, the more 
specific research question becomes: How do the two party leaders in 
these countries use the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor and its 
adjoining metaphorical cluster to construe the hierarchical gender 
binary and with what effects? 
• Finally, while concentrating more closely on the successive discursive 
articulations of selected conceptual metaphor: How do the two party 
leaders construe masculinity performatives with the help of conceptual 
metaphors? Of interest here is to investigate how the two party leaders 
account for their own masculinity performative particularly among the 
other performatives of masculinity and more generally among 
performatives of gender in the national family context. 
1.1.3 DELIMITATIONS: EMPIRICAL MATERIAL, TIMEFRAME, CASES, AND 
LANGUAGE(S) 
On the matter of discursive production, reification, and dissemination of ideology, 
a highly influential channel for such processes is represented by newspapers, and 
other such media institutions. Furthermore, several researchers have maintained 
that editorial columns represent not only the dominant editorial views of the 
respective media outlet, but are in fact diligent organs in the service of their 
owners, and thereby mirror faithfully the organisation’s driving ideology (Hart, 
2010: 16–19; van Dijk, 1998: 187–189; 2006: 138). Such a stance needs, however, 
to be corroborated with the findings of researchers of radical right populism that 
have concluded that the media have played a crucial role in emergence of such 
political forces to the forefront of mainstream politics in various national settings. 
Equally important, to judge from their findings, has been the radical right populist 
leader as the main voice representing their party’s ideological stance and the most 
suitable for satisfying the contemporary media logic that appears highly 
responsive to emotive and passionate appeals, abrasive language, and public 
protest (Bos, van der Brug & de Vreese, 2010: 157–159; 2011: 184–185; Ellinas, 
2010: 32–33; Mazzoleni, 2003: 6–7). However, the present study does not operate 
a drastic separation of leaders from the parties they chair; rather, acknowledging 
11 The present study subscribes to the practice adopted in cognitive linguistics to employ small 
upper case to represent abstract reasoning – conceptual metaphors as they are to be defined later 
in the text – (Kövecses, 2002: 4). In so doing, I acknowledge the impact of said discipline on other 
social sciences concerned with the study of metaphors. 
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that in the electoral competition ‘the party leader factor is, by and large, a function 
of the party factor’ (Karvonen, 2010: 84), the analysis concentrates on the media 
production of these leaders as illustrative articulations of the radical populist 
ideology in discourse. 
More clearly, while acknowledging the role of media outlets in the rise to 
prominence of radical right populist leaders as the main representatives of radical 
right populist ideology, in order to counter the possible distortions that 
mainstream media channels might be operating in mediating (from radical right 
populist leaders to their intended audience and possible political supporters) 
these ideological messages, I am focusing in the present study on those media 
outlets directly connected to the radical right populist parties. Even more 
narrowly considered, key here are the editorials authored by radical right populist 
leaders. These editorial columns have been supplemented at times with interviews 
of the party leaders published in the selected party organs in which they would 
comment specifically on various socio–political developments that otherwise have 
not been addressed in their authored editorials12. In so doing, my aim has been to 
gain unmediated access to the discursive manifestations of radical right populism 
as envisaged by the party leaders. At the same time, I have also attempted to 
address the challenge posited by the presence of a cordon sanitaire that 
mainstream media might build around radical right populist parties and their 
leaders, effectively boycotting their attempts to make their stances known to a 
wider swathe of voters (Ellinas, 2010: 76–124; Rydgren, 2006: 106–108). 
Concerning the investigation of radical right populist expressions in Romania, 
the empirical material has been compiled from the pages of the PRM organ, the 
weekly Greater Romania Magazine (Revista România Mare; ISSN 1220–7616). 
The material was gathered taking into consideration the selected timeframe, from 
January 2000 – the issue anticipating the Romanian Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections that took place later that year – to June 2009 – the issue 
published after the European Parliamentary elections. Since the newspaper in 
question has not been available online, photocopies have been made of the 
relevant issues. These have been archived at the PRM regional headquarters in 
Cluj–Napoca/Kolozsvár13 – in May 2007, respectively in June 2010. It is worth 
noting that only those pages containing the leader’s weekly editorials and press 
12 In order to ensure a comprehensive, coherent, and unitary referencing system for the collected 
empirical material in both cases, I have implemented a specific referencing style. More clearly, 
each empirical item is not referenced by author, but by indicating the issue number in each case, 
followed by the year of publication, and the corresponding page number. A detailed list of the cited 
empirical items has been annexed to the end of this study. 
13 Officially, the name is recorded only in Romanian (Cluj–Napoca). The city also has an unofficial 
Hungarian name (Kolozsvár). These names testify to the city’s historical cultural–economic 
importance for both ethnic communities. Despite the significant Hungarian minority in the city, it 
has never become officially bilingual. In turn, the city witnessed a period of fervent Romanian 
nationalism, for over a decade after the fall of the Ceausescu’s regime. I use both forms one next to 
another in sign of respect and tolerance for both communities. 
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releases have been selected for the purpose of this study, since the newspaper 
itself generally has voluminous issues (generally, 24 pages per issue). 
With regard to the examination of radical right populist manifestations in 
Sweden, the empirical material has been collected from the pages of the SD 
newspaper, namely the Sweden Democrat Courier (SD–Kuriren; ISSN 1103–4009 
(0284–6861)). In this case, the empirical material has been gradually gathered 
during an extended visiting fellowship at the Stockholm University, which 
commenced in April 2008 and lasted until the study’s conclusion. The newspaper 
has been available in hard copy (with an average of 12 pages per issue) for 
subscription. Nevertheless, I have opted to download all issues within the chosen 
timeframe, from October 2005 – the newspaper’s first issue in the aftermath of 
SD leadership change – to October 2010 – the post–elections issue. I have 
performed the download directly from the party’s official website, which earlier 
had a direct link to the newspaper’s own pages14. In this case, I have widened the 
selection of empirical material, including the leader’s editorials, his press releases 
and debate articles, and other pieces in which he had been interviewed on daily 
political matters. 
I have focused in the present study on the inherent ideological transformations 
that, in my view, enable the selected radical right populist parties not only to craft 
their ideological profile to be distinguishable from other parties in their respective 
countries but also permit the researched parties to react to various historical and 
social circumstances. In a sense they engage in a constant (re)interpretation of 
their cardinal ideological tenets with the purpose of gaining parliamentary 
representation and participate in the forming of governing coalitions. Such a 
stance is, to a certain extent, related to the ‘lifespan model’ employed by Susi 
Meret (2010) in her study of radical right populist ideology. I maintain 
nonetheless that over–drawing the metaphor of the lifespan of a radical right 
populist party being like that of a human being may deflect scholarly attention 
from precisely those various ideological transformations and adaptations of 
interest. Additionally, the present study has a specific timeframe, which neither 
contains the selected radical right populist parties’ foundation, nor their political 
demise; rather, it represents a clearly defined temporal slice of the political 
activity of selected radical right populist parties.  
A second distinction I make is between the specificity of researching how the 
discursive manifestations of radical right populist ideology under scrutiny gain 
consistency through the use of particular conceptual structures and rhetorical 
political analysis. While also interested in the analysis of the substantive content 
of political discourse, scholars of rhetorical political analysis position their studies 
in a decidedly dialogic context. Consequently, they pay attention to political 
14 In late August 2010 and then again in the eve of elections day, several cyber–attacks were 
directed against the SD official webpages (those of the party’s main organisation, the newspaper, 
and several others). Consequently, the newspaper archive has been placed behind a password–
protected wall. 
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arguments, regarded as loci for political persuasion. In other words, of interest for 
rhetorical political analysis is the dynamic between those political actors involved 
in the argumentative situation under study (cf. Finlayson, 2007; 2012). In my 
view, such a take is not particularly suitable for the present analysis, since the 
radical right populist parties have often been treated with indifference, if not 
fenced off outright from the political arguments in which established parties 
engage, as noted above. 
I have therefore opted to concentrate the analysis on the effective adaptations 
of radical right ideology to the specificities of historical, geographical, and cultural 
contexts they are located in, and as such to make use of the party programmes of 
chosen radical right populist parties as anchoring posts, rather than as main 
empirics for the present examination. Under these circumstances, I have deemed 
a genealogical approach – as suggested by Michel Foucault (cf. 1990; 1998; 2000) 
– a more appropriate methodological means to investigate these transformations. 
More clearly, selecting as empirical material for the present investigation the 
media production of radical right populist leaders, I have attempted to account for 
the ideology’s operative (re)positioning and (re)interpretation, which in my view 
afford a more vivid and veridical picture of radical right populist ideology 
(Freeden, 1998a: 79–80; Meret, 2010: 58–61). 
Another important delimitation concerns the choice and number of cases that I 
have selected for the analysis. Having in mind that the present study has a 
decidedly qualitative aspect, it would not have been feasible to consider a large 
number of cases. In this context, I have selected the two cases through a two–step 
process. The first step pertained to focusing explicitly on a set of conceptual 
structures – more clearly, the NATION IS A FAMILY and the STRICT FATHER conceptual 
metaphors – to be researched in the context of radical right populist discourses. 
The second step involved a careful evaluation of the cases’ complexity and 
specificity, in the sense of selecting those cases that I have considered might 
provide competing perspectives on the use of the aforesaid conceptual 
constructions. This was undertaken with particular attention to the countries’ 
different historical, socio–economic and political developments in the European 
periphery. The Romanian case (the PRM) illustrates the development of radical 
right populism in Central and Eastern Europe, whilst the Swedish case (the SD) 
problematises the previously considered failed case of radical right populism in 
Northern Europe (Carmel, 1999: 143; George & Bennett, 2005: 83–84; Landman, 
2005: 41; Platt, 2007: 110). It is worth noting in this context that I regard the two 
selected cases – the PRM in Romania and the SD in Sweden – as ‘heuristic case 
studies’, since the ambition of this study is to relate to and contribute to theory 
building in a deliberate fashion, thereby purposefully pursuing generalisable 
relations in Critical Metaphor Theory (Eckstein, 1992: 143–147; George & 
Bennett, 2005: 75). 
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A final remark on the matter: I am aware that such a qualitative analysis is 
heavily dependent on the author’s subjective abilities and limitations to interpret 
the collected empirical material, and as such these may have a serious impact on 
the validity and reliability of such a study. In my attempt to address this challenge, 
I have relied on feminist reflexivity as praxis in undertaking my research (Lazar, 
2005: 14–19). I thereby acknowledge that the skills I am equipped with, which I 
have employed in the present investigation, have been influenced by my personal 
academic trajectory and exposure to specific scholarly communities (most 
importantly, membership in the feminist research community), my acquired 
language skills – in both Romanian, and Swedish – and my intellectual capacity to 
decode, and interpret specific cultural codes, and to convey the results of such 
cognitive processes in English15. Put differently, I have made use of my intricate 
insider, yet outsider, relationship I have developed over the years with the two 
countries, cultures, and languages where the objects of my study are located in 
order to produce the most effective insights into the collected empirics (Carmel, 
1999: 145). Although I am aware that a perfect replication – in the qualitative 
understanding of the process – may probably not be possible, I have been 
motivated to undertake such an analysis by other feminist researchers’ appeals for 
a situated subjectivity in the analysis of conceptual metaphor in discourse 
(Mottier, 2008: 188). 
1.2 DISPOSITION OF THE STUDY 
At the time this study was initiated, in early 2007, radical right populist parties 
across Europe hovered somehow below the radar of wider public attention, being 
mainly under the scrutiny of several scholars whose works were considered as the 
field’s theoretical cannon (cf. Betz, 2002; 2005; Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Canovan, 
1981; 2002; 2005; Eatwell, 2000; 2005; Ignazi, 2003; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; 
Mudde, 2000; 2004; 2005; Norris, 2005; Ramet, 1999; Rydgren, 2002; 2006; 
Taggart, 2000). The electoral performance of these parties differed dramatically 
from the present situation. In Romania the PRM had a total of 48 representatives 
(MPs) in the Romanian Houses of Parliament. The PRM was a significant political 
actor in Romanian politics and an important member of the parliamentary 
opposition. The PRM, like other Romanian parties, was preparing for the first 
Parliamentary elections decoupled from the Presidential ones, which were 
15 To enable a seamless line of reasoning, in the main body of the text I have provided the English 
translations of the Romanian and Swedish original empirical material. I have performed these 
translations myself, if not stated otherwise, and I then had them checked by two native speakers of 
Romanian and Swedish respectively – to ensure the correctness of the translation. In so doing, I 
have attempted to convey, as much as possible, the various nuances of original language, thereby 
opting for providing rich and nuanced English translations. This notwithstanding, I have at times 
opted to relay certain words in their original form whenever I have considered they had a strong 
connection to the cognitive structures under investigation. 
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scheduled to take place on 30 November 2008. The party appeared to have a 
devoted core electorate and researchers considered the PRM to be a typical 
example of radical right populism in the region with a discourse characterised by 
anti–Semitic, anti–Hungarian, and anti–Romani appeals (cf. Andreescu, 2005; 
Chen, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Mudde, 2005; Shafir, 2008). 
In Northern Europe, in contrast, the radical right populist parties did not enjoy 
such strong numbers. For example, from the 2007 Finnish Parliamentary 
elections the PS/SF had only 5 MPs; the lowest number of elected representatives 
of any party in the national Parliament. Similarly in Sweden, the SD had not even 
managed to go past the 4 percent electoral threshold, and consequently had no 
representatives in the Swedish Parliament. Some researchers even deemed 
Sweden to be an exceptional case of having immunity from the rising radical right 
populist presence across Europe by indicating the previously failed attempt of a 
party with a similar political agenda to take root in mainstream Swedish politics, 
and the extensive media embargo against the SD, coupled with a strong opposition 
from the political establishment as the main explanations for such a development 
(cf. Hannerz, 2006; Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2002; 
2006; Taggart, 2000; Widfeldt, 2000; 2007). 
Presently, the situation differs dramatically. Just months before the 2008 
Parliamentary elections in Romania, Law no. 35/2008 introduced an elaborate 
mixed majoritarian electoral system and, subsequently Governmental Ordinance 
no. 802/2008 established the single–candidate electoral colleges within the 
existing administrative units, some of them varying significantly from the earlier 
introduced legal stipulations. The PRM had vociferously opposed these 
developments accusing the governing coalition of gerrymandering; alas, the 
Supreme Court rejected their claims. In the ensuing elections, only 39.2 percent of 
the Romanian population with a voting right cast their ballot. The PRM performed 
poorly, polling only 3.4 percent for the two Chambers of Parliament, significantly 
below the 5 percent electoral threshold and thereby lost its parliamentary seats 
(cf. Downs, 2009; Marian & King, 2010; Stan & Vancea, 2009). However, it 
appears that the PRM succeeded in maintaining part of its loyal electorate; in the 
2009 European Parliamentary elections, the PRM polled 8.6 percent of the votes 
and sent three representatives to the European Parliament (Sum, 2010: 21). In the 
Presidential elections the same year, the PRM leader received 5.6 percent of the 
votes in the first round, insufficient to allow him to progress into the second round 
(Muntean, Pop–Eleches, Popescu, 2010: 756). 
In contrast to the downward evolution of the PRM in Romania, in Sweden it 
appears that the SD is no longer the exceptional failed case confirming the rise of 
such parties elsewhere across Europe. Indeed, at a closer look, the SD has 
registered a constant albeit very slow–paced increase in its electoral support 
among Swedish voters. Although in the 2006 Parliamentary elections the SD has 
polled only 2.9 percent, this entailed a more than a doubling of their vote from the 
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previous elections in 2002 (Agius, 2007: 586; Mattsson, 2009: 35; Widfeldt, 
2007: 823–823). Following this pattern, in the 2009 European Parliamentary 
elections the SD received the support of 3.3 percent of the Swedish voters – still 
below the electoral threshold. Eventually, in the 2010 Swedish Parliamentary 
elections, the SD achieved its parliamentary breakthrough, polling 5.7 percent of 
the votes – safely past the 4 percent threshold, and slightly above the results of 
two other established parties in Swedish politics (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 
2012: 186; Widfeldt, 2011: 586). 
In light of the political developments in Romania and  Sweden described 
above, the aim of the present study has been to document the genealogical 
articulations across time – the aforesaid repositioning and (re)interpretations – 
that the conceptual metaphors of interest here – the NATION IS A FAMILY, 
respectively the STRICT FATHER – reveal across radical right populist discourses. The 
focus in this context has been put on the discourses of the leaders of those parties 
espousing such an ideological stance. As such, the ambition has been to undertake 
a feminist genealogical analysis of the conceptual metaphors that underpin radical 
right populist ideology. With this in mind, the present study has been structured 
as follows. 
Chapter two has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, I provide a 
comprehensive overview of the radical right populist scholarship, fleshing out the 
field’s theoretical diversity. I then evidence what I deem to be the main tenets of 
radical right populism that various canonical theoretical approaches appear to 
agree on. On the other hand, I challenge the silence of this theoretical canon about 
gender when defining the ideological apparatus that underpins radical right 
populist manifestations. The stance I thereby introduce at this point is that not 
being aware of men’s own gendered identity and not researching the power binary 
hierarchies between men and women at work within radical right populist parties, 
in fact projects men in a normative position rendering white ethnic majority 
middle–class heterosexual masculinity invisible. This places the burden of 
intelligibility on all those falling off the normative spectrum, in other words all 
those individuals that are different from this norm in terms of gender, 
ethnicity/‘race’16, social class, and sexual orientation. 
Chapter three consequently brings gender into the study of populism. Such an 
approach is enabled by exploiting productively the contact points between 
theories of populism and those of nationalism, especially the commonalities 
shared by the building block of radical right populist ideology – the people – with 
that of nationalism – the nation. More clearly, I make use of the feminist 
16 Employing the scare quotes when referring to matters related to alleged distinctions between 
people based on racial classifications, I follow in the footsteps of Anthony Appiah Kwame who has 
contested the reality of ‘races’ and unveiled it to be socially constructed and historically contingent 
(Kwame, 1993). I am nonetheless aware of the critique of such practice raised by Jaqueline 
Stevens, who has argued that by the same measure scholars should employ scare quotes for such 
concepts as gender, nation, and ethnicity or run the risk of ascribing them an ontological status 
(Stevens, 1999: 23). 
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theorising of nationalism, being particularly interested in the ideological 
interconnectedness between nationalism and gender. In relation to this, I consider 
the symbiotic relation between patriarchal gender binary structuring – that 
postulates women’s submission to men – and the construction of the nation – that 
celebrates men’s power as leaders and defenders of the national construct and 
sanctifies women’s motherhood – of key importance for the present study. I 
thereby argue that the people is envisioned as a family construction that contours 
a heteronormative worldview ordering the society according to a paternalist logic 
that contains women in an inferior and dependent position – even when 
temporarily and conditionally allowed in politics. The representative of sovereign 
people appears invested masculine attributes – people’s pride needs to be restored 
and their insecurities in the rapidly changing environment of the new millennium 
need to be dispelled by a (male) leader. 
Chapter four revolves around the tasks of designing a suitable methodology 
and explicating the choice of empirical material for the present academic 
undertaking. In this context, I argue that metaphor – the crucial concept of this 
study – is actively enforcing a specific understating of how social relations are to 
be perceived, of how certain political issues are to be discussed, and brings to the 
top of the political agenda specific issues while concomitantly obscuring some 
others. Put simply, I maintain that the use of metaphor by political actors is 
ideologically motivated. As such, I underline the essential difference between 
conceptual and surface realisation of metaphor, defining metaphorical concepts 
in contrast to metaphorical expressions. Furthermore, I make explicit 
metaphorical clusters to represent a cohesive system of metaphorical concepts, 
and their subsequent discursive articulations that depart from a common 
condition or image to transmit a specific experience or idea. Then I introduce the 
two key conceptual metaphors at work in this study: the NATION IS A FAMILY and the 
STRICT FATHER, which, I argue, articulate a distinctive metaphorical cluster that 
structures the intelligibility of right–wing conservative discourse and thereby 
provides it with a specific ideological consistency. Considered from a feminist 
perspective, the two conceptual metaphors appear constrained to a compulsory 
family–centred heterosexuality. This engenders the entrapment of both women 
and men into patriarchal heteronormativity, which posits the family’s head as the 
source of authority and guardian of the ‘natural order’. In my attempt to broaden 
the analytical scope of metaphor research to account for the wider discursive 
context and inherent ideological transformations across time, I develop a 
genealogical perspective that enables a cyclical argumentation of the analysis. 
More clearly, I underline the importance of the context in which the analysed 
events are embedded, and of the minute documentation of the consecutive 
repositioning and (re)interpretation of the conceptual structures – accounting for 
the development and ramifications of the metaphorical cluster under scrutiny. 
Subsequently, I detail and explain the choice of the two particular manifestations 
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of radical right populist discourses in Europe of interest for the present analysis, 
namely the PRM and the SD. 
Chapter five explores the radical right populist ideology in the Romanian 
context. I analyse the genealogical articulations of the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor, at first identifying the alleged moral wholeness of the 
Romanian national family. On this matter, I underline the productive 
juxtaposition between ethnic ‘purity’ and Orthodox Christianity as its 
quintessential values. This, I argue, confirms the moral supremacy of the 
Romanian national family, and concurrently naturalises a gendered hierarchy 
with the figure of male ethnic Romanians at the top. Delving into the opportunity 
opened to women to participate in parliamentary politics and thereby represent 
the national family, I show the institutionalisation of masculinity in politics in 
general and the reification of aggressiveness as inherent to the political discourse 
in particular. This conceptual metaphor, I maintain further, is developed to 
position Romanian men as epitomes of political agency and financial supporters 
of their extended families. Additionally, it relegates women to the domestic sphere 
as ‘natural’ caregivers of other dependants – the offspring of their Romanian men, 
the elderly, the sick, and those socially disadvantaged – and a position of less–
than–men in politics. The genealogical expansion of the NATION IS A FAMILY also 
circumscribes those failing the conditions of being a part of the national family, 
either in the form of outside Others – the Jews, Hungarians, and Romani – or 
those internal Others not fulfilling the heteronormative expectations – 
particularly homosexual men. Connected to this, I identify the STRICT FATHER 
conceptual metaphor, which constitutes the radical right populist chair as the 
providential leader to enforce a new moral order and bring about national 
redemption. I conclude that the heteronormative matrix appears to be safely 
secured in place and proves to be flexible enough to accommodate ever more 
categories of exclusion. 
Chapter six, in turn, details the articulations of radical right populist ideology 
in the Swedish context. Focusing on the (re)interpretations of the folkhem (in 
translation, the home/house of [Swedish] people) – taken as demonstrating the 
NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor in Sweden – I show the centrality of 
welfare chauvinism within this discourse. The identification of the folkhem’s true 
inhabitants with the disenchanted citizenry among the Swedish ethnic majority 
allows for the crystallisation of a critique of mainstream politics, espousing a 
strictly conservative heteronormative stance that thinly disguises a xenophobic 
attitude. Such a stance is articulated by defining the national family’s Others – 
either as the not–being Swedish migrant Other, or the less–than–perfect Swedish 
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQI) community. 
Additionally, it incorporates an ideal of patriarchal family structuring – in which 
women active in politics are criticised for being less–than–men (misgoverned by 
feelings, and incapable of rational thinking), and failing in their expected position 
of devoted mothers of Swedish offspring. Under these circumstances, I argue, the 
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claims that both the SD as well as its leader have reached ‘maturity’, and their 
delimitation from the antiquated political establishment is evidence of the 
crystallisation of a metaphorical construct centred on an ideal of masculinity 
underpinned by a combative political participation, youthfulness, and 
preoccupation with an idealised past. Such a construct however departs 
significantly from that of the STRICT FATHER employed by other European radical 
right populist parties and understood to surmount the national family construct. 
These particularities notwithstanding, I conclude, the metaphorical cluster at 
work in Swedish radical right populism emphasises heteronormative hegemonic 
structuring, which is underpinned by deeply entrenched xenophobia, coupled with 
fear for miscegenation and homophobia. 
Chapter seven assembles together the study’s principal arguments, presents 
the main conclusions and identifies some key issues that are to be considered for 
further research. The main findings of the detailed analyses in the two national 
settings are thus corroborated to synthesise a model for the critical evaluation of 
the metaphorical cluster centred on the conception of national family. In this 
context, I show that centrally located within this cluster lie specific masculinity 
performatives (in their diverse manifestation, either as a strict father figure, or a 
youthful challenger) that are unveiled to be in an intrinsic dynamic relation with 
certain femininity performatives (that negatively depict emancipation and 
equality as facets of alienation). The gender dyad thus in place is uncovered to be 
ideologically sanctioned as desirable ideals within radical right populist 
discourses. This notwithstanding, I underline the specificities that characterise the 
manifestation of the metaphorical cluster when comparing the ideological 
manifestations through discourse of selected radical right populist parties. On this 
matter I discuss the place of the political man in the national family, and indicate 
how this manifests in the form of a fatherly figure, or a youthful challenger, both 
underpinned by staunchly patriarchal understandings of the national construct. I 
eventually return to the ideological productivity of gendered conceptual 
metaphors and indicate several new avenues of research that may bring forth 
valuable insights on how the conception of structuring the national construct 
along family lines may be manifest in some other national settings within radical 
right populist discourses. 
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2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK (I): 
CHALLENGING THE LACK OF GENDER IN THEORIES OF 
RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 
The people terminology is oftentimes used to denote a generic reunion of an 
indefinite number of human beings. Grammatically, the people appears as a 
multifaceted element, either as a collective noun for a plurality of individuals with 
specific unifying traits, as for instance in the phrase ‘these people are righteous’, 
or as the suppletive plural of the noun ‘person’. Rhetorically, the people can also 
be employed as a singular form for an indefinite ethnic group or nation in such 
phrases as ‘our people’ or ‘the Romanian people’. When used for political 
purposes, the people proves yet again its versatility. It can convey a meaning of 
solidarity – a nation for instance – when used in such phrases as ‘the Romanian 
people’ above. Alternatively, it can embody an allegedly legitimate segment of the 
population or a class, as for instance in the phrase ‘the common people are 
righteous’, which usually represents a presumably genuine and ‘normal’ people in 
a stark opposition to another fluid political entity – that is the ‘elite’. In this 
regard, Margaret Canovan has perhaps managed to capture most successfully the 
concept’s ambiguity. This versatility, in turn, represents a serious analytical 
challenge for those scholars who decide to analyse its shifting conceptual contents: 
The great charm of ‘the people’ for a politician – and the fundamental 
source of exasperation for a political scientist – is that the term manages to 
be both empty of precise meaning and full of rhetorical resonance. When 
used to mean ‘everyone’, it is conveniently vague and sounds definite, 
conveying a sense of solidity and harmony. When used to mean a particular 
class or section of the population, it gains in definition but somehow 
manages to avoid losing its overtones of comprehensiveness and legitimacy. 
(Canovan, 1981: 285–286) (Italics in original) 
With this in mind, the theorising of radical right populist manifestations in 
Europe unveils a high degree of diversity with numerous conceptual labels, which 
are rather similar in meaning, describing the same political ideology – that of 
radical right populism – and referring to the same political forces; the populist 
parties of the radical right. For the purpose of present study, radical right 
populism denotes the umbrella–concept that incorporates scholarship researching 
radical right parties (cf. Art, 2011; Kitschelt, 2007; Loch, 2001; Minkenberg & 
Perrineau, 2007; Norris, 2005; Startin, 2010; Učeň, 2007), extreme–right parties 
(cf. Caiani & della Porta, 2011; Eatwell, 2000; Hainsworth & Mitchell, 2000; 
Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2000; Newell, 2000; Rydgren, 2005), the new populist 
right parties (cf. Laycock, 2005; Mudde, 2004), far right parties (cf. Morjé 
Howard, 2010; Taggart, 2004), anti–immigration populist parties (cf. Morjé 
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Howard, 2000; Van Spanje & Van der Brug, 2007), right–wing populist parties 
(cf. Betz & Meret, 2009; Cuperus, 2003; Helms, 1997; Kriesi et al, 2008; Laclau, 
2005), right–wing radical parties (cf. Luther, 2000; Williams, 2006), neo–
nationalist parties (Banks & Gingrich, 2006), national–populist parties (cf. 
Hermet, 1997; Perrineau, 1997; Taguieff, 1997; Winock, 1997), radical right 
populist parties (cf. Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Hellström & Nilsson, 2010; Rydgren, 
2003; 2006) and conversely the populist radical right parties (cf. Egedy, 2009; 
Mudde, 2007; Zaslove, 2009), or simply the populist parties (cf. Abts & 
Rummens, 2007; Canovan, 1999; Fella & Ruzza, 2009; Ghodsee, 2008; Jasiewicz, 
2008; Ruzza & Fella, 2011). Rather unsurprisingly, researchers have been 
employing these terms interchangeably across time in a field that has expanded 
exponentially in the past two decades. Nonetheless, they seem to generally agree 
on the ‘family resemblance’ of these parties, which is underpinned by a shared 
‘thin–centred ideology’ – a point that is addressed in the subsequent section. It is 
worth noting, in this context, that I review scholarship dealing with those parties 
espousing a radical right populist ideology that appear to accept – at least 
nominally – the basic rules of parliamentary democracy, thereby not focusing on 
scholarship analysing neo–fascist, or other such extreme fringe movements. This 
has been a cardinal criterion for selecting the scholarship for review. 
On closer inspection, however, the wealth of scholarship addressing radical 
right populism commonly appears to disregard the gender implications of its 
theorising. It only acknowledges the disproportionate presence of men amongst 
radical right populist parties’ rank and file and their supporters, and the 
overwhelming majority of male leaders at the helm of these parties (cf. Hellström 
& Nilsson, 2010; Ignazi, 2003; Laycock, 2005; Luther, 2000; Mudde, 2007; 
Rydgren, 2006; Widfeldt, 2000; Winkler & Schumann, 1998). An illustrative 
example of such an attitude comes from the influential work of Cas Mudde (2007). 
Although recognising that radical right populist parties have oftentimes been 
considered ‘men’s parties’ (Männerparteien), Mudde has nonetheless challenged 
the few feminist analytical inroads in the field. Having gender equality as the 
norm of understanding party politics was dismissed as a ‘feminist bias’; he has 
concomitantly disputed the assumption that all women hold non–patriarchal, 
feminist views on the gender roles (Mudde, 2007: 91). Mudde then concurred with 
other researchers that most women are present in the radical right parties because 
of their male partners or continue the politics initiated by their fathers (cf. 
Klandermans & Mayer, 2005), and merely acknowledged that women oftentimes 
play subordinate roles in these parties, as the ‘party lists are filled up with the 
names of partners and siblings of male candidates’ (Mudde, 2007: 107). Mudde 
concluded his criticism of feminist analyses in the field suggesting that the 
different socialisation of men and women is the main factor that leads ‘to a lower 
level of political efficacy among women; this in turn explains why more women 
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than men vote conservatively, i.e. for established centre parties, and shy away 
from parties that are new and perceived as extreme’ (Mudde, 2007: 118). 
Nevertheless, such a line of reasoning seems to be buttressed by factual error, 
in the sense that it interprets gender in a reductionist manner that accounts for 
where women and men – seen in a rather monolithic fashion, as wholly distinctive 
and unitary gender identities – are present in these parties. In my opinion, this 
overlooks the gendered aspect of power relations and how these are reflected in 
the identity constructions at stake – the interplay between masculinities and 
femininities – and how these in turn are performed – in the Butlerian sense, as in 
being constantly reiterated, contested and renegotiated, and  then enforced (cf. 
Butler, 1990; 1993; 1995; 2004). More clearly, I maintain that the major pitfall of 
gender–blind scholarship on populism is that it constantly disregards the 
importance of gender and interrelated axes of social structuring in the ideological 
constructions of identity. I maintain further that such a gender–blind theorising 
posits the problem of constructing a whole field of knowledge as apathetic to 
gender, and thereby reifying a system of power relations that ignore the 
importance of analysing gendered hierarchies in social relations. More clearly, 
what I make reference to here is the power–knowledge nexus, which was 
investigated by Foucault in his seminal Discipline and Punish (1995). Foucault 
warned that the constitution of a field of knowledge is an effect of power relations 
and encouraged researchers to engage more critically in their analyses: 
We should admit rather that power produces knowledge […]; that power 
and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. […] In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that 
produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power–
knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is 
made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. 
(Foucault, 1995: 27–28) 
More clearly on the matter at stake in this chapter, a gender–blind theorisation 
of radical right populism runs the risk of legitimising the preference for what 
feminist scholars uncovered to be a masculinist, hard, and ‘real’ writing of political 
theory. Such a masculinist theorisation of the field merely reproduces existing 
power relations since the ‘conceptual ordering of masculine over feminine is 
inextricable from political ordering imposed in state making and reproduced 
through masculinist discourse (political theory, religious dogma) that legitimises 
the state’s hierarchical relations’ (Peterson, 1999: 40). This has an immediate and 
direct effect on ourselves as social beings, because, as Monique Wittig had warned, 
‘there is nothing abstract about the power that sciences and theories have, to act 
materially and actually upon our bodies and minds, even if the discourse that 
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produces it is abstract. [...] All of the oppressed know this power and have had to 
deal with it’ (Wittig, 1980: 160). Even more so, she continued, the scientific 
discourse dismisses the contesting voices as not being scientific, or not reaching 
the required level of theoretical abstraction, in other words naïvely confusing 
discourse and reality, or simply misunderstanding science altogether (Wittig, 
1980: 160). Corroborating the aforesaid criticism regarding the impact of 
‘masculinist’ science on the articulation of knowledge and refusal to allow 
contending voices to participate in crafting the discourse of knowledge with the 
Foucauldian argument on the intricate relationship between power and 
knowledge, I argue that this kind of theoretical silence about gender is 
troublesome. The present research project comes as a response to appeals for 
innovative ways to explore radical right populism (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010), 
and particularly to examine the hierarchical gender binary – in general – and the 
masculinities – in particular – that underpin such political discourses (cf. Geden, 
2005). 
The present chapter has a twofold purpose. First, it presents the main tenets of 
radical right populist ideology theorising, detailing on the radical right populist 
‘party family’ (cf. Ignazi, 2003; Kriesi et al, 2008; Mudde, 2000; 2007; Rydgren, 
2005). Five features appear to characterise European radical right populism: 
nationalism and nativism, racism, xenophobia, new forms of democratic 
governance, and appeals for a strong state (Hermet, 1997: 45–46; Ignazi, 2003: 
27; Mudde, 2000: 11; Taggart, 2004: 271–274). Second, the chapter emphasises 
the contact points between the theories of populism and those of nationalism, and 
consequently demonstrates that the constitutive elements of populist ideology – 
the idea of popular sovereignty embodied into the figure of the leader, and the 
Manichean opposition between a homogenous people and a purportedly 
corrupted and detached elite – are rarely investigated from a gender–informed 
vantage point. It thus prepares the ground for the subsequent chapter, which 
introduces a gender–sensitive perspective into the theory of populism making use 
of the wealth of previous feminist scholarship theorising nationalism (cf. Enloe, 
1989; Nagel, 1998; 2000; Yuval–Davis, 1997; Walby, 2000; Waetjen, 2001), and 
underlines the construction of gendered hierarchies underpinned by centrally 
located ideals of masculinity (cf. Anand, 2007; Bracewell, 2000; Huysseune, 
2000; Ferber, 2000; Norocel, 2010c). 
2.1 THEORISING RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM: THE SILENCE 
ABOUT GENDER  
Scholars of radical right populism generally concur on the difficulty of defining the 
subject of their research. There seems nonetheless to be a certain degree of 
agreement on problematising it as a ‘thin–centred ideology’ (cf. Abts & Rummens, 
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2007; Canovan, 1999; Ignazi, 2003; Jungar, 2010; Mudde, 2000; 2007; Ruzza & 
Fella, 2011; Stanley, 2008) that portrays society to ‘be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt 
elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people.’ (Mudde, 2004: 543) (Italics in original) By 
and large, such theorising mentions three elements as constitutive of this thin 
ideology. First, the theoretical construct appears to rest on the dichotomous 
relationship between the people and elites (cf. Abts & Rummens, 2007; Barr, 
2009; Canovan, 1999; Jungar, 2010; Laclau, 2005; Panizza, 2005). While there is 
a certain level of consensus among researchers that the establishment is criticised 
for its privileges, lack of accountability and alienation from the grievances of the 
commoners, some have suggested a Manichean distinction between the people 
and elites (Hermet, 1997; Mudde, 2004). More concretely, such a view parts the 
society dualistically into two clearly defined and hermetically contained entities: 
the people and their allies, on the one hand, and their enemies on the other. Some 
other researchers have argued, however, that populism, in general terms, should 
be seen as a means for a redemptive type of politics (Canovan, 1999). Second, 
(radical right) populism has been theorised as the ideology claiming to restore 
popular sovereignty and thus to override ossified structures (Canovan, 1999, 
Kriesi et al, 2008), or to put it simply, to open up the field to popular initiatives 
and referenda (Abts & Rummens, 2007). Third, the construction of the people 
renders a genuine, homogeneous (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008), and democratic 
sovereign (Canovan, 1999; Jungar, 2010), thereby an ideal totality (Laclau, 2005; 
Panizza, 2005). Nonetheless, the inherent tension between a genuine inclination 
for the betterment of the common people – on the one hand – and populist 
demagogy – on the other – has been noted by scholars who warned that: 
‘Populism’, in the common parlance of the day, embodies the tense 
coexistence between the ideas of demophily and demagogy. In other words 
‘populism’, in its constitutive ambiguity, can be regarded as an ideological 
corruption of democracy, if the latter, which is founded upon transmittable 
principles, implies [...] the desire to instruct and educate the people, rather 
than to seduce it and make it act in the desired fashion. 
(Taguieff, 1997: 11) 
The type of populism that caught most scholarly attention in Europe, 
particularly since the beginning of the 1990s, is that arguably positioned to the 
right. It stems from the so–called ‘new right’ movement – or simply the New Right 
(la Nouvelle Droite, ND) – centred on the French philosopher Alain de Benoist in 
the 1970s. It is noteworthy that there is an inherent genealogical connection 
between these parties and the fascist and national–socialist parties of the interwar 
period, which is centred on, among others, their strong nationalism, centralist 
ideals of social organisation, and the idea of a ‘race–community’ (which later on 
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morphed into that of a unitary people) preserved and promoted through resisting 
foreign influences (Eley, 1990: 52; Ignazi, 2003: 32–33; Steiner, 1995: 13). Mudde 
has nonetheless argued that the fundamental difference between the extreme right 
– fascism, national–socialism, and their more recent ‘neo–’ developments – and 
the radical right populism founded on the ND principles resides in the latter’s at 
least nominal acceptance of democracy (Mudde, 2007: 31). Indeed, de Benoist has 
been instrumental in presenting to a wider audience the ideas of the Research and 
Study Group for European Civilization (le Groupement de Recherches et d'Etudes 
pour la Civilisation Européenne, GRECE) that he lead. The organisation was 
founded in 1968 as a ‘community of work and thought’ and not as a political 
movement, and its acronym (GRECE, means Greece in French) indicates the 
groups’ resolute rejection of Christianity and monotheism in general, and its 
admiration of the democratic model of the Greek city–states of antiquity. 
GRECE’s declared aim has been to engage into a meta–politics or, put simply, in a 
critique of the analytical, synthetic, and normative language of post–war politics. 
Alain de Benoist is generally regarded as GRECE’s grey eminence. His declared 
intention has been to create an intellectual nexus for the French right, and to 
crystallise a ‘new culture of the right’ capable of addressing the ‘pressing problems 
of modernity’, which result from what he considered the melange of Judeo–
Christian traditions and Marxist ideology that reins though terror among the 
French intellectuals and academics (Sévillia, 2000; Valla, 1977: 61–69). Detailing 
his opposition to the universalistic ‘equalitarian myth’ based on the Judeo–
Christian values, he coined the term ‘ethno–pluralism’, which asserts a ‘right to 
difference’ understood in terms of ethnic and racial separatism (de Benoist, 
2006). Illustratively, while criticising modern democracies, de Benoist praised 
Athenian democracy for being communitarian – narrowly defined to include 
natives, the ‘true’ people reunited by a desire to preserve and exercise their 
freedom: 
The democracy of antiquity was communitarian and ‘holist’; modern 
democracy is primarily individualist. Ancient democracy defined citizenship 
by a man’s origins, and provided him with the opportunity to participate in 
the life of the city. Modern democracy organises atomized individuals into 
citizens viewed through the prism of abstract egalitarianism. Ancient 
democracy was based on the idea of organic community; modern 
democracy, heir to Christianity and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
on the individual. In both cases the meaning of the words ‘city,’ ‘people,’ 
‘nation,’ and ‘liberty,’ are totally changed. 
(de Benoist, 2003: 55) 
In this context, it has been argued, the stigmatised discourse of ‘racial 
difference’ of neo–Nazism was exchanged by de Benoist and subsequently by the 
ND for the more palatable one appealing for the preservation of the ‘cultural 
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heritage’ of European nations, thereby identifying an inherent ‘cultural difference’ 
between natives – the people as a homogenous national body – and newcomers; 
the representatives of a menacing globalising modernity (cf. Hermet, 1997; Ignazi, 
2003; Kriesi et al, 2008; Mudde, 2000). These ideas would later be employed by 
the French radical right populist Jean–Marie Le Pen, and his the National Front 
(le Front National, FN), and have a major impact on the discourses of radical 
right populist parties across Europe (cf. Betz & Meret, 2009; Bornschier, 2008; 
Fennema, 2005; Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2000). 
The main tenets of the ND, on closer examination, appear to be firstly 
criticising liberalism – particularly its late modern neoliberal manifestations – for 
its alleged commodification of every human relationship. Secondly, denouncing 
Westernisation and American cultural hegemony, which it held responsible for the 
alleged annihilation of cultural specificities, and thirdly, distancing itself from the 
representative liberal democratic model in a quest for new means of political 
participation (Ignazi, 2003: 23–25). The ND has also attempted to overcome the 
traditional left–right divide and has discarded egalitarianism as a secondary 
product of the coalescence of mass–society and neoliberal individualism in late 
modernity (Ignazi, 2003: 23). In this light, some researchers have posited that 
radical right populism has emerged as a reaction to the deep socio–economic and 
socio–cultural transformations in post–industrial Europe (cf. Art, 2011; Betz, 
1998; Betz & Meret, 2009; Cuperus, 2003; Kitschelt, 2007; Kriesi et al, 2008). 
Even more so, some have argued that radical right populism is, to a certain extent, 
also inspired by neo–conservatism, in terms of moral traditionalism, recasting of 
national pride, communitarianism as counterweight to the state, and uneasiness 
with multiculturalism (Ignazi, 2003: 25–27). On this matter, radical right 
populism appears to engender a counter–reaction to an elite political culture 
‘imbued with liberal values of individualism, internationalism, multiculturalism, 
permissiveness and belief in progress’ (Canovan, 1999: 4), and a call to address 
the urgencies of a vaguely defined people, that upon necessity can refer to ‘the 
dispossessed, the hard–working middle classes, the burdened taxpayers, the 
“common man”, the moral majority, and so on’ (Arditi, 2003: 22). In an 
increasingly complex and globalised world, have some researchers argued, ‘such 
reified and populist personifications of responsibility for social malaise have 
resurfaced along with conspiracy theories over the last decade.’ (Rensmann, 2011: 
128) As such, the French FN has not only successfully translated the doctrinal 
agenda of the ND into politics, but has arguably served as a poignant example to 
other similar political manifestations, in a process of cross–national learning (Betz 
& Meret, 2009: 314). This has led scholars to talk about a ‘party family’ that unites 
the various radical right populist parties across Europe (cf. Fennema, 2005; 
Ignazi, 2003; Lachat & Kriesi, 2008; Mudde, 2000; 2007; Rydgren, 2005). 
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2.1.1 THE RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTY FAMILY 
One crucial aspect of the concept of radical right populism is that it makes 
reference to parties – subsequently referred to here as radical right populist 
parties – that generally and at least declaratively subscribe to the democratic 
rules of governance and engage in competition with other political parties in order 
to achieve parliamentary representation and partake in government building 
procedures (Ignazi, 2003: 26; Mudde, 2000: 1). The rather vague appellative 
‘democratic’ above embodies an identity marker of Western societies (Kurunmäki 
& Strang, 2010: 9), thus signalling an affiliation to an envisioned common 
European heritage and future – ranging from the Athenian democracy to the 
European Union’s (EU) much debated democratic deficit – at a time of intensified 
globalisation processes and pressing multicultural dilemmas. At the same time, 
what appears to be specific to the radical right populist agenda is the voicing of a 
general dissatisfaction with the present state of democracy and democratic 
processes. Their radicalism, under these circumstances, resides in their 
vehemence to restore a supposed popular sovereignty, which appears to bypass 
the existing system of checks and balances as a model of parliamentary 
democratic governance and ease the direct communication between the voters – 
understood as the sovereign people – and their elected representatives. Bypassing 
the separation of powers has oftentimes been envisioned as a return to the 
Athenian model of direct, plebiscite democracy, in which the people – here 
conterminous with the citizenry – would vote on all matters of concern, ranging 
from the implementation of new taxes to granting new rights to minority groups. 
Nevertheless, there has been suggested a second interpretation of the matter, one 
which underlines the importance of the radical right populist leader, to whom the 
people are to entrust their sovereignty and who in turn would govern in the name 
of all people. The inherent ambiguity in the radical right populist model of 
democratic rule has been aptly summarised by Ignazi: 
[Some] of these demands and needs converge in the defence of the natural 
community, at national or sub–national levels, from alien and polluting 
presences – hence racism and xenophobia – and respond to the identity 
crisis produced by atomisation at the societal level, by globalisation at the 
economic level, and by supra–nationalism at the political level […] On the 
other hand, the demand for more law and order, the search for a 
‘charismatic’ leader, the need for harmony and security, and the uneasiness 
over representative mechanisms and procedures, express a desire for an 
authoritative guide in a society where self–achievement and individualism 
have disrupted the protective network of traditional social bonds. Finally, 
the return of rigid moral standards is a definite counterpart of post–
materialist libertarianism. 
(Ignazi, 2003: 34) 
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These parties thus differ from the extreme fringe groupings that aspire to 
overthrow the democratic system of doing politics altogether. The radical right 
populist critique emphasises nevertheless the uneasy transition to post–modern 
societies, the perceived problematic nature of multiculturalism, and the challenges 
that native populations experience in the process of accommodating increasingly 
diverse societies. Transition is generally equated to insecurity, which in turn is 
exploited politically by the radical right populist parties. Their vociferous appeals 
to the restoration of revered old standards and values, of order and authority, 
imply ‘punishing’ the political establishment for its alleged abuses of power, 
governmental mismanagement, enforcement of political correctness, liberal 
permissiveness and tolerance of certain non–majority groups that populists 
portray as non–normative and non–native parasitic elements on the national 
body. Radical right populists thus hold responsible these groups for increased 
crime rates and insecurity, and the alleged social moral decline (Betz & Meret, 
2009: 333; Blokker, 2005: 371; Bornschier, 2008: 89; Cuperus, 2003: 91, 
Fennema, 2005: 19–21). To sum up, radical right populist parties appear to 
embody an answer to a series of demands and needs that have emerged in the last 
decade of the twentieth century across the European continent, which allegedly 
have not been met by the traditional parties. 
In this context, the parties espousing a radical right populist ideology promote 
a particular type of equalitarianism, which appeals to the common people 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3–7). Such an understanding of equalitarianism 
is founded, according to Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, on ‘a mythology of “the 
people” as an undifferentiated unity’ (Ruzza & Fella, 2011: 171). This process 
nevertheless occurs by stigmatising those not conforming to the values of the 
majority culture; thus, this ‘inverted egalitarianism intersects with experiences of 
status and economic insecurity to fuel hostility towards non–majority group 
immigration, [and] towards programs that support multiculturalism’ (Laycock, 
2005: 134). This comes as a reaction to ‘nativist nationalist’ appeals which hold 
that ‘states should be inhabited by members of the native group (“the nation”) 
and that non–native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogeneous nation–state’ (Mudde, 2007: 19) (Italics in 
original). In a similar vein, Herbert Kitschelt has noted that the parties embracing 
the radical right populist ideology ‘make xenophobic mobilisation against 
immigrants and insistence on a dominant national cultural paradigm obligatory 
for all residents the central planks of their policies’ (Kitschelt, 2007: 1178). Indeed, 
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten has aptly pointed out that anti–immigration mobilisation is 
the main common denominator for such parties, while the anti–establishment 
rhetoric and critique of the globalising economy contribute to enforcing the 
overall populist mobilisation in some countries (Ivarsflaten, 2008: 17; see also, 
Lachat & Kriesi, 2008). This line of reasoning has been developed further by 
Michelle Williams, who maintains that the vociferous anti–immigration appeals 
allow the radical right populist parties ‘to voice more than protest and opposition’ 
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and ‘find favour among people who feel threatened by changing conditions in their 
societies’ (Williams, 2006: 18). 
The anti–immigration stance embraced by radical right populist parties 
appears to rest on the imperative to preserve the national culture, understood as a 
reference point. On this matter, Hans–Georg Betz and Susi Meret have shown in 
their research that such ‘nativist’ claims entail the unconditional assimilation of 
the minority group into the majority that presupposes ‘not only willingness, but 
also the ability, on the part of the immigrant [or the non–majority individual] to 
absorb the host culture. Assimilability, in turn, presupposes cultural 
commensurability with respect to the foundational values that define […] Europe’s 
cultural heritage.’ (Betz & Meret, 2009: 318) The reference to assimilatory 
demands and anti–immigration mobilisation has nonetheless proven to be rather 
problematic in the Central and Eastern European context. Indeed, the region 
offers a much more complex picture. Anti–immigration and particularly anti–
Muslim attitudes are sharply on the rise, especially in the aftermath of the 
September 11 2001 attacks in the United States. These seem to be a more recent 
addition to older and apparently deeply entrenched prejudices against ethnic 
minorities (such as those directed against Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia; 
Turks in Bulgaria, and so on) – among which the Romani are the most disliked 
across the region. Additionally, anti–Semitism and Holocaust denial are arguably 
a common political currency in the region, to a larger extent than elsewhere in 
Europe (Mudde, 2005: 280; Rensmann, 2011: 141–143). This has led some 
scholars to maintain that the on–going processes in the region are more complex 
and far–reaching than the current post–industrial modernisation experienced in 
Western Europe, since Central and Eastern Europe underwent a complete regime 
change in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian regimes and 
dismantlement of planned economies. Michael Minkenberg and Pascal Perrineau 
have compellingly argued that radical right populist parties in the region have 
taken advantage of these profound changes and ensured their success by 
combining communist and nationalist ideas amid high levels of social 
disorientation and ambivalence resulting from the fundamental changes in the 
social and political system (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 32). Under these 
circumstances, goes the argument, radical right populist political entrepreneurs 
have resorted to oversimplified solutions and appeals to the people – seen as a 
homogeneous national community instead of any references to a particular class 
or to a unifying modernisation project. As a result, the Central and Eastern 
European radical right populism combines post–industrial aspects – the 
decreasing importance of mass party organisation, the wide use of media outlets – 
with an ideological mix that juxtaposes nationalism with the legacy of an 
authoritarian planned economy. 
The link between populism and nationalism is rather easily distinguishable in 
Central and Eastern Europe. On this matter, Paul Blokker among others, has 
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argued that radical right populist parties in this region are employing a kind of 
emancipatory discourse, which claims to defend and liberate the ‘true’ people of 
the national body from the domestic subjugation of local elites and the foreign 
domination of Western institutions – be they the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO/OTAN), the Council of Europe, and others (cf. Blokker, 
2005; Egedy, 2009; Ghodsee, 2008; Jasiewicz, 2008). Nonetheless, Blokker 
observed that Central and Eastern European radical right populism is quite 
similar to that manifest elsewhere in Europe in its at least declarative respect for 
democratic principles and underlined that in their discourses: ‘an argument is 
often made for increased popular sovereignty through the granting of absolute 
priority to the nation, in other words, to the people as an undivided and organic 
unity, and the expression of its will’ (Blokker, 2005: 377). Other scholars have 
noted as well this conceptual proximity between the idea of popular sovereignty 
and nationalism, which appears to be a fertile ground for the development of 
radical right populism, and further underlined the validity of such findings across 
Europe (cf. Laycock, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Učeň, 2007; Zaslove, 2009). As such, 
the recent radical right populist manifestations in Europe seem to be often fused 
with older nationalist feelings, which have led some researchers to even talk about 
‘national–populism’ (cf. Hermet, 1997; Kriesi et al, 2008) conversely ‘populist 
nationalism’ (Blokker, 2005) and thereby to dissolve the conceptual clarity of the 
terms involved in theorising the field. This has lead such researchers as Mudde to 
maintain that the people of populism is to the same extent an imagined construct 
as it is the nation to nationalism (cf. Anderson, 1991): 
Today, populism is again mainly associated with the (radical) right. […] 
Increasingly, non–radical right parties are also included in the category of 
‘right–wing populism’ […]. This is not entirely illogical, because of the 
right’s focus on nation and the radical right’s nationalism. The step from 
‘the nation’ to ‘the people’ is easily taken, and the distinction between the 
two is often far from clear. 
(Mudde, 2004: 549) 
Too strong an emphasis on the nation as a potent synonym for the people may 
nonetheless obscure the insistence on the alleged ‘purity’ of the collectivity that 
the radical right populist parties endeavour to protect. According to Sabrina 
Ramet, for example, nationalism is one possible means of expressing the radical 
right populist concern with ‘purity’ (whether defined along national, ‘racial’, or 
religious lines), but bigotry as well as moralising self–righteousness may also be 
viable avenues for conveying such a preoccupation. The need to maintain the 
aforesaid ‘purity’ of the people is often expressed in ‘a compulsive need to 
safeguard group boundaries (as by regulating sexual mores, prescribing religiously 
derived values and behaviours, and expelling or exterminating those viewed as 
‘outsiders’)’ (Ramet, 1999: 19). Nonetheless,  she argues further, what 
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distinguishes the moderate right from the radical right populists is the latter’s 
willingness to impose these values on others, and appeals to ‘patriotism’, ‘family 
values’, or the ‘Christian way of life’, which may be employed to justify murder, 
arson, and even the corruption of the whole democratic process (Ramet, 1999: 19). 
To sum up, there is a great deal of variation in regard to which features are the 
most important for the classification of radical right populist parties. This is 
reflected in the significant diversity among the constitutive parties of the radical 
right populist ‘party family’. Attempting to be more concrete, the radical right 
populist ‘party family’ accommodates a great variety of political actors. These 
include in Northern Europe: the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) in 
Denmark, the PS/SF in Finland and the SD in Sweden. In Central and Eastern 
Europe it includes the National Union Attack (Национален съюз Атака, Ataka) 
in Bulgaria, Jobbik – the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik) in Hungary, and the PRM in Romania. In 
Western Europe it would include the FN in France, the Party for Freedom (Partij 
voor de Vrijheid, PVV) in the Netherlands, and the Swiss People’s Party 
(Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP/Union démocratique du centre, UDC) in 
Switzerland. This is to name just a few of the parties that have generally been 
classified as radical right populist by various researchers in the field. 
There seems nonetheless to be a certain degree of agreement that the radical 
right populist parties make constant references to protecting a specific group, 
regarded as the embodiment of the people, tinged with nativist and anti–
immigration appeals, in short a welfare chauvinist rhetoric. More precisely, the 
welfare system is no longer universalistic in nature and extended to include all 
inhabitants in the respective country; rather, it is reserved only to a selected few, 
to those who can ‘rightfully’ claim (a bloodline) membership in the people 
collectivity. This is, I argue, the major difference between the populist 
manifestations in Europe in general, and those from Latin America, which 
researchers often consider to be expressions of a left–leaning populism; most 
notably late Hugo Chávez’s presidency in Venezuela, or of Evo Morales in Bolivia 
(cf. Ellner & Hellinger, 2003; Hawkins, 2010; March, 2007). Furthermore, the 
radical right populist parties in Europe claim to represent the common people’s 
interests against the misgovernment of the self–absorbed elites. They demand a 
restoration of popular sovereignty, stricter laws and tougher punishment, and 
concurrently advocate for a return to traditional values, thus calling for 
conservative policies. With these in mind, in the following the conceptual unity of 
the people is first scrutinised; the dichotomous position of the people and elites is 
subsequently detailed, and then the concept of popular sovereignty is coupled to 
that of charismatic leadership. 
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2.1.2 THE CONSTRUCTED UNITY OF THE PEOPLE 
At the core of radical right populist ideology appears to be the construction of a 
homogenous people, portrayed in a rather monolithic manner. On this matter, 
several researchers have observed that the people seem to be crafted as an 
indivisible, self–conscious, and easily identifiable majority (cf. Abts & Rummens, 
2007; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jungar, 2010; Ramet, 1999; Ruzza & Fella, 
2011). Nevertheless, as Franco Panizza has observed, the fullness of the people is 
in fact a continuous process of reiteration, since the indivisibility of the people is 
achieved through the exclusion of an ‘Other’ that can never be fully vanquished 
(Panizza, 2005: 16). In addition, the idea of sovereign independence, noted by 
some scholars (cf. Canovan, 2002; Jungar, 2010; Laycock, 2005), invests the 
people with a certain territoriality, enclosed within the boundaries of a particular 
polity, such as the one illustrated by the appellation das Volk (Mény & Surel, 
2002: 6). Indeed, some researchers have underlined the intimate connection 
between the constructed people and the territory they inhabit or they lay claim 
over as their home(land): 
[P]opulists tend to identify themselves with a ‘heartland’ that represents an 
idealised conception of the community they serve. It is from this territory of 
the imagination, that populists construct the ‘people’ as the object of their 
politics. [...] The commitment to the ‘people’ is in fact a derivative 
consequence of the implicit or explicit commitment to a ‘heartland’. 
(Taggart, 2004: 274) 
The radical right populist politicians generally maintain the people’s exclusive 
ownership over the discussed territory, and the link between people and land is 
depicted as ancestral and substantial. On this issue, Patricia Chiantera–Stutte and 
Andrea Petö, while analysing right wing populism in Central Europe, have further 
argued that the bond between the Volk and its territory is often envisioned as 
founded on old traditions and histories. More clearly, the people’s ‘territory, its 
culture, and its collective identity constitute a whole, in which every element is 
related and determined by every other’ (Chiantera–Stutte & Petö, 2003: 3). Such a 
finding falls in line with research on the matter by Blokker who has shown the 
ambivalent dimension to the people (conterminous here to the ethnic community, 
as the German cognate indicates), which works as an exclusionary logic in the 
service of a homogenising (national) project, on the one hand, and as an 
integrative principle in the name of a popular and collectivistic self–rule on the 
other. The former relies on a rejection of pluralism, diversity, and even individual 
autonomy through its emphasis on the organic unity between people, territory, 
and history, while the latter emphasises the people’s common destiny and praises 
popular sovereignty as its core value – thus coming very close to liberal 
understandings of democracy (Blokker, 2005: 383). The unity of the people is as 
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such expressed through an exclusive identity and consequently the people 
category becomes tantamount to the (ethnic) nation (Canovan, 2002: 34; Mudde, 
2004: 546). 
Nonetheless, an overemphasis on the sovereignty of the Volk is equally 
problematic as it may lead to the installation of ‘ethnocracy’ (Betz, 2005: 32–33; 
Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 30; Mostov, 1999: 49) or even a ‘new ethnarchy’ 
(Ramet, 1999: 25). More clearly, it implies a monopolisation of the political scene 
by those considered to be the ‘true’ representatives of the people. Such a definition 
on ethnic national grounds calls for the preservation of the imagined homogeneity 
and cultivates antagonistic relations with those not satisfying the criteria of 
belonging; be they ruling elites and/or immigrants (cf. Abts & Rummens, 2007; 
Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Bornschier, 2008; Caiani & della Porta, 2011; 
Canovan, 1999; Kitschelt, 2007; Ramet, 1999; Ruzza & Fella, 2011). From this 
point of view, Betz has argued that the radical right populist ‘discourse on 
immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism […] represents a fundamental 
challenge to liberal democracy, to a certain extent obscured by the fact that the 
radical populist right has managed to make an assault on liberal democracy’ in the 
name of defending the constitutive values and norms of western liberal democracy 
(Betz, 2005: 36). 
Concerning the exclusionary nature of ethnic–populism, it appears that 
marginality is the permanent condition of those not belonging to the community 
of the people. Pushed to the extreme, noted Ernesto Laclau, forced marginality 
can lead to ethnic cleansing, which is ‘a latent possibility once the discursive 
construction of the community proceeds along purely ethnic lines’ (Laclau, 2005: 
197). Such a stance is founded on, according to some researchers, the attempt to 
deny horizontal divisions within the homogenous body of the people (such as the 
left versus right cleavage), and enforced by the introduction of a new vertical 
dimension, which portrays both elites at the top and non–natives at the bottom as 
inherently foreign and thus threatening to the people’s indivisible body (Mény & 
Surel, 2002: 12). 
2.1.3 A MANICHEAN OPPOSITION: THE PEOPLE AND THE ELITE 
Addressing the issue of what radical right populism opposes requires discussing 
another imagined community, which is constructed as a counterpart of the people 
in radical right populist ideology. Some researchers have posited that the 
frustration of unfulfilled social demands in front of an unresponsive establishment 
determines the amorphous and indistinguishable crowd to identify itself with the 
populus as a whole (Laclau, 2005: 86). The people is thus perceived not as a 
constitutive part of the community, but as a self–standing entity, since the elite 
responsible for aggravating the people’s social and economic situation cannot 
claim to be a legitimate part of the community, or as Margaret Canovan put it: 
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The perennial cry of populists is that power has been stolen from the people 
by politicians and special interests. Calls to ‘give politics back to the people’ 
exploit the ambiguity according to which ‘the people’ is first understood by 
contrast with the power–holders (and therefore as something less than the 
population at large) and then expanded to wield the authority of a sovereign 
people as a whole. 
(Canovan, 2005: 5) 
Under these circumstances, the establishment is denounced not only for its 
presumptive corruption and privileges (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 408), but also for 
its lack of accountability to– and remoteness from– the real interests and values 
of the people that populists claim to represent (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3; 
Barr, 2009: 38; Betz, 2005: 30–31; Jungar, 2010: 212; Mudde, 2004: 558). What 
the radical right populist criticise the elites for is ‘their misbehaviour in relation to 
politics as well as with moral norms and values. Political elites (both from the left 
and the moderate right) are pictured as corrupt and only focused on own personal 
interests and not really caring about the country.’ (Caiani & della Porta, 2011: 193) 
In this regard, René Cuperus has noted that the radical right populism is 
particularly critical to the continuous convergence towards the centre of all major 
political forces – be they social–democrats, christian–democrats, or liberals – in 
their search to maximise their support base. In other words, the radical right 
populist parties ‘rejected this post–war consensus, viewing it as counter to the real 
interests of “the people”, if not a form of self–enrichment for special interests and 
corrupt party elites’ (Cuperus, 2003: 97–98). Indeed, radical right populism 
appears to take issue with what scholars have called ‘the cartel–like power of 
entrenched political elites’ (Jones, 2007: 38), ‘the inherently oligarchic dimension 
of representative democracy’ (Papadopoulos, 2002: 48), or the ‘inward looking 
political establishment divorced from the electorate’ (Cuperus, 2003: 87), and 
emphasises the need to curtail the powers of representative institutions and to 
return to more direct forms of democracy (Laycock, 2005: 129). 
Furthermore, radical right populism is directing its critique against the 
national elites for their alleged cultural internationalism, as Canovan has 
observed. Embracing cultural internationalism is portrayed as a betrayal of the 
traditional habits of the majority – understood as shorthand for the people – and 
thereby as a forceful imposition upon the ‘common people’ of the discourse of 
political correctness. Even more so, the discourse of political correctness compels 
the introduction of a series of progressive policies that mostly benefit the 
disadvantaged – asylum–seekers, immigrants, and ethnic/‘racial’, religious, or 
sexual minorities – at the expense of the ‘ordinary’, ‘hard–working people’. 
Among the enemies that threaten the way of life and economic security of the 
‘ordinary people’ there are also the international capitalists and the bureaucratic 
apparatus in Brussels (cf. Bornschier, 2008: 86–87; Canovan, 2002: 32; Panizza, 
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2005: 17). It is noteworthy that populism makes a normative distinction between 
elites and the people. As such, it is asserted that the people have a deeper quality 
than being simply the opposite of power, and identifies it with the people being 
‘real’; the quality of being real is in itself positively charged (Laclau, 2005: 152). 
One step further is that populism is thought to present a ‘Manichean outlook, in 
which there are only friends and foes. Opponents are not just people with different 
priorities and values, they are evil! Consequently, compromise is impossible, as it 
“corrupts” the purity.’ (Mudde, 2004: 544) (Italics in original) 
2.1.4 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE AND CHARISMATIC 
LEADERSHIP 
Having established the people as a homogeneous entity at odds with the ruling 
elites, radical right populism calls for the restoration of popular sovereignty, and 
demands that politics should express the immediate will of the people (Arditi, 
2005: 76; Canovan, 1999: 4–5). In relation to this, Canovan has additionally noted 
that the question of popular sovereignty triggers the crystallisation of boundaries, 
both between the people whose sovereignty radical right populists claim to restore 
and the elites, and between the rest of the world and the polity over which radical 
right populists attempt to assume power: 
Popular sovereignty implies boundaries of two kinds. As legitimate 
sovereign, ‘the people’ is distinguished from, and counterposed to, the 
power elite, from whom power is to be retrieved. But its sovereign 
independence of external powers also gives its territorial definition, linking 
its borders to the boundaries of the polity, while its essential unity narrows 
down its identity, making it equivalent to the nation. 
(Canovan, 2002: 34) 
Oftentimes the people’s will appears to attain the ultimate level of political 
intelligibility once embodied in the person of radical right populist leader. This is 
founded on the populist proclamation of unmediated relationship between the 
people and the radical right populist leader, which is built on plebiscitary 
processes and mutual trust (Barr, 2009: 40; Betz, 2002: 199). In this context, 
radical right populism plays the emancipatory card, claiming to be in favour of 
improving the people’s status in the political system (Mudde, 2004: 546). 
However, people’s emancipation does not imply a change of their values or their 
‘way of life’; rather, the daily problems are to be dealt with, and solutions of 
‘common sense’ are to be identified by the person to whom they have willingly 
entrusted their future. Even more so, Manuela Caiani and Donatella della Porta 
have argued that radical right populism entails an exclusionary hierarchy and a 
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high degree of elitism on behalf of its leaders that results in envisioning the people 
merely as a passive mass of disciples: 
[T]here is a rather exclusive vision of the people, which refers to a strongly 
hierarchical and elitist conception of the society. Indeed, not only corrupt 
political elites but also other political and ethnic adversaries are excluded 
from this conception of the people, which is, furthermore, relegated to a 
passive role in politics. 
(Caiani & della Porta, 2011: 185) 
Because of the establishment’s incapacity to reconnect with the mundane 
needs of the people, salvation often resides in the person of charismatic leader, 
who can speak and act on behalf of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 408; 
Bornschier, 2008: 88–89; Mudde, 2004: 560). The term ‘charismatic leadership’ 
was first coined by Max Weber at the beginning of the twentieth century in his 
tripartite classification of authority. It was intimately related to a certain style of 
leadership that challenged what Weber considered to be the more established 
forms of political legitimacy – the traditional (patrimonialism and feudalism) and 
the legal–rational (bureaucratic rule and legalism) (Weber, 1991). The concept has 
been later employed by such historians as Emilio Gentile to explain the rise, and 
assess the nature of fascist dictatorship in interwar Italy (Gentile, 1998). Herbert 
Kitschelt has applied it in his analysis of the emerging cleavages in the post–1989 
Central and Eastern Europe, and Hans–Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall have 
argued that charismatic leadership plays an important part in the rise of radical 
right populist parties in Western Europe (cf. Kitschelt, 1995; Betz & Immerfall, 
1998). Such a stance has been further discussed by Paul Taggart, who noted 
somewhat ironically that populism ‘requires the most extraordinary individuals to 
lead the most ordinary of people’ (Taggart, 2000: 1). In other words, ‘followers of 
populist movements are said to surrender easily to the “charms” of a charismatic 
figure who they believe can represent their grievances and immediately give voice 
to their needs’ (Albertazzi, 2006: 136). 
Even more so, this salient preference for a direct leadership, which goes past 
the intricate network of representative institutions, has been noted by scholars to 
open up the possibility for a concentration of personal power that is often hard to 
reconcile with democratic processes (Canovan, 1999: 14). Going one step further, 
Vladimir Tismaneanu has argued that ‘despite its anti–elitist pretence, radical 
populism treats the masses as a mob and endows the leader with quasi–mystical, 
demiurgic attributes’ (Tismaneanu, 2000: 17). The prophetic, warrior–like, or 
demagogic nature of the charismatic leader enacts a relationship between 
followers and leaders inspired by faith (Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007: 31). 
Consequently, the figure of the leader is seen as highly symbolic in radical right 
populism, even though calls for more detailed analyses of the ‘charismatic’ nature 
of the radical right populist leadership have been voiced by several researchers in 
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the field (Art, 2011: 8; Barr, 2009: 41; Eatwell, 2002: 17–21; Norris, 2005: 205). 
Among others, Roger Eatwell has analysed the issue of charisma and the rise of 
European radical right populism (Eatwell, 2002; 2005). It is noteworthy that he 
depicted in his analyses the two genders in a schematic and antagonistic manner. 
Eatwell plainly noted that while charisma ‘has usually been a male form of 
narrative/symbolism, associated with action and heroics, the modern tendency to 
view politics in terms of business (with its “mission statements”) and economics 
offers opportunities for females’ (Eatwell, 2005: 107) (Italics in original). In my 
view, Eatwell applied a reductionist conceptual apparatus that disregarded the 
complexity of the gendered aspect of power relations and how identities are 
construed and conditioned by these relations. Although he acknowledged that 
some radical right parties are led by women, he simply maintained that these 
women leaders have ‘courted the image of ordinary housewives’ and concluded 
that such an image ‘clearly can appeal to men as well as women’ (Eatwell, 2005: 
107). Under these circumstances, I maintain that he uncritically associated men 
with ‘heroics’ and ‘action’ and assigned women the role of ‘housewives’ since these 
‘clearly’ could appeal to both men and women who managed to read the ascribed 
gendered hierarchies in aforesaid descriptions. 
Identification with, and abandonment to the radical right populist leader’s 
volition, are envisioned to ‘produce an effect of virtual immediacy, that is, an 
imaginary identification that suspends the distance between masses and 
authorities’ (Arditi, 2003: 23). Such process, according to Cuperus, takes place in 
the name of ‘plebiscitary democracy’ but in fact enforces the replacement of the 
now established democratic culture of debate between equal peers with the highly 
personalised leadership ‘with a democratic mandate’. This tendency becomes even 
more pronounced in the modern communication age that is marked by the 
media’s dominance of democratic processes and media’s increased demands for a 
politics of ‘personification without consultation’ (Cuperus, 2003: 93–94). A 
similar argument has been developed by Panizza. He noted that the populist 
leaders pursue a politics based on personal allegiances and clearly defined top–
down representations that go past institutional debate and party support. Panizza 
maintained further that ‘in contrast with the political forms of political democracy 
based on strong institutions and checks and balances, populist leaders are a 
disturbing intrusion into the uneasy articulation of liberalism and democracy, and 
raise the spectre of tyranny with popular support.’ (Panizza, 2005: 18) In a similar 
vein, Mudde has approached the issue of leadership and discussed the role of 
authority and authoritarianism. According to him, ‘authoritarianism is […] the 
belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be 
punished severely. […] It does not necessarily mean an antidemocratic attitude, 
but neither does it preclude one’ (Mudde, 2007: 23). Authoritarianism thereby 
makes reference to a punitive interpretation of conventional ethics and appeals to 
a strict law and order enforcement. 
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2.2 THE PROBLEM OF GENDER–BLIND RADICAL RIGHT 
POPULIST THEORISING 
Having presented the major avenues of research and the most recent 
developments in the field, I nonetheless argue that it is highly problematic that the 
theorising of radical right populism practically overlooks the importance of gender 
in the construction of the ideological apparatus that underpins radical right 
populist manifestations. First, the grouping of various political parties across 
Europe into a radical right populist ‘party family’ begs the question what sort of 
family are these parties presumed to constitute? Even more so, is there a certain 
genealogical connection between these parties, and what sort of family relations 
are supposed to develop between these various ‘family members’? Furthermore, it 
is troublesome to discuss about family and family relations in a manner devoid of 
any awareness of gender, without acknowledging that the archetypal family is 
generally regarded by radical right populist parties as the privileged site for 
women’s power and self–realisation through maternity (Bacchetta & Power, 2002: 
8; Petö, 2006; 2010). In addition to that, not being aware of men’s own gendered 
identity and not researching the power hierarchies at work between men and 
women, in fact, projects men in a normative position, which renders white ethnic 
majority middle–class heterosexual masculinity invisible, and places the burden 
of intelligibility on all those falling off the normative spectrum, in other words all 
those individuals that are different from the aforesaid norm in terms of gender, 
ethnicity/‘race’, social class, and sexual orientation. 
Second, going one step further into the theorising of radical right populist 
ideology and approaching the issue of people’s unity, the theoretical cannon has 
generally acknowledged the radical right populist preoccupation with the people’s 
purity as a means to preserve its monolithic homogeneity. Nonetheless, what 
remains rather unquestioned is the exclusionary process at work in the 
construction of such homogenous collectivity. Even more so, it is precisely the 
women’s bodies that become battlefields for the preservation of national purity 
(cf. Charles & Hintjes, 1998; Cusak, 2000; Nagel, 2000; Stevens, 1999). 
Disavowing pluralism and difference does not occur only in terms of class, 
ethnicity/‘race’, religion, but at the intersection of these analytical concepts with 
those of gender and sexuality (Bacchetta & Power, 2002: 4). 
Third, there is a sole instance when the existence of gender is acknowledged in 
the theorising of populism. Referring to the populist supporter’s profile, it is by 
and large agreed that radical right populism attracts more men than women (cf. 
Betz, 1998; Givens, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2006). It has been generally 
maintained that men in low–skilled positions are the most likely victims of 
globalisation processes. They are those who ‘having faced not only declining real 
wages, but also a loss of authority in their families at home vis–à–vis wives who 
are also wage earners’ (Kitschelt, 2007: 1200) support radical right populist 
parties. It was further argued that right wing populists are offering an 
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overwhelming reassurance ‘and a masculine reassurance at that: a firm hand that 
will control things such as rampant immigration, meddling by EU bureaucrats and 
so forth; in brief, a return to order.’ (Banks & Gingrich, 2006: 16). In this light, it 
seems, that the representative of the sovereign people is embodied as 
overwhelmingly male, whose pride needs to be restored and whose insecurities in 
the rapidly changing environment of the new millennium need to be dispelled; 
this image then morphs into that of the strong male leader. This proves highly 
problematic if taking a global perspective. Notwithstanding that men in the global 
‘West’ and ‘North’ may be the apparent losers in the globalisation processes, it is 
women who are most commonly in low–paid positions and reduced to a condition 
of precariousness particularly in the global ‘South’, but in other places around the 
world as well (cf. Enloe, 1989; 2004). 
A further point of contention is represented by the assumed strong male 
leadership in the radical right populist parties. More clearly, Pia Kjærsgaard, a 
woman, has been the uncontested leader of the radical right populist DF in 
Denmark between 1996 and 2011; also a woman, Siv Jensen, was elected in 2006 
to the helm of the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet / 
Framstegspartiet, FrP). Jensen appears to have preserved the FrP’s electoral 
support in the aftermath of 22 July 2011 Oslo bombing and Utøya massacre, 
although the perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, was a former disgruntled party 
member. As of 16 October 2013, the FrP has become the junior partner in the 
governing coalition, with Jensen as Minister of Finance. It is noteworthy that this 
is not an isolated phenomenon contained to the Northern Europe. On the 
contrary, Marine Le Pen was elected in 2011 as the FN chair, and has proven to be 
a serious contestant in the 2012 French presidential race, coming third in the first 
round of elections. In Central and Eastern Europe, it is worth mentioning the role 
played by Krisztina Morvai – although not from a leadership position – in the 
success recorded by the Jobbik in the 2009 European parliamentary elections in 
Hungary. In this context, I maintain that the people of radical right populism may 
be envisioned as a family construction that contours a heteronormative 
worldview, which orders the society according to a paternalist logic that contains 
women to an inferior and dependent position, even when temporarily and 
conditionally allowing them in politics. This criticism to the existing scholarship in 
the theorising of radical right populism is developed in the following chapter with 
the help of the feminist research in the study of nations and nationalism, and 
those works that have addressed radical right populism from a gender perspective. 
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3 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK (II): 
BRINGING GENDER IN THE STUDY OF RADICAL RIGHT 
POPULISM 
Aiming to address the problematic approach to gender in what is currently 
regarded as mainstream research on radical right populism, the present chapter 
combines existing feminist scholarship that analyses the radical right populist 
phenomenon with the feminist contributions in the field of nationalism studies. In 
this light, I suggest a novel avenue for the research of radical right populism, one 
that accounts for the importance of gender and the interrelated axes of social 
structuring – ethnicity/‘race’, social class, sexuality – in the ideological 
constructions of identity. Despite criticism voiced by some of the researchers 
whose works are part of the aforesaid mainstream (cf. Klandermans & Mayer, 
2005; Mudde, 2005) there are several studies authored by feminist scholars that 
have problematised the issue of gender in their analyses of radical right populism 
(cf. Allwood & Wadia, 2000; Bacchetta & Power, 2002; Charles & Hintjes, 1998; 
Chiantera–Stutte & Petö, 2003; Meret & Siim, 2013). These studies are buttressed 
in the following with the feminist analyses that discuss the situation of women and 
men in the construction of nationhood, and underline the importance of gender in 
the articulation of nationalist discourses (cf. Enloe, 1989; Hasso, 1998; 
Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991; McClintock, 1991; Nagel, 1998; 2000; 
Stevens, 1999; Yuval–Davis, 1997; Waetjen, 2001; Walby, 2000). The chapter 
thereby strengthens the general feminist critique addressed to the canonical 
scholarship researching radical right populism for its masculinist representations, 
and the danger of reification such approaches entail. The chapter aims to 
concurrently widen the field and suggest new ways for the investigation of radical 
right populist ideology. 
I consider it of crucial importance to introduce in the present chapter the 
feminist conceptual vocabulary that contributes to formulating answers to the 
battery of research questions I have presented in the first chapter. For this 
purpose, in reviewing feminist scholarship in the present chapter, I show those 
conceptual building blocks that have a crucial role in articulating the present 
study. First, I subscribe to the feminist observation that women occupy a plurality 
of positions in various hierarchies of power relations in any given society (cf. 
Collins, 2000; 2004; hooks, 1981; McClintock, 1995; Mohanty, 2003; Wittig, 
1980; 1982; 1989). Second, I acknowledge the importance of gender as a principal 
means to organise difference and reify hierarchies, in which the biology of sexes 
serves as an instrument to justify and naturalise the superiority of men in relation 
to women (cf. Cranny–Francis et al, 2003; Rubin, 1998). Third, I focus on the 
problematisation of heterosexuality as a normative standpoint, which rests on the 
traditional hierarchical gender binary arrangement within the (legally sanctioned) 
monogamous union between a man and a woman (cf. Butler, 2004; Jackson, 
 
OUR PEOPLE – A TIGHT–KNIT FAMILY | 53 
 
2006; Tuori, 2009). Fourth, I explicate gender as a performative, understood as a 
continuous and contingent set of practices of iteration of one’s gender in the 
aforementioned context of heteronormativity (cf. Butler, 1990; 1993; 1995; 2004). 
These enable me to articulate the theoretical standpoint of intersectionality. 
Intersectionality aims to account for the complexity of gendered hierarchies, 
detailing the social location of various gender performatives at the junction of 
several systems of oppression (cf. Collins, 2000; 2004; McClintock, 1995; 
Mohanty, 2003; Mulinari, 2003). It is this theoretical framework that I 
subsequently employ to approach the feminist studies of men and masculinities. 
In a circular move, then, I integrate the study of men and various masculinity 
performatives in the context of hierarchical gender binary represented by the 
traditional family (cf. Brown, 1988; Carver, 2004; Connell, 1987; 1992; 1995; 
Halberstam, 1998; Hearn, 1996; 2004; Hooper, 2001; Kimmel, 2000; Mac an 
Ghaill & Haywood, 2007). When discussing the family construct I underline its 
inherent connection to other means of legitimating exclusion and hierarchy along 
biological and hierarchical principles – such as depicting national communities as 
extended families (cf. McClintock, 1995; Stevens, 1999; Toltz & Booth, 2005; 
Yuval–Davis, 1997). 
In so doing, I acknowledge the feminist pronouncements on the role of gender 
as a crucial factor for making nationalist ideology more comprehensible, despite 
its inherent inconsistencies. Already some two decades ago this has been 
demonstrated by Anne McClintock who criticised the mainstream theorists of 
nationalism for not exploring in what manner nationalisms are concerned with 
gendered power. She noted that in fact ‘no nationalism in the world has granted 
women and men the same privileged access to the resources of the nation state. So 
far, all nationalisms are dependent on powerful constructions of gender 
differences.’ (McClintock 1991: 105) Even more so, Thembisa Waetjen has 
emphasised the ideological interconnections between nationalism and gender, and 
argued that the hierarchical gender binary – which postulates women’s 
submission to men – is in a symbiotic relation with the nation – which sanctifies 
women’s motherhood and celebrates men’s power as leaders and defenders of the 
national construct. In other words, ‘the nation upholds patriarchy while 
patriarchal gender order systems provide a narrative lubricant for smoothing out 
nationalism’s well known internal contradictions of time, space, and identity’ 
(Waetjen, 2001: 121–122). With this in mind, one may rightly argue that the 
feminist engagement with the study of nation and nationalism has exposed the 
illusory naturalness of the hierarchical gender binary and the apolitical quality of 
the private sphere to which women have been relegated to in nationalist ideology 
(Sluga, 2000: 517; Yuval–Davis, 1997: 1–2; Zalewski, 1995: 355). 
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3.1. FROM THE UNIVERSAL WOMAN TO THE PERFORMATIVE 
OF GENDER: INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSES OF FEMININITIES 
AND MASCULINITIES 
Before going any further it is nonetheless necessary to elaborate the 
terminology at work in the present study and anchor it firmly in the field of 
feminist scholarship. If in its initial phases feminist studies concentrated attention 
on the voting rights and property rights for women, they have later on enlarged 
their scope and addressed a series of other issues, such as the critique of treating 
women as an aberration from the male norm, persisting inequalities, the family, 
women’s reproductive rights and the workplace (cf. de Beauvoir, 2010; Friedan, 
2001). Gradually, the monolithic stance on what women are and how to describe, 
assess, and defend their interests has been critiqued. In the last decades of the 
twentieth century some feminist scholars have argued for a more nuanced 
approach to the subject of feminist research. A first critique concerned the need to 
discuss women and their lives, and not about the Woman (with capital letter, as 
the universal ideal and sole intelligible entity, embodying ideals of white middle–
class heterosexual Western womanhood), thus acknowledging the diversity of the 
feminist subject(s) of study: working class women; women of colour (cf. Collins, 
2000; 2004; hooks, 1981; McClintock, 1995); women loving other women (cf. 
Rich, 1980; Wittig, 1980; 1982; 1989); women from the global South (cf. 
Jayawardena, 1986; Mohanty, 2003); women of different ages; women with 
disabilities and so on. 
A second point of contention concerned the sex/gender debate. Discussing sex 
and biological differences between women and men has been critiqued for reifying 
women’s role in life on the assumption of their biology and their psychological 
make–up. In turn, the concept of gender was suggested as a means to denounce 
the idea of biological determinism (the much criticised ‘anatomy is destiny’ 
adage), and thereby contest the naturalisation of sexual difference in various 
social contexts (Haraway, 1991: 127–148; Oakley, 1972; Rubin, 1998). An 
influential representative of such feminist efforts has been Ann Oakley. In her 
view, ‘“sex” is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and 
female’, while gender ‘is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification 
into “masculine” and “feminine”’ (Oakley, 1972: 16). Even more so, she continued, 
the organisation of modern Western societies has been structured around the 
differences rather than the similarities between sexes, in a way confirming the 
assumption of a biological causality for the existing inequalities in these societies; 
she nonetheless warned that such a biological reasoning rested in fact on 
prejudice (Oakley, 1972: 210). While sex was assumed to be a ‘natural’, 
unchanging biological fact, gender has been conceptualised to account for the 
differences between men and women that are socially conditioned, and thus vary 
across time, and from one culture and national setting to another. Focusing their 
analytical attention on gender as a means of organising difference, feminist 
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researchers subsequently discussed gender as a form of constructing hierarchies, 
in which the biology of the sexes has been employed to proclaim the superiority of 
men and respectively the subordination of women. More clearly, women’s 
oppression represents a direct consequence of such asymmetrical structuring, and 
‘patriarchy’ denotes the systematic privileging of the masculine over the feminine 
(Cranny–Francis et al, 2003: 1–2; Lazar, 2005: 7–9; Mohanty, 2003: 61; Rubin, 
1998: 534–538). 
Another turning point has been the interrogation of women’s and men’s 
assumed heterosexual ‘nature’. This has led scholars to call for a comprehensive 
analysis of heterosexuality – which, it was argued, needed to be recognised and 
studied as a political institution (Rich, 1980: 637). Investigating the alleged 
‘naturalness’ of heterosexuality, several researchers pointed out that, by contrast, 
any other forms of manifesting one’s sexuality that did not fulfil the ascribed 
attraction between sexes with the scope of reproduction have been deemed to be 
abnormal and even pathological (cf. Butler, 1990; Jackson, 2006; Seidman, 
2005). The process of naturalising heterosexuality has a strong normative aspect 
that enforces a specific grid of intelligibility for bodies, genders, and desire, which 
Judith Butler coined as the ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1990: 151). Crucially, 
normative heterosexuality rests on gender asymmetry, which naturalises the 
identification and evaluation of women in terms of their sexual availability and 
attractiveness to men, and their confinement within heterosexual relationships as 
wives and mothers (Jackson, 2006: 114; Tuori, 2009: 157–158). Such 
heteronormativity not only posits heterosexuality as intrinsically more valuable 
than homosexuality, but it also creates a set of hierarchic relations among the 
various sorts of heterosexuality, leading to the establishment of ‘hegemonic and 
subordinate forms of heterosexuality’ (Seidman, 2005: 40). But because of 
heterosexuality being so fragmented, this leaves room for the establishment of 
different degrees of respectability and various means to portray what is deemed to 
be good citizenship among heterosexuals. What is generally heralded as the norm 
is underpinned by traditional gender arrangement – sanctioned within the 
lifelong and legally sanctioned monogamous union between a man and a woman 
(Butler, 2004: 5; Seidman, 2005: 59–60). 
Investigating the connection between gender and sex, Judith Butler has 
reversed the logic that generally posited sex as the origin of gender and argued 
instead that gender produces sex (cf. Butler, 1990; 1993; 1995; 2004), and both 
are produced within the aforementioned heterosexual matrix (Butler, 1990; 
2004). In this respect, Butler regarded gender not as a noun, but as a verb, as a 
series of acts. From this perspective, the gendered identity becomes manifest only 
at the moment of its enactment, when gender is ‘performed’. The consequence is 
that there is no natural gendered body; the body is instead constructed through 
the acts that generate its reality (Butler, 1990: 173). In her later writings Butler 
argued further that gender, far from being a simple model that people attempt to 
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appropriate, is in fact a means of social power that establishes the hierarchical 
gender binary – femininity and masculinity – and concomitantly defines the 
boundaries within which a subject becomes intelligible as gendered (Butler, 
2004). This however underlines the fact that gendered identity is contingent upon 
the practices that constitute it. In other words, the gender performative bears in 
itself the potential for being produced, reproduced, but also ‘deproduced’: 
If gender is a norm, it is not the same as a model that individuals seek to 
approximate. On the contrary, it is a form of social power that produces the 
intelligible field of subjects, and an apparatus by which the gender binary is 
instituted. As a norm that appears independent of the practices that it 
governs, its ideality is the reinstituted effect of those very practices. This 
suggests not only that the relation between practices and the idealisations 
under which they work is contingent, but that the very idealisation can be 
brought into question and crisis, potentially undergoing deidealisation and 
divestiture. 
(Butler, 2004: 48) 
In relation to this, Butler employed the example of drag performances as a 
means to underscore the artificiality of gender as ‘performed’, and its inherent 
position as an effect of the heterosexual matrix, or to use the appellation employed 
in the present text, of heteronormativity. In her own words, ‘in imitating gender, 
drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its 
contingency’ (Butler, 1990: 175). Even more so, she maintained further that both 
drag and heterosexuality are dependent on the repetition of those acts; when 
understood according to the heteronormative principles of intelligibility, these 
acts signify a particular gender (Butler, 2004: 209). Nevertheless, while all forms 
of performing a gendered identity are constructed, only some of them – 
heterosexuality – are privileged as authentic and invested with normative power. 
More clearly, the gendered identity is crafted through the ‘ritualised production, a 
ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of 
prohibition and taboo’ (Butler, 1993: 95) of certain acts and gestures that are 
intelligible within heteronormativity. 
It is worth noting that in the present study I make use of the term 
performative of gender – employed interchangeably with gender performative – 
rather than that of performativity. I do so in order to underline the contingent, 
unstable, and negotiated nature of gender, and concurrently to emphasise that I 
conceptualise gender more than mere performance – in the theatrical sense of the 
term – a distinction made in her earlier works by Butler herself (Butler, 1993: 95). 
Key here is that gender is dependent on perpetual repetition whereby rendered 
unstable. Butler has nonetheless revised and refined her theoretical concepts, 
addressing the criticism formulated against the performativity of gender and 
anchored it further into language. She therefore defined what it means to be 
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performatively constituted as ‘to be produced in a given network of 
power/discourse’ (Butler, 1995: 135), in a sense echoing the Foucauldian 
discussion on the power/knowledge mentioned in the previous chapter (Foucault, 
1995). Under these circumstances, then, heteronormativity, whose effect is the 
gender performative, represents in fact such a power/discourse network that 
articulates objects and subjects in their intelligibility (Butler, 1995: 138). 
If heteronormativity has been unveiled to be the system of gendered 
oppression and gender an inherent effect of it, the concept of intersectionality has 
been suggested to the academic community to account for the social location at 
the junction of several such systems of oppression. More specifically, an 
intersectional study entails an analysis based on the claim that ‘systems of race, 
social class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, and age form mutually 
constructing features of social organisation’ (Collins, 2000: 299). These systems 
have a major impact onto the experiences of, and at the same time are shaped by 
the very women or/and men that populate these locations (cf. Collins, 2000; 
McClintock, 1995; Mulinari, 2003). Nevertheless, McClintock has warned that 
these systems of oppression need not be understood as ‘distinct realms of 
experience, existing in splendid isolation from one another; nor can they be 
simply yoked together retrospectively like armatures of Lego. Rather, they come 
into existence in and through relation to each other – if in contradictory and 
conflictual ways.’ (McClintock, 1995: 5) (Italics in original) Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty, in turn, has warned researchers that the interwoven processes of 
sexism, racism, misogyny, and heterosexism ‘in conjunction with the regressive 
politics of ethnic nationalism and capitalist consumerism, are differentially 
constitutive of our lives in the early twenty–first century’ (Mohanty, 2003: 3). 
Consequently, feminist studies have systematically broadened their spectrum of 
analysis to incorporate more than just scholarship that contested the mainstream 
definition of women and womanhood circulating in culture and society. They have 
also explored analytically the complexity of hierarchical gender binary and the 
way this impacted on the lives of various women and men. For example, Patricia 
Hill Collins has emphasised that when talking about gender, it does not mean 
focusing exclusively on women’s issues, since men’s experiences are deeply 
gendered as well. Conceptions of gender shape both ideals of femininity and 
masculinity. Indeed, she added, ‘regardless of race, ethnicity, social class, 
citizenship status, and sexual orientation, all men and women encounter social 
norms about gender. These norms influence people’s sense of themselves as men 
and women as well as perceptions of masculinity and femininity.’ (Collins, 2004: 
6) 
Another concern for feminist research I show here has been to develop means 
to theorise men and masculinities that are situated within the hierarchical gender 
binary discussed above, and investigate the particular social practices which are 
used to reproduce social divisions and inequality in connection to the construction 
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of masculinities. This was a counteraction to the hegemonic discourse that 
presented solely women as gendered beings. It was thereby necessary to unveil 
men as a gendered political category, and a constitutive part of the intricate 
relationships that underpin patriarchal gender structuring. It was also motivated 
by the fact that politics have long been the social practice most explicitly 
connected with the crafting of masculine identity, one that witnessed the 
dominance of middle–class heterosexual masculinities (cf. Brown, 1988; Carver, 
2004; Halberstam, 1998; Kimmel, 2000; Mosse, 1996; Phillips, 1998). 
Consequently, ‘analysing men as a politically gendered category removes it from 
its normative location as transparent, neutral and disembodied’ (Mac an Ghaill & 
Haywood, 2007: 29). Put differently, masculinity often operates as an implicit 
shorthand for the ‘normal’ individual, which is itself a maker of exclusion and 
subordination of subjects that do not coincide in terms of gender, sexuality, class, 
‘race’, religion and other alleged ‘signs of “difference” and “less than human” 
status’ (Carver, 2008: 70). In other words, the white man remains ‘true’, without 
being sexualised. At the same time, he embodies the alive and able–bodied being. 
In that, he silently represents the standard against which everyone else is 
measured, be they native women, or minority and/or migrant women and men 
(Eduards, 2007: 69; Halberstam, 1998: 2–3; Lorentzen, 2011: 111; McClintock, 
1995: 5–6; Mulinari, 2003: 116).  
With this in mind, it is worth noting the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’, 
which was submitted to scholarly attention and subsequently developed in the 
works of RW/Raewyn Connell (1987; 1992; 1995). Hegemonic masculinity, in this 
context, was not statistically normal but had nonetheless a normative power, in 
the sense that it ‘embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man, it 
required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and ideologically 
legitimated the global subordination of women to men’ (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). Besides being indebted to the Gramscian concept of 
‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971), hegemonic masculinity was also inspired by the 
criticism of black feminism mentioned above against the ‘race’ bias taking place 
when conceptualising power solely in terms of sexual differences. In so doing, it 
set the base for an understanding of masculinity as a non–monolithic, 
multifaceted construct. The construction of a hegemonic masculinity thus involves 
the marginalisation and subordination of other, less normative masculinities – 
such as masculinities of the non–majority ethnic/‘racial’/religious group, non–
heteronormative masculinities, and so on. From this point of view, Carver has 
warned scholars of men and masculinities that the ‘gender lens works differently 
for men and things masculine than it does for women and things feminine’ 
(Carver, 2004: 252). 
While gender inequality contains women to a subordinate position as such, the 
idea of a dominant typology of masculinity rests on a fluid hierarchy among men 
that is constantly defined, described, naturalised, and defended. A special position 
of privilege in the hierarchy of masculinities is that of paternal masculinity, which 
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presupposes a legally sanctioned monogamous heterosexual union, and the 
production of offspring (cf. Carver, 2004: 252–254; Hooper, 2001: 55; Mac an 
Ghaill & Haywood, 2007: 62–71). Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind that the 
formulation of ‘a hierarchy of masculinities grew directly out of homosexual men’s 
experience with violence and prejudice from straight men’ (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005: 831). This was in fact an acknowledgement of the 
subversive ability of homosexuality in a heteronormative male–dominated gender 
hierarchy, since this ‘subversion is a structural feature of homosexuality in a 
patriarchal society in which hegemonic masculinity is defined exclusively as 
heterosexual’ (Connell, 1992: 748). 
Despite its merits, the concept of hegemonic masculinity has nevertheless 
come under criticism – for removing focus from questions of power and 
domination, for relying heavily on heteronormative understandings of gender 
whereby overemphasising sexual differences between men and women, and 
disregarding the relational aspect of the gender binary (cf. Brittan, 1989; 
Halberstam, 1998; Hearn, 1996; 2004; Hooper, 2001; Nixon, 1996). The field of 
study of men and masculinities has since developed ‘an expanding vocabulary of 
emerging paternal masculinities, “deadbeat” dads, male fetishised and narcissistic 
displays, masculinised feminine performances, disembodied male subjects and the 
new man’s non–phallic masculinity’ (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2007: 33). 
Researching the different instances of performing masculinity, Judith/Jack 
Halberstam, as well as Jean Bobby Noble, has suggested a counterexample of 
analysing masculinity (cf. Halberstam, 1996; Noble, 2004) – investigating the 
details of ‘masculine difference by comparing not men and women but butch 
lesbians and female–to–male transsexuals’ (Halberstam, 1998: 3). Hence, they 
argued for a ‘degree of indifference to the whiteness of the male and the 
masculinity of the white male and the project of naming his power’ (Halberstam, 
1998: 3), and suggested instead examining the performative of masculinities in 
which men are not present; put differently, a study of ‘masculinities without men’ 
(Noble, 2004). In her analysis, however, Halberstam has acknowledged that 
‘masculinity in this society inevitably conjures up notions of power and legitimacy 
and privilege; it often symbolically refers to the power of the state and to uneven 
distribution of wealth. Masculinity seems to extend outward into patriarchy and 
inward into family’ (Halberstam, 1998: 2). 
Discussing the opportunity to revitalise the examination of gender and the 
study of masculinities, RW/Raewyn Connell and James Messerschmidt observed 
that the constitutive tandem of gender hierarchies initially suggested by Connell – 
that of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and ‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell, 1987) – 
have received little scholarly attention thereafter. They argued further that since 
gender is always constructed in a relational manner, ‘the patterns of masculinity 
are socially defined in contradistinction from some model (whether real or 
imaginary) of femininity’ (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Understood in 
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relation to this, Halberstam’s comment – on the extension of masculinity outward 
into patriarchy and inward into family – demonstrates the family as a 
constitutive part of the heteronormative rule, and the main arena for the 
interdependent performative of masculinities and femininities. This has deep 
implications for gender studies, since the issues of women’s oppression in 
patriarchy, that of normative heterosexuality, of ‘hegemonic masculinities’ and 
their contestation by either subordinated, non–normative masculinities, or by 
those performatives of ‘masculinities without men’ find their nexus in the 
traditional family conceptualisation. 
The ‘traditional family’ ideal not only confirms heterosexuality as ‘normal’, but 
also naturalises an authority structure consisting of a father–head earning a 
satisfactory family wage, a stay–at–home wife, and their offspring (Rich, 1980: 
657). Returning briefly to the painting described in the first chapter, I argue that 
the ‘Family’ of Wolfgang Willrich portrays precisely such a traditional family ideal 
centred on the paternal authority of the man, and underpinned by the 
subordinated motherhood of the woman. On this matter, among other feminist 
researchers, Collins has aptly observed that the traditional family is both an 
ideological construction and a fundamental principle for social organisation. As 
such, she continued, it rests on a conception of the family as a private enclosure 
separated from the public world, underpinned by a rather rigid sexual division of 
labour that requires a separation of work and family, within which the ‘correct’ 
type of reproduction is sanctioned by legitimising the offspring of the man 
involved in said family construct, and the paternal masculinity he thus embodies: 
Assuming a relatively fixed sexual division of labour, wherein women’s roles 
are defined as primarily in the home and men’s in the public world of work, 
the traditional family ideal also assumes the separation of work and family. 
Defined as a natural or biological arrangement based on heterosexual 
attraction, this monolithic family type articulates with governmental 
structures. It is organised not around a biological core, but a state–
sanctioned, heterosexual marriage that confers legitimacy not only on the 
family structure itself but on children born into it. 
(Collins, 1998: 62–63) 
The appeals to the family as a category of belonging, feminist scholars have 
unveiled, are oftentimes employed to justify differentiation along ethnic and/or 
‘racial’, religious, and class–defined lines (cf. McClintock, 1995; Stevens, 1999; 
Toltz & Booth, 2005; Yuval–Davis, 1997). On this matter, McClintock has argued 
that the family construct is ‘indispensable for legitimating exclusion and hierarchy 
within nonfamilial social forms such as nationalism, liberal individualism and 
imperialism’ (McClintock, 1995: 45). In the same vein, Erik Ringmar has 
evidenced in his research the impact of political language in which the family is an 
often used metaphor to refer to a certain principle of understanding social 
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structuring – one that combines both biological and hierarchical principles. More 
exactly, political leaders ‘have often found it expedient to define themselves as 
“fathers” of the countries they rule and their subjects as “children” of varying ages 
and states of maturity’ (Ringmar, 2008: 60). Imitating the traditional model of 
family, the ‘father of the state’ has claimed monopoly over the decision–making 
process, while the other family members have been expected to obey his will and 
not question his judgment. 
Returning to the matter at stake, the depiction of the nation that circumscribes 
the idea of the state – or the people of the radical right populists, for that matter – 
as an organic community proves a means most productive for claims of white 
masculine superiority. In its radical right populist interpretation, the national 
family is portrayed as a hierarchical structuring that naturalises the dominance of 
men, presented as heads of the family and fathers of offspring, and the submission 
of women, contained in the positions of wives and mothers (Honohan, 2008: 73; 
Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010: 56–57; Stevens, 1999: 143–148). With this in mind, 
the chapter details in the following the feminist scholarship that has addressed the 
issues of nations and nationalism, and that of radical right populism, and 
concentrates on the national family construct as the epitome of patriarchal 
heteronormativity. It subsequently examines the relationships between 
masculinities and the aforesaid national construct, and demonstrates the position 
of power at the helm of the family and people that heteronormative masculinities 
are ascribed. The chapter then concludes with a presentation of the main findings 
of mapping out the field. 
3.1.1 GENDERED NATION – NATIONED GENDER17  
Feminist researchers have argued that issues pertaining to gender and nation 
need to be understood in a dynamic relationship, through which they inform and 
shape one another (cf. Cusak, 2000; Hasso, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1991; Kulpa, 2011; 
McClintock, 1995; Mulinari, 2010; Nagel, 1998; 2000; Parker et al, 1992; Petö, 
2006; 2010; Rankin, 2000; Taylor, 1997; Yuval–Davis, 1993; 1997). As previously 
discussed, gendered identities are contingent and subject to a continuous process 
of definition, contestation, and redefinition. The national construct is similarly 
situated, bound to specific historical moments and developments in a particular 
part of the world; furthermore, the aforesaid construct is shaped by shifting 
nationalist discourses and, in turn, inherently determines the very language that is 
employed to articulate them (Brubacker, 2004: 116; Pryke, 1998: 532). These 
nationalist discourses and the nationalist ideology they underpin are developed, 
17 The title of this chapter pays tribute to the work of Nira Yuval–Davis in the field of nations and 
nationalism studies. It makes direct reference to the concepts of ‘gendered nations’, and 
respectively ‘nationed gender’, her way of emphasising the strong relation of interdependency 
between the concepts of gender and nation (Yuval–Davis, 1997: 21). 
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maintained, and contested by different groups in their quest for a hegemonic 
position within the polity under scrutiny. This imagined national collectivity 
naturalises the dominant position of a specific group – generally defined in 
ethnic/‘racial’, religious, and/or linguistic terms. It thereby establishes the group’s 
monopoly over the polity’s ideological apparatuses. In so doing, it posits the 
subordinated minority groups as deviant from the normative majority. This is 
often used as a justification to prevent minorities from claiming, or even gaining 
access to resources, and in extreme cases to ‘ethnic cleansing’ (cf. Anderson, 1991; 
Brubacker, 2004; Saukkonen, 2003). 
A pioneer of feminist scholarship of nations and nationalisms, Nira Yuval–
Davis has maintained that the conceptions of femininity and masculinity play a 
central role in the ideological construction of nationalism and its interpretation of 
the nation (cf. Yuval–Davis, 1980; 1989; 1993; 1997). Although agreeing with 
Benedict Anderson in his conceptualisation of the nation as ‘an imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1991), she nevertheless developed her own classification 
of the structuring dimensions of the national project. In her view, the first 
component is the ‘genealogical dimension’, based on the myth of a common origin 
and a shared pool of genes/blood, which enables ‘to construct the most 
exclusionary/homogeneous vision of “nation”’ (Yuval–Davis, 1997: 21). What 
comes second is the cultural dimension, understood in terms of ‘the symbolic 
heritage provided by language and/or religion and/or other customs and 
traditions’ which constitute the national ‘essence’. In addition to this, she detailed 
on the role of gender in the biological and cultural production of the nation. A 
third interpretation is what she called ‘the civic dimension’ of nationalist projects, 
which is inherently connected to the idea of state sovereignty and specific 
territoriality (Yuval–Davis, 1997: 21). 
Attempting a rough classification of women’s roles within the national 
collectivity, and their place in the nationalist ideology, a first position evidenced 
by research in the field is that of women as bearers of the national community, at 
both biological and symbolical level (cf. Charles & Hintjes, 1998; Cusak, 2000; 
Stevens, 1999; Yuval–Davis, 1980; 1993; 1997). Such a standing underlines 
nonetheless the inherent inconsistencies that lie at the heart of the national 
construct underpinned by ideals of ethnic essentialism. There are differences in 
terms of class solidarities, differences between men and women, and differences 
in the valorisation of sexual orientation, with some being considered worthwhile 
members of the nation, thereby encouraged and protected, whilst some others are, 
at best, frowned upon if not forbidden outright and persecuted. As such, 
nationhood appears oftentimes conflated with gender, parentage, and ‘racial’ 
belonging, in a manner that ties it to a sense of inevitability, which brings forth 
demands for the individual’s abandonment to a common good and readiness for 
personal sacrifice. More clearly, nationalist ideology depicts women and men 
primarily in essentialist terms. This is in turn reflected in the special place women 
are ascribed in the national community and on the prescribed behaviour they are 
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expected to display for their acknowledgement as members of said collectivity, 
which is envisioned as a tightly knit community. In so doing, their membership in 
the national construct is confirmed as merely being at the side of their men. 
Women are consigned to the burden of national parenthood, whilst men are 
entrusted with the task of leading and defending the nation (Charles & Hintjes, 
1998: 6; Cusak, 2000: 543). As a result, the nation’s women are marked off from 
the Other’s women: 
The very language of nationalism singles women out as the symbolic 
repository of group identity. [Thus,] nationalism describes its object using 
either a vocabulary of kinship (motherland, patria) or home (heimat), in 
order to denote something to which one is ‘naturally’ tied. Nationness is 
thus equated with gender, parentage, skin–colour – all those things that are 
not chosen and which, by virtue of their inevitability, elicit selfless 
attachment and sacrifice. The association of women with the private 
domain reinforces the merging of the nation/community with the selfless 
mother/devout wife; the obvious response of coming to her defence or even 
dying for her is automatically triggered. 
(Kandiyoti, 1991: 434) 
A second capacity identified in feminist research has been that of women as 
signifiers of national differences, in other words as embodiments of and symbols 
in the ideological discourses that have been employed for the construction, 
reproduction, and transformation of national categories. It is worth noting that in 
the context of drawing clear lines of demarcation between one’s national 
community and its immediate Other, the discussion over the veil worn by women 
of Islamic faith as a marker of belonging/exclusion has been addressed at length 
from various viewpoints. At first, feminist researchers have been writing about the 
importance of gender in the national struggles against imperialism in the former 
colonies and used as evidence the use of the veil as a political tool for crafting 
national solidarity underpinned by Islamic precepts of piety and modesty (cf. 
Ahmed, 1992; Kandiyoti, 1991;). More recently and echoing the wide socio–
political impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks, feminist scholars have 
focused on the politicisation of the veil as a sign of radical Otherness and as such a 
fetishisation of cultural attributes and claims, often connected to alleged Islamic 
practices such as female genital mutilation, forced marriages, honour killings, and 
imposition of Shar’ia law (cf. Khiabany & Williamson, 2008; Meer, Dwyer & 
Modood, 2010; Mulinari, 2010). 
Another perspective on the matter of symbolic difference has explored the 
distinction operated between the women identified as belonging to a native 
majority and those of an immigrant non–majority background. For example, 
Tobias Hübinette and Catrin Lundström have researched the place of radical right 
populism in the overall political culture in Sweden, which has generally been 
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considered as a progressive country and a schoolbook example of gender equality. 
On this matter, they have shown that radical right populism exploits a racist 
undercurrent present in Swedish society. In the process, a distinction is made 
between the native women, who are assimilated into the domain of white men, 
thereby superior, and the immigrant women, who are suspected of benefitting 
unrightfully from the European welfare system. The different valorisation of 
women shows the crucial role that the family plays in the national construct; 
family politics being national politics: 
Here lies a deep difference between the construction of white women 
standing outside the labour market on the one hand and the non–white 
women on the other. While the white woman is expected to reproduce the 
nation through her household and reproductive labour, the non–white 
woman is subject to discourses of being welfare abusers. Such a racialised 
juxtaposition reflects the ideological function that the family plays in the 
construction of the nation as naturalising gendered and national 
boundaries, and indeed how the politics of family values nurtures 
nationalistic ideals […]. 
(Hübinette & Lundström, 2011: 49) 
In conclusion, I maintain that the findings of feminist scholarship of 
nationalism – especially those which pertain to the gendered nature of the 
imagined national communities, the women’s burden of national parenthood, and 
the women’s various positions within/outside the national community based on 
their family ties – constitute valuable theoretical vantage points for the 
investigation of the hierarchical gender binary at work in radical right populism. 
3.1.2 NORMATIVE MOTHERHOOD AND THE NATION 
Several feminist researchers have been documenting the radical shifts that 
accompany the transformation of motherhood – from a discourse and practice 
usually positioned within the private sphere – into a matter of national concern – 
and implicitly prominent in the public sphere (cf. Kramer, 2005; Mulinari, 2010; 
Stevens, 1999; Yuval–Davis, 1997). Consequently, women play a crucial role in the 
discursive (re)production of the nation ‘given the central role that the myth (or 
reality) of “common origin” plays on the construction of most ethnic and national 
collectivities’, and their bodies become battlefields for maintaining the ‘purity’ of 
the national construct (Yuval–Davis, 1997: 26). Analysing further the 
‘demographic race’ discourse – aimed at preserving a certain ethnic or ‘racial’ 
make–up in a country –, that of ‘eugenics’, or the Malthusian discourse, which 
share their preoccupation with issues of pronatalist and anti–abortion policies, 
forced sterilisations and even gendercide, Yuval–Davis uncovered their gendered 
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nature, and the high price that women have to pay for maintaining the alleged 
national purity (Yuval–Davis, 1997: 26–37). 
The ideal of women’s national parenthood has developed in a direction that 
assimilated motherhood to a normative position that entailed raising the right 
type of offspring – impinging directly upon women’s rights to terminate undesired 
pregnancies, to determine the terms of their motherhood, or to freely choose their 
partners (cf. Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989; Kramer, 2005; Petö, 2006; 2010; 
Taylor, 1997). This has taken different forms across the world. In the post–1989 
context in Central and Eastern Europe, the abortion debate has been particularly 
important in gathering nationalist forces and conservative actors – such as 
religious institutions. In Poland, for example, the anti–abortion nationalist 
discourse has been centred on the promotion of an iconic image of the Polish 
mother (Matka Polka) that rose to prominence in the nineteenth century Polish 
national struggle: a self–sacrificing woman who served her country by giving birth 
to the next generation of Poles and bringing up children with ‘Polish values’. The 
nationalist stance has benefited from the strong support of the Roman Catholic 
Church. In contrast, those women that did not fulfil the Polish mother paradigm 
were excluded as non–feminine, enemies of the nation, and even threats to 
national unity (Kramer, 2005: 142). 
The ideal of women–as–mothers becomes even more complex, researchers 
have argued, in highly polarised societies where class cleavages juxtapose racial 
segregation, such as in South Africa during the apartheid regime (cf. Gaitskell & 
Unterhalter, 1989). In this case, the position of women as mothers played an 
important role in nationalist discourses, but was at all times permeated by 
conceptions of racial differentiation. More clearly, the racial aspect determined 
the selective recognition of motherhood, according to the women’s own racial 
belonging and identification with the national community and its cause. Indeed, 
appeals ‘to motherhood have been couched in ethnically very exclusive terms as 
well as in racially inclusive ways. The different circumstances of black and white 
mothers have shaped the relation between the ideas of nation, state and 
motherhood.’ (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 76) 
In relation to this, some feminist researchers have developed the concept of 
‘normative motherhood’, which enabled them to investigate the masculinist 
attempts to construe and impose a certain ideal of femininity, one intimately 
connected to ideas of feminine submission, reproduction, and domesticity (cf. 
Petö, 2006; 2010; Taylor, 1997). Such attempts to compel women into a 
masculinist interpretation of maternity have been denounced for being merely 
‘patriarchy in drag’ (Taylor, 1997: 184). Women’s resistance to these coercive 
portrayals of femininity has been used by the state power, researchers have 
claimed, as a means to distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘pure’ femininity that 
entailed non–political motherhood – isolated from the public sphere within the 
walls of their homes – and the ‘bad’ femininity – women actively and physically 
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taking part in the public sphere. It was politically active women that were targeted 
by authoritarian regimes, such as the Argentinean junta (Taylor, 1997). It was 
these women that the notion of ‘patria’ itself had singled out as unworthy 
examples of femininity and potential enemies of the state: 
[It] is interesting to note that Patria, which comes from padre or father, 
does not mean ‘fatherland’ in Spanish. Rather, the word Patria signals the 
image of motherland as envisioned by patriarchy. […] The very notion of the 
feminine was split in two – into the ‘good’ woman and the ‘bad’ woman. On 
the one hand, the junta honoured the symbolic image of pure motherhood 
associated with the Patria, the ‘good’ woman, and made clear to women that 
their role was also to be ‘pure’, that is, non–political, mothers confined to 
the private sphere. On the other hand, active women were ‘bad’ women, 
associated with deviance and subversion. Women who were not content to 
stay at home were often targeted as enemies of the State. 
(Taylor, 1997: 184) 
Normative motherhood has been also employed to research the conservative 
and extreme right presence in Hungary (Petö, 2006; 2010). One of Andrea Petö’s 
key findings has been the conceptual importance of the family – and the place 
women occupy within that family context – in articulating both the extreme right 
ideology and motivating women to become active in various conservative and 
extreme right social movements, and, consequently, to engage in parliamentary 
politics as representatives of such parties. The Hungarian women active in these 
environments appear relegated to a role of normative motherhood and embody 
the so–called ‘feminine virtues’ in the family context in a modern interpretation of 
the cult of Virgin Mary, in a manner very much similar to the Polish case 
described earlier (cf. Kramer, 2005; Petö, 2006; 2010). 
Normative motherhood appears to serve several purposes and is legitimised by 
certain public discourses. First, the cult of motherhood is intended to strengthen 
the national family, identifying the body of women with the body of the nation. 
This justifies the extreme right appeals to the nation’s men to defend the national 
family. It concomitantly regulates the acceptable behaviour between women and 
men – potentially containing and domesticating more extreme manifestations of 
masculinity, such as violence directed against women. Second, the reference to the 
Virgin Mary contains women to a specific role – that of mothers – and restrains 
their ability to be active in the public sphere. Third, it also consolidates a quasi–
scientific discourse that maintains women as the weaker sex and the only ones 
able to bear children (Petö, 2010: 195). Corroborated with the internalisation of 
normative motherhood, a possible explanation for the women’s involvement in 
extreme right politics lies, according to Petö, in the way these women have 
appropriated the authoritarian model of understanding and doing politics, in the 
sense of regarding the state as another manifestation of the family household and 
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using the emotional and thinking patterns they have learned at home to make 
sense of political life (Petö, 2006: 329). It is precisely the conception of normative 
motherhood and the conceptual overlap between the state and family household – 
relegating women to such a subordinated position within the national community 
– that represent a valuable theoretical construct for the present analysis. 
3.1.3 WOMEN, FEMININITIES, AND THE NATION – THE BURDEN OF 
HETERONORMATIVITY 
The centrality of the normative motherhood conception to the nationalist 
discourse rests on the assumption of universal heterosexuality shared by all 
members of the national community (cf. Kulpa, 2011; Mosse, 1996; 1997; Nagel, 
2000; Parker et al, 1992; Pryke, 1998; Rankin, 2000). On this matter, it appears 
that ‘[n]ormative heterosexuality is a central component of racial, ethnic, and 
nationalist ideologies; both adherence to and deviation from approved sexual 
identities and behaviours define and reinforce racial, ethnic, and nationalist 
regimes’ (Nagel, 2000: 107). As a result, the appropriate gender performatives for 
both heterosexual women and men are highly regulated, and are often assimilated 
with that of ethnic belonging and national identification, thereby intimately 
related to such concepts as the community’s honour and its respectability (cf. 
Mosse, 1996; 1997). More precisely, men are expected to embody courageous, 
honourable, and active citizenship in the public sphere, thereby portraying ‘the 
foundation of the nation and society’, while women are required to fulfil their 
obligations as ‘guardians of the traditional order’ and morality in the private 
sphere (Mosse, 1997: 17). From this point of view, these heteronormative 
discourses enable the crystallisation of specific hierarchies of worthiness, at work 
both inside and across the ethnic or national boundaries: 
Across a wide variety of ethnic groups appropriate enactments of 
heterosexuality are perhaps the most regulated and enforced norms. In 
particular, correct heterosexual masculine and feminine behaviour 
constitutes gender regimes that often lie at the core of ethnic cultures. Our 
women (often depicted as virgins, mothers, pure) v. their women (sluts, 
whores, soiled). Our men (virile, strong, brave) v. their men (degenerate, 
weak, cowardly). […] Because of the common importance of proper gender 
role and sexual behaviour to ethnic community honour and respectability, a 
great deal of attention is paid to the sexual demeanour of group members 
(by outsiders and insiders) in inspection and enforcement of both formal 
and informal rules of sexual conduct. 
(Nagel, 2000: 113) 
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On a closer inspection of the interplay between gender, sexuality, and 
nationalism in the Northern hemisphere, women loving other women – 
particularly those that chose to build a family and bear children – appear to 
occupy a specific position in the nationalist discourses. In her research on 
Canadian queer nationalism, Pauline Rankin has argued that most nationalist 
manifestations are intrinsically homophobic – a consequence of the hegemonic 
position occupied by heteronormativity within the national constructs (cf. Kulpa, 
2011). In this she concurs with previous explorations of nationalism and sexuality 
that underlined the marginality of female non–reproductive sexuality, and of 
women loving women in a context in which motherhood – the epitome of 
heterosexual reproductive sexuality – has been portrayed as a feminised version of 
‘national service’ (Parker et al, 1992: 7). Rankin then maintained that the 
contemporary neoliberal agenda has had a profound impact on the Canadian 
society. In its neoliberal interpretation, preoccupied with procreation but 
effectively silencing the possibility for non–heteronormative reproduction 
techniques, Canadian nationalism has once more cemented the link between the 
‘traditional family’ and the nation. As such those who have not been accepted as 
part of the traditional heteronormative family constellation have been yet again 
excluded from the national body. The envisioned image of the new Canada was 
thereby inherently heterosexist, without being explicitly homophobic (Rankin, 
2000:185). Nonetheless, the new Canadian nationalism has developed a 
conflicting relationship with the Canadian lesbians. It morphed from openly 
challenging their ability to function as ‘good citizens’ – the ideal engendered by 
their heterosexual counterparts – to accommodating the so called ‘lesbian baby–
boom’ of the past decade – with the further implications of child rearing and 
‘national cultural reproduction’ – and finally to curtailing their access to new 
reproductive technologies provided by the state. In so doing, it confirmed the 
‘superiority’ of the traditional family to other family constellations within new 
Canadian nationalism (Rankin, 2000: 192). 
It is worth noting that in the name of securing the nation’s future – through the 
acceptance of the (legally sanctioned) monogamous union as the solely acceptable 
family model in which to bear and raise offspring – a distinction is made between 
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ among the members of the LGBTQI community. This echoes 
strongly the conceptual separation between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ women and their 
femininity performatives that the various manifestations of nationalist ideology 
have actively enabled (cf. Butler, 2009; Duggan, 2002; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 
1989; Petö, 2006; 2010; Rankin, 2000; Taylor, 1997). Indeed, more recent 
analyses at the intersection of nation, ethnicity, and gender and sexuality have 
discussed the relationship between nationalism and ‘homonormativity’ – 
understood as the acceptance of the hegemonic heteronormative ideology and its 
adaptation to a depoliticised queer constituency in the neoliberal context of 
contemporary late modernity (cf. Butler, 2009; Duggan, 2002; Kulpa, 2011; Puar, 
2007). Unlike Jasbir Puar, who has theorised the fusion between nationalism and 
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homonormativity as a new discourse that she labelled ‘homonationalism’ (Puar, 
2007), Robert Kulpa has criticised the conceptual grounds on which the term 
‘homonormativity’ is built upon. Taking up the issue of class in his criticism, 
Kulpa uncovered the universalistic claims of the narrative about nations, gender, 
and sexuality located in the ‘West’, and argued for geographical awareness and an 
acknowledgement of the different manifestations of capitalism and different 
articulations between nationalist projects and homosexuality: 
This link between respected sexuality, aberrant homosexuality, class and 
capitalism is tightly connected to Western European history, privileging 
again ‘Europe’ (i.e. the West) as the Grand Narrative, presumably semi (if 
not fully) transparent universalisation. However, for somebody interested 
in non–Western European logics of nationhood and homo/sexuality, the 
link might seem less pervasive, if only for reasons of lacking a ‘capitalist, 
class–based society’ (which is not to say that it is not stratified). 
(Kulpa, 2011: 57) 
On this matter, the traditional scholarship on nationalism has been criticised 
by feminist and queer scholars alike for being short–sighted in its positivist 
binaries at work in the analysis of nationalism and its ready–made formulas, 
which most of the times are reduced to simple mono–disciplinary investigations. 
Such approaches, commented Spike Peterson, deny any analytical importance to 
questions of ‘emotion, desire, sexuality, culture and – hence – identity and 
identification processes’ (Peterson, 1999: 36). Peterson employed the sexuality 
construct to illustrate the institutionalisation and normalisation of 
heterosexuality. She maintained that ‘the conjuncture of heterosexist ideology and 
practice is inextricable from the centralisation of political authority/coercive 
power that we refer to as state–making’ (Peterson, 1999: 39). More clearly, the 
heterosexual ideology imposes the exclusive normalisation of heterosexual, 
reproductive desire, intimacy, and family life. In addition, this process of 
normalisation entails the hegemony of the heterosexual male over women and the 
justifiability of rape as an expression of male power over women (Peterson, 1999: 
40), or as a means of warfare among competing national/ethnic communities 
(Munn, 2008: 153–155; Nagel, 2000: 125; Pryke, 1989: 538; Yuval–Davis, 1997: 
109–110). It is worth noting that within the context of gender relations that 
naturalise and normalise masculine heterosexual superiority, fatherhood has been 
evidenced by several researchers to play a crucial role (cf. Cusak, 2000; Miller, 
2003; Stein, 2006). Indeed, the position of fatherhood solidifies the system to 
which it is a part, and it embodies concurrently the origin of the family, the leader 
of the family and the nation, and the head of the church: 
One among others in a system of reciprocal relations, fatherhood is also 
supposed to anchor the system in which it belongs. Symbolically, it is at 
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once the origin, foundation, and summit of the family, the tribe, the nation, 
and the church. No member of a class can stand outside the class to which it 
belongs; no human person can be the Father. Figures of patriarchal 
authority, however, are presumed by definition to speak from the place and 
in the name of this absolute fatherhood. 
(Miller, 2003: 16) 
To sum up, I consider it of cardinal importance for this study that these 
conceptual clarifications with regard to the heteronormative nature of the national 
community project in the neoliberal context of contemporary–late modernity – 
built on the successive differentiation between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ ways of 
performing one’s own gender, with the emphasis on women’s responsibility to be 
mothers, and men’s implicit fatherhood, and ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ LGBTQI 
members, with emphasis on reproducing the national construct in the framework 
of monogamous unions. This underlines the flexibility of nationalist ideology in 
crafting a national community and its reliance upon the institution of family. 
3.1.4 MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND THE NATION – HEADING THE FAMILY 
AND THE PEOPLE 
The conceptual apparatus developed for the theorising and investigation of men 
and masculinities in various social interactions – concisely presented in the 
previous section – has also been employed in analyses of the nation and 
nationalist manifestations (cf. Anand, 2007; Bracewell, 2000; Ferber, 2000; 
Huysseune, 2000; Nagel, 1998; Norocel, 2010c; Waetjen, 2001; Zivkovic, 2006), 
and more recently even in the study of radical right populist movements (Geden, 
2005). Focusing on the relationship between nations, nationalist ideology, and the 
construction and performative of masculinities, the research community appears 
to have acknowledged the usefulness of such a perspective in uncovering the 
gendered nature of national constructs. Indeed, within the nationalist ideology the 
two hegemonic forms, that of nationalism and normative masculinity, articulate a 
symbiotic relationship. More clearly, the cult of the nation emphasises and 
resonates with cultural themes that praise normative masculinity, and concepts 
such as ‘honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty are hard to distinguish 
as either nationalist or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied to both the 
nation and manliness’ (Nagel, 1998: 252). 
Nevertheless, several feminist researchers have argued for a more nuanced 
perspective on the place of masculinities within nationalist ideology (cf. Anand, 
2008; Bracewell, 2000; Munn, 2008; Norocel, 2010c; Waetjen, 2001). Most 
importantly, some researchers have appealed for a more complex understanding 
of the two hegemonic discourses and demonstrated the need to conceptualise 
them as historically situated, hence dependent upon specific modes of production, 
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reproduction, and political control. In so doing, they have reiterated and 
concomitantly refined the criticism voiced by earlier feminist research on 
masculinities and nationalism, which warned that the theorising of nations and 
nationalism from a gender perspective runs the risk of treating men and 
masculinities as stable, undifferentiated categories, and equating male interests 
with masculinity and nationalism (cf. Bracewell, 2000; Waetjen, 2001). The 
concept of gender power is one alternative theoretical construct that enables 
researchers to account for the inherent stratification among men in the allegedly 
unitary national body, since social cleavages along class lines are an 
indistinguishable part of the nationalist construct across time (Waetjen, 2001: 
124). Consequently, being aware of the internal divisions present among men 
represents a first step in deconstructing the central position of masculinity in 
nationalist mythologies. 
A similar position is shared by other researchers in the field that have 
concentrated their scholarly attention either on the post–conflict environments – 
such as in Kosovo, and interrogated ‘the latent insurrectionary power of 
nationalist myths and practices as narrative performances of hegemonic 
masculinity’ (Munn, 2008: 143–144) – or who researched manifestations of 
‘porno–nationalism’ – a term which accounts for the centrality of sexualised 
imagination in Hindu ‘nationalism as an ideology and a lived collective political 
movement’ (Anand, 2008: 163) – or even on the ambiguous relationship between 
political power, ‘deviance’, and nativist masculinity performatives – the conflict 
between effeminate men, masculine women, corrupted aristocracy and foreigners, 
and the eventually triumphant nativist masculinity engendered by Romanian 
peasantry (Norocel, 2010c: 9–10). However, it is imperative that the scholars with 
a gender–sensitive research agenda are aware of the multi–faceted nature of 
masculinity because it ‘may have for gender theory the same metaphoric value it 
has for nationalism – an overstated cohesion of interests, forces, and ideologies.’ 
(Waetjen, 2001: 123) 
Importantly, the studies mentioned above have shown that the dominant, 
steadfast, and heterosexual typology of masculinity represents the epitome of the 
national community understood in ethnic/‘racial’/religious terms. In nationalist 
reasoning, the Others are deemed inferior, being assigned a feminised position. 
Feminisation, it is worth noting further, can be manifested at a symbolic level – 
domination exercised by a competing masculinity that acquires a hegemonic 
position – or at a more physical level – the most radical being the act of rape of 
either the group’s women or even of the subordinated men themselves. Such 
feminisation of the Other, or the threat of feminisation by a competing 
community, is of global recurrence in nationalist thinking (cf. Anand, 2007; 2008; 
Bracewell, 2000; Huysseune, 2000; Munn, 2008; Zivkovic, 2006). For example, 
in the separatist debates of the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) – a regionalist 
and radical right populist party in Italy – a recurring exclusionary practise is 
 
72 | Ov Cristian Norocel 
feminising the geographic and political Other (Huysseune, 2000). More clearly, 
the LN portrayed ‘Padania’ (a region in northern Italy, roughly overlapping the 
contours of the river Po basin) in opposition to both a corrupt and ‘politicianist’ 
centre (Rome), and a backward and dormant south. As such, ‘southern Italian 
effeminacy’ was presented as a threat to the masculine straightforwardness and 
righteousness of ‘Padanians’, as the southerners’ ‘feminine nature’ enabled them 
to be skilful manipulators (Huysseune, 2000: 603). Making use of a traditionalist 
interpretation of the hierarchical gender binary, the LN claimed not only a higher 
moral standing, but also the subsequent subordination of the south to the 
superiority of the north (Huysseune, 2000: 604–605). The party has in other 
words construed a normative hierarchy inasmuch as it separated along 
geographical lines between northern masculine superiority and domination, and 
southern submissiveness. In so doing, the LN discourse espoused its ideological 
affinity with the ‘colonialist vision of the North–South relation of earlier discourse 
of nation–building’ (Huysseune, 2000: 607). 
Other feminist scholars have in turn uncovered the close interaction between 
purist conceptions of heteronormative masculinity and racist ideology (cf. Ferber, 
2000; McClintock, 1995). A closer investigation of two seemingly unconnected 
social movements, in the US, the white supremacy  and the mythopoetic men’s 
movements, shows that both gather disenfranchised white males and ‘blame the 
losses of white men on women and minorities’ (Ferber, 2000: 32). Even more so, 
these movements appear to share a common sense of insecurity and the need to 
uphold their hegemonic position within the society. Because ‘both racial and 
gender identities are increasingly revealed to be unstable, that those who have the 
most invested in these categories and their hierarchical construction react by 
reasserting their unwavering foundations’ (Ferber, 2000: 40). In doing so, the two 
movements proclaim the essential nature of these identity constructs, and as such 
envisage a re–masculinisation of the hierarchical gender binary – put simply, a 
restoration of an allegedly glorious past in which the ‘white race’ and 
heteronormative masculinity constructions were unchallenged. 
Nationalist ideology, however, does not seem to be exclusively concerned with 
the ethnically/‘racially’ different outside Other. Within the national body there are 
contesting definitions of masculinity, and how gender relations should be 
envisaged and reproduced. These too are subject to a process of normative 
evaluation and policing. Through these practices, the nationalist ideology 
underlines the desired masculinity performative and proclaims its hegemonic 
status. In so doing, it also defines the ‘abomination’ falling off the normative 
spectrum – the non–heteronormative masculinity (cf. Kulpa, 2011; Mosse, 1996; 
Norocel, 2010c; Stevens, 1999). As Connell has aptly noted, there is no other 
conception of masculinity more destabilizing than that of homosexuality. Indeed, 
within the dynamics of hegemony of masculinity in the Western world, ‘the 
relationship between heterosexual and homosexual men is central, carrying a 
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heavy symbolic freight. To many people homosexuality is a negation of 
masculinity, and homosexual men must be effeminate’ (Connell, 1992: 736).  
A case in point here is the emergence of political homophobia. As I have 
evidenced elsewhere, homosexuality has oftentimes been depicted as a disease on 
the otherwise healthy national body, and regarded as a possible threat to the 
dominating heterosexual masculinity performative, since the possibility of the 
latter being corrupted into homosexuality can never be excluded thereby 
undermining the whole national project (Norocel, 2010c). The only feasible option 
in such a situation has been to banish homosexuality extra muros, separating the 
‘true’ masculine embodiments of the nation from its ‘weak’ and ‘perverted’ 
manifestations portrayed by homosexual desire and its corresponding masculinity 
performative18. To sum up, what I make use of in the present study is a conceptual 
symbiosis between the normative masculinity performative and nationalist 
ideology – particularly the main means to operate a separation between the 
various groups of men and their different masculinity performatives, with an 
emphasis on the reproductive heteronormative masculinity performative of the 
ethnic majority as the apex of the nation construct, and the various means it is 
afforded to dismiss and control competing masculinity performatives. 
3.2 FOR GENDER–SENSITIVE RESEARCH OF RADICAL RIGHT 
POPULISM 
In this chapter I synthesise the main feminist concepts that I intend to employ in 
the investigation of radical right populist ideology herein. In so doing, my 
intention has been not to deliver a detailed overview of feminist research. Rather, 
I have aimed to indicate how my own research project is anchored in the tradition 
of feminist research – providing the feminist conceptual vocabulary I employ in 
this work. In addition, I have reviewed the key contributions of feminist 
scholarship of nations and nationalism, which I considered of importance for this 
study. I have thus indicated a possible means to address the gender–blindness of 
the theoretical canon of radical right populism. More clearly, extrapolating from 
the findings of feminist scholarship on the field of nations and nationalism to the 
study of radical right populism, I argue that the people of radical right populist 
ideology may be conceptualised as a gendered construct, inasmuch as the nation 
of nationalist ideology. Additionally, the conceptual construct of the people – just 
as the nation and the gender performative – is, as detailed in the previous chapter, 
18 It is nonetheless worth noting that the distinction between ‘good’ heterosexual men and ‘bad’ 
homosexual men has become less clear in the past decades. With the increase interaction between 
nationalism and homonormativity – take, for instance, the special ‘LGBT chapters’ of extreme 
right English Defence League (EDL) – it seems the boundaries have been moved in the direction of 
at least nominally incorporating into the national project those members of the LGBTQI 
community that submit to the nationalist ideals in the neoliberal context. 
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characterised by contingency and instability, being subject to a continuous process 
of definition, consolidation, contestation, and reinterpretation across time, as well 
as between various polities in which the concept is employed by the radical right 
populist ideology. In other words, a study of the radical right ideology could trace 
the discursive genealogy of the concept, and the place occupied by the hierarchical 
gender binary in this context; hence it would evidence the various changes, 
reinterpretations, and possible moments of tension across time. More clearly, the 
gender–sensitive lens at work in the present study ‘enables us to see the extent 
and structure of gender hierarchy. It permits us to examine both how social 
constructions of masculinity and femininity shape our ways of thinking and 
knowing how women’s and men’s lives are patterned differently as a consequence 
of gendered practices’ (Peterson & Runyan, 1993: 190). 
Starting from the conceptual overlap between the people and the nation, which 
I noted in the previous chapter, and juxtaposing it with the gendered aspects of 
the national construct evidenced by feminist research in the field, I maintain that 
the femininity and masculinity performatives ascribed to the women and men 
constituting the people community might be seen in a similar way in radical right 
populist discourses as they are in nationalist discourses. There are several aspects 
that need to be shown here. In order to answer to the research questions I posited 
in the first chapter, I need to analyse how the people collectivity – overlapping 
with that of the national family construct – is gendered. 
In order to do so, following on the footsteps of feminist scholarship of 
nationalism, I plan to employ the theoretical conceptualisation of the woman’s 
burden of national parenthood, and the position to which women have been 
relegated within the national collectivity to account for the functioning of the 
hierarchical gender binary in radical right populist ideology. As such, 
heteronormativity may represent a crucial criterion of intelligibility in radical 
right populist discourses. Consequently, of particular importance is to investigate 
the place that radical populist discourses may assign to women as bearers of the 
community, and as signifiers of the people as a homogeneous collectivity. On this 
matter, crucial is the awareness of the normative implications of assimilating 
motherhood to bearing the offspring of the family father, and by extrapolation the 
people’s offspring. Such a move therefore brings to attention the position of other, 
non–normative femininities in radical right populist ideology. 
On the issue of people’s homogeneity, as I showed in the previous chapter, the 
radical right populist parties appear to be preoccupied with maintaining the purity 
of the people. Such a preoccupation requires investigating radical right populist 
appeals to the people’s men to defend their women from either internal or 
external threats – which similarly to nationalist descriptions might be oftentimes 
depicted in masculine terms. This may also indicate an attempt to control 
women’s bodies through various means – either by prohibiting the women’s 
interaction with the masculine Other under the threat of rape, or discouraging 
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women’s autonomy and the right to control their own bodies by positing the right 
to abortion as problematic and relating it to the ‘demographic race’. 
Another aspect worth noting here is an awareness of the position of men and 
certain masculinity performatives at the heart of the national family construct. 
Such ascribing of men as family heads may reconfirm the asymmetric, patriarchal 
nature of the hierarchical gender binary manifest in radical right populist 
discourses. Here, emphasis is put on the plurality of masculinity performatives, 
and the position of hegemony some of them may be afforded in particular 
political–socio–cultural–economic circumstances. As such, certain hierarchies at 
work within the spectrum of masculinity performatives that underpin radical right 
populist discourses – more clearly, if the native heterosexual masculinity 
performative is heralded as the ideal in radical right populism – may involve the 
crafting of a hierarchy of subordination and even oppression of other masculinity 
performatives. The assumption of masculine leadership leads to a symbiotic 
relationship between the people and their male leaders, which in turn results in 
the representation of – to paraphrase Nagel (1998: 252) – honour, patriotism, 
cowardice, bravery, and duty as quintessential attributes of the hegemonic 
masculinity performative, and concurrently designate these as inherently defining 
dimensions for the whole body of people. To investigate these, in the following 
chapter I introduce the main tenets of the conceptual metaphor theory and 
present the most important lines of criticism this has met since its introduction. 
Having the above criticism as a point of departure, I suggest a genealogical take on 
the analysis of conceptual metaphors, which enables my inquiry on the gendered 
nature of the radical right populist discourses and the ideology they underpin. 
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4 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND CHOICE OF 
EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 
The analyst of manifestations of radical right populist ideology through discourse 
needs to be aware of several interrelated axes of structuring the political subject – 
gender, ethnicity/‘race’, social class, sexuality. This stance is grounded in the 
gendered nature of the people construct in such discourses. The people 
conception, as discussed previously, rests on the generic presentation of the 
collectivity, in metaphorical terms, as a family. The collective identification with 
an enlarged family thereby enables the ordering of radical right populist 
discourses according to a heteronormative criterion of intelligibility. With this in 
mind, I suggest in the following a discussion on the concept of metaphor. 
Metaphor, as it is detailed in the present chapter, is not simply and innocently an 
embellishment of political discourse; in fact, it is actively producing the ‘reality’ 
that is described and reinforced through that discourse. More clearly, metaphor 
highlights how social relations are to be understood, in which way specific political 
issues are to be talked about, focuses attention on specific problems and elevates 
them to the centre stage of the political agenda, while purposively obscuring 
others. Consequently, the use of metaphor by political actors uncovers the 
ideological underpinnings of the discourse the metaphor is embedded in, and at 
the same time provides a comprehensive description of the specific worldview the 
said political actors entertain. Fleshing out the connection between metaphor, 
ideology, and discourse, I strengthen my argument for the investigation of 
conceptual metaphor in radical right populist discourses. 
At a basic level, metaphor represents ‘the ideational construction of reality’ 
(Koller, 2004: 3), a communicative resource usually employed by language users 
to enrich ‘the expressiveness of their message through the most economical means 
available to them’ (Charteris–Black, 2004: 17). Put differently, metaphor can be 
defined as the beams of light from a ‘searchlight that selectively highlights some 
aspects of the unknown but leaves other aspects in the dark’ (Mühlhäusler, 2012: 
9). In other words, depicting the people as a family collective enriches the 
expressiveness of radical right populist discourses, and concurrently suggests a 
certain level of closeness and even intimacy between the constitutive members of 
the people community. Indeed, kinship or simply ‘family’ or ‘own blood’ offers a 
high degree of certainty for self–identification. Against an ever globalising world 
characterised by fluidity and diversity, a reference to family ties enforces a view 
that regards the named community as immutable, ‘real’ and ‘natural’ (Baumann, 
1995: 736; Carsten, 2004: 143). It is precisely the metaphorical construction that 
facilitates such transfer of attributes from the family concept to that of the people, 
which is of interest here. 
The etymological origin of the word ‘metaphor’ is the Greek metapherein 
(meta– means ‘with’/‘after’, while –pherein stands for ‘to carry’, ‘to bear’), which 
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denotes a process of transfer of meaning (Aristotle, 1997: 1457b, 7–20). The 
aforesaid dynamic relation of motion, which metaphor brings about, has the 
ability to transport those participating in such communicative situations by calling 
into mind a specific emotional response – in a sense showing the common 
etymological root shared by ‘motion’ and ‘emotion’, and strengthening the central 
position of metaphor as bearer of meaning in communication among people 
(Charteris–Black, 2004: 19). It is worth noting that such a process of metapherein 
– in plain speech, of carrying over – takes place in a context in which the 
interlocutors have a specific expectation about the meaning of the metaphorical 
construct in question, in the sense that such a movement takes place in a 
communication context in which the metaphor has been previously anchored in 
language and discourse (Charteris–Black, 2011: 31). However, metaphors are not 
simple ‘doilies decorating daily speech and thought – and ensuing action – but an 
integral part of it. They cannot be taken away, leaving behind them some perfectly 
clear, unambiguous set of terms that have a one–to–one relationship with their 
referents’ (Yanow, 2008: 235). Put differently, metaphorical constructions are 
effective not only at an immediately apparent lexical level – for instance, how 
words are joined together in a text – but have a higher cognitive dimension as well 
– how these words joined together call in our minds certain ways of 
understanding what is being communicated to us. In this resides their importance 
to the study of political discourses. 
The political rhetoric and the ideologically motivated conduct of political 
actors, which underpins political discourses, require a string of oversimplified 
explanations, which are expressed metaphorically. Put simply, the increasing 
complexity and heterogeneity of social norms has been presented by political 
actors in a simplified form with the help of metaphorical constructions, thereby 
allowing a basic understanding of such issues of common interest. Nevertheless, 
researchers have warned, by employing metaphors discursively, political actors 
make use of the metaphors’ inherent ability to disproportionately highlight certain 
elements of social practices, which at the same time obscure if not outright omit 
some others. More precisely, political actors emphasise with the help of 
metaphors some specific aspects of the issue at stake, while silencing some others, 
thereby reflecting their ideological stand on the matter (Carver & Pikalo, 2008: 3; 
Edelman, 2001: 4; Gregg, 2004: 60). The type of ideological underpinning that 
metaphors are involved in does not become apparent at once. Awareness of the 
relationship between a particular lexical metaphor present in a certain political 
discourse, the conceptual metaphor that it may be related to and their place within 
a wider cluster of metaphors, vary greatly from one individual to another. 
Nonetheless, ‘awareness of their motivation in socially influential domains of 
language use improves our understanding of the ideological basis for metaphor 
choice’ (Charteris–Black, 2004: 244). Returning to the example above, referring 
to the people in metaphorical terms as a national family emphasises the unitary 
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aspect of the community, and thus alleges a common albeit distant genetic 
heritage. At the same time, it obscures the diversity of the collectivity in terms of 
gender identification, social class and sexual preferences. 
To account for the ideological work metaphors do, in this chapter I elaborate 
the methodological apparatus that enables the analysis of the discursive 
articulations of radical right populist ideology. This is undertaken in several steps. 
At first, I discuss the Aristotelian ambiguity in the use of metaphor in rhetorical 
contexts (Aristotle, 1997; 2010). I thereby problematise the understanding of 
metaphors as mere lexical embellishments and their capacity for persuasion. In so 
doing, I assess the key findings of metaphor research in the field of pragmatics, 
modern hermeneutics, and philosophy of language (cf. Black, 1993; Ricoeur, 
2003; Searle, 1993). The ‘conceptual turn’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003) is of crucial 
importance for the present study. The main tenets of conceptual metaphor theory 
are therefore presented in detail. The Lakoffian conceptual constructs of the 
NATION IS A FAMILY metaphor and that of the STRICT FATHER receive particular 
attention (Lakoff, 2002). Its subsequent critiques (cf. Charteris–Black, 2004; 
Chilton, 2004; Hart, 2010; Kövecses, 2002; Tendahl, 2009) are then elaborated 
upon, and the feminist interventions in the study of metaphors are presented 
against this background (cf. Adams, 2009; Ahrens & Lee, 2009; Carney, 2008; 
Haste, 1994; Koller & Semino, 2009; Meier & Lombardo, 2009; von der Lippe, 
1999). Discussing the challenges of designing an appropriate methodological 
apparatus (Boréus & Bergström, 2009) and avoiding circular argumentation (cf. 
Kertész & Rákosi, 2009; Kövecses, 2008), I suggest a syncretic methodology for 
the analysis of conceptual metaphors in discursive contexts (cf. Carver & Pikalo, 
2008; Gibbs & Lonergan, 2009; Mottier, 2008; Musolff, 2003; Semino, 2008). 
The genealogical aspect of this methodology and its importance to understanding 
the ideological manifestations in radical right populist discourses is then 
explained at length. Subsequently, I describe the empirical material selected from 
the discourses of two European radical right populist parties to be analysed in the 
following chapters with the help of the aforesaid methodology. The parties’ 
newspapers are then introduced as their ideological mouthpieces, and their 
importance for the present investigation is shown. 
4.1 CRITICAL CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY: 
ADDRESSING THE AMBIGUITY OF METAPHORS 
The discussion concerning metaphors and their role in discourse – with a 
particular preoccupation for their effects in political discourses – has a 
considerable tradition. Despite the long history of the usage and conceptualisation 
of metaphors, the topic has been heatedly debated and oftentimes has become the 
subject of intense academic scrutiny. On this matter, Aristotle’s philosophical 
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works – particularly Poetics (1997), and Rhetoric (2010) – have represented 
pivotal points of departure for fruitful academic theorisation and primary material 
for critical review and reinterpretation. This may be partly attributed to the 
vagueness of the original Aristotelian text, but also to the different forms of 
reading the aforementioned texts by various researchers that have been interested 
either in rhetorical argumentation and the philosophical implications of 
metaphorical constructions (cf. Black, 1993; Ricoeur, 2003; Searle, 1993), or the 
cognitive conceptual understanding of metaphor (cf. Carver & Pikalo, 2008; 
Charteris–Black, 2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). On this matter, it is worth 
keeping in mind that in Poetics Aristotle had defined metaphors as a powerful 
means to transfer meaning from one context – such as events, activities, ideas, 
objects, attributes, etc. – to another, resting on the ability to depict unusual 
resemblances between the two domains at stake. Although this indicates the 
potential of using metaphors at a philosophical level, thereby hinting at their 
conceptual understanding, the meaning of metaphor as a mere figure of speech is 
nonetheless strengthened in the opus, and hence relegates metaphor to a 
decorative accessory of discourse (Aristotle, 1997: 1459a, 3–8; 1460b, 6–12). 
Even more so, in his theorising of rhetorical devices and strategies, 
suggestively titled Rhetoric, Aristotle had focused on language and how metaphor, 
through its ‘foreign air’ may obscure the intention of the speaker and ‘make the 
discourse appear clear and perspicuous’ (Steen, 2009: 34–35). This had not 
precluded Aristotle from acknowledging the cognitive power of such metaphorical 
construction, in the sense that metaphor was deemed able to put together two 
different domains in a novel way, that was previously inconceivable (Aristotle, 
2010: 1404b, § 6–8; 1410a, § 3–4). Indeed, Aristotle’s theorising of metaphor has 
been carefully reviewed in the past two decades and a more decidedly conceptual 
understanding of metaphor has been suggested (Semino, 2008: 9; Turner, 1998: 
47). Under these circumstances, the similarities with abstract philosophical 
reasoning have been shown in the Aristotelian text, such as in the following: 
Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before […] from objects 
closely related, but not obvious to everyone at first sight […] just as in 
philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is 
characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas’ saying, that 
arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the 
injured or wronged. 
(Aristotle, 2010: 1412a, § 5) 
The usefulness of metaphorical constructions for enabling philosophical 
reasoning and the metaphors’ inherent conceptual structure have determined 
researchers to take a pragmatic perspective on the study of metaphor, thereby 
focusing on the persuasive capacity of metaphor (cf. Black, 1993; Ricoeur, 2003; 
Searle, 1993). In so doing, the pragmatics movement reiterated the Aristotelian 
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understanding of rhetoric as the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory 
of argumentation and that of composition and style. The pragmatic theories of 
metaphor have contributed greatly to the development of metaphor research. 
Indeed, the pragmatic framework for conceptualising metaphors has 
demonstrated that metaphorical constructions are dependent on the speakers’ 
intention to persuade and rely on the use of inferences, thereby replacing logical 
judgement based on direct observation with a contextualised operationalization 
dependent on circumstantial evidence and prior conclusions (Searle, 1993). 
Nonetheless, the pragmatic approach claimed incorrectly that metaphorical use is 
restricted to special instances, and hence assumed that literal language has 
precedence over metaphorical language (Charteris–Black, 2004: 10–13); it is 
precisely the ability of metaphor to transcend the constrains of literal presence at 
lexical level that I discuss in the following section. 
4.1.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF RHETORICAL ANALYSES OF METAPHORS: 
EXAMPLES FROM ROMANIA AND SWEDEN 
At this point it is worthwhile returning to the metaphorical representation of the 
nation as a family and considering the limitations of aforesaid approaches. The 
etymology of such terms as ‘patriot’ or ‘fatherland’19 indicates that these 
metaphorical constructions ‘belong to a common stock of political metaphors, 
which have been used in Western culture since antiquity.’ (Musolff, 2003: 127) In 
the Central and Eastern European context, namely in Romania, the depiction of 
the nation as a family has not diverged noticeably from the aforementioned 
‘Western’ tradition. On this matter, it is worth mentioning a particularly salient 
play published in the first decade of twentieth century: The Sunset (Delavrancea, 
1967). The play emphasised the importance of the family metaphor for the 
Romanian national construct and hence confirmed ‘the communion of 
generations in the spirit of the eternal Romanian ideal’ (Boia, 2001: 195). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the play has become part of the Romanian literary canon. It has 
enjoyed equal levels of popularity in the interwar period marked by the rise of 
Romanian fascism of Orthodox inspiration, in the fervently nationalist phase of 
the Romanian communist dictatorship, and in the years post–1989 that witnessed 
the syncretic reclamation of the two previous periods, and the crystallisation of 
radical right populism in Romania (cf. Andreescu, 2005; Gallagher, 2005; 
Norocel, 2010c). 
19 ‘Patriot’ has a Greek etymology, patriotes meaning ‘of one’s father’. The ‘fatherland’ similarly 
comes from the Greek and Latin patria; it is widely used in Romance languages and makes direct 
reference to a pater, in other words a ‘father’; in Germanic languages it is derived from the form 
vaterland with the same meaning of ‘forefathers’ land’. 
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Illustratively, the play’s key figure, Stephen III, ruler of the Moldavian 
principality20 – also known as Stephen ‘the Great’ – delivers a memorable speech 
on his deathbed. Reminding those present of his past as their ‘shepherd’ – a term 
with strong Christian and especially Christian Orthodox connotations, which also 
echoed the long pastoral traditions of the Romanian–speaking people – Stephen 
proclaims with his last powers that the land/country he has ruled over had never 
been the property of his princely forefathers that led the country before him. Nor 
did he ever own it himself. Even more so, none of those present could lay claim on 
owning the land/country, because it belongs to the future generations and their 
offspring in perpetuity. Consequently, this (home)land becomes a valuable asset to 
be inherited – according to the Salic law – by allegedly worthy male offspring, very 
much similar to how the herds of sheep were transferred from one generation of 
male shepherds to another – as sheep husbandry has generally been an exclusively 
masculine endeavour – thereby ensuring the survival of the shepherd’s family. 
With this said, Stephen declares his readiness to hand over the effigy of princely 
power to his male successor, and symbolically confirm the community of blood 
and destiny of the inhabitants of the Romanian principality he ruled: 
Remember the words of Stephen, who has been your shepherd far into his 
old age… that [this land/country] did not belong to my ancestors, it never 
belonged to me, and it does not belong to you either, for it belongs to your 
offspring and to your offspring’s offspring till the end of all times! […] This 
mantle is too heavy … someone younger needs to bear it on his shoulders… 
(Delavrancea, 1967: 54) 
Moving to Northern Europe, in the Swedish context, the concept of folkhem 
(meaning the home/house of the [Swedish] people) has played a prominent role in 
the country’s modern history (Hall, 2008: 146–148; Hellström, 2010: 95; 
Trägårdh, 2002: 131). Indeed, in the nineteenth century, in its initial conservative 
interpretation, the folkhem embodied the harmonious relationship between the 
king and his people, in a manner similar to that of the bourgeois family under the 
careful authority of its father (Hall, 1998: 71). The emphasis was put on the ideal 
of organic conservatism and its core values of orderliness, national cohesion, and 
20 Moldavia represents a historical and geographic entity, and former principality that together 
with Wallachia formed the basis of the original Romanian state. These two Romanian Danubian 
principalities had been autonomous within the Ottoman Empire and succeeded to follow a 
different path of development than the other neighbouring Ottoman provinces. Their rulers paid 
tribute to, and were the subservient political satellites of the Ottoman Porte; the two principalities 
avoided Islamisation and their ruling elites were tolerated by the Porte when exploiting the 
common people and preserving their customs and privileges in these lands. The binding force 
between the ruling classes and commoners was their shared Christian Orthodox faith. The figure of 
medieval prince Stephen III is highly symbolic since he actively opposed the ascendency of the 
Porte in the Romanian principalities, and his long rule marked the climax of independent 
Moldavian politics (Boia, 2001: 195–196; Gallagher, 2005: 18–19; Livezeanu, 2000: 4; Verdery, 
1996: 71). 
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naturalised hierarchical structuring (Götz, 2001: 104–105). The metaphorical 
construct of the national home/house became nonetheless a part of the Swedish 
social–democratic discourse in the early twentieth century, epitomising the party’s 
efforts to construct a society based on equality, solidarity and confidence in 
progress, in which the figure of the worker became synonymous with ‘the common 
folk’ (Dahlstedt, 2009: 117–119; Götz, 2001: 106; Hellström, 2010: 97). It was 
Per–Albin Hansson, Social–Democrat leader and Prime Minister in four 
governments between 1932 and 1946, who consecrated the folkhem founded on ‘a 
trinity of democracy, the people and the nation that contributed to the 
establishment of the modern Swedish national community’ (Hellström & Nilsson, 
2010: 62). In Hansson’s view, social cohesiveness and solidarity were 
cornerstones of the Swedish welfare project envisaged by his party. This idealised 
home/house epitomised a place of equality, in which privilege and 
disenfranchisement were replaced by fairness, compassion, cooperation and 
helpfulness: 
The foundations of the folkhem are the social consciousness and sense of 
togetherness. The good home does not know any privileged or any 
dispossessed, no darlings and no stepchildren. [...] It is equality, caring, 
cooperation, and helpfulness that triumph in the good home. Adapted to 
the folkhem [...] this would mean the breakdown of any social and economic 
barriers, which at present separate the citizens into privileged and 
dispossessed, dominant and dependent, into rich and poor, wealthy and 
impoverished, plunderers and plundered. 
(Hansson, 2010: 57–58) (Italics – mine) 
What the two metaphorical constructions from the Romanian and Swedish 
contexts unveil are the limitations of a superficial lexical reading – in the sense of 
analysing only how the words have been arranged together in the two transcribed 
quotes – in search for the national family metaphor. In order to account for the 
complexity of the two metaphorical constructions, the analysis needs to take place 
at a higher, conceptual level – one which connects the words arranged in a specific 
formation as reproduced above with a more abstract register. After a brief glance 
at the two examples, it becomes readily apparent that for instance in the 
Romanian example one cannot claim that the metaphorical construction of the 
national family is in use at lexical level. What may be identified, however, is the 
metaphorical representation of the (male) political leader as ‘shepherd’ and an 
intention to persuade the readers about the uninterrupted genealogy of the 
country’s inhabitants – hence evidence of rendering in a pragmatic key. On the 
other hand, the Swedish concept of the folkhem does not have an exclusively 
lexical metaphorical value. It too can be understood in a pragmatic manner as 
evidence of the speaker’s intention to persuade his public about a community of 
destiny gathered under the protective roof of one shared home – the Swedish 
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people’s home/house – and concomitantly as an intention for a more complex 
structuring of the discourse. In other words, in both cases the national family 
metaphorical construction does not become immediately apparent, but it 
nonetheless emerges from the context at a higher cognitive level. This bears 
witness to the presence of metaphor at a conceptual level. Consequently, the 
following section discusses the conceptual aspect of metaphorical constructions. 
4.1.2 THE CONCEPTUAL TURN IN THE ANALYSES OF METAPHORS AND 
CRITICISMS OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
Generally speaking, conceptual linguists have asserted that metaphors need not be 
understood as mere rhetorical embellishments, and have in turn elaborated a 
theory of metaphors as foundational to the human conceptual system (cf. 
Charteris–Black, 2004; Gibbs, 1998; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Semino, 2008; 
Tendahl, 2009). Such a theoretical standpoint has been founded on the 
aforementioned constitutive ambiguity of Aristotle’s works, and benefited from 
the insights of research on the pragmatic aspect and, hence, the significant role 
played by metaphors in abstract reasoning. According to Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, any lexical artefact21 within a given discourse gains meaning according to 
a conceptual structure. This conceptual structure is context bound, being founded 
on cultural and physical experiences, very much alike conventional metaphors 
(Kövecses, 2008: 179; Tendahl, 2009: 2–3; von der Lippe, 1999: 181–183). Hence, 
meaning is embedded in the appropriation and employment of a conceptual 
system (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 197). 
In the context of conceptual metaphor theory then, a distinction has been 
made between the terms metaphor and metaphorical concept, on the one hand, 
and metaphorical expression, on the other. Metaphor, often used interchangeably 
with metaphorical concept, entails in this context ‘a cross domain mapping in the 
conceptual system’ (Lakoff, 1993: 203), where the notion of mapping is imported 
from the mathematical terminology. More clearly, the target domain, which is 
explained with the help of conceptual metaphors, generally makes reference to 
areas of experience that are typically unfamiliar, of a certain level of abstraction 
and complexity. Conversely, the source domain, which provides a new explanation 
of the target domain, oftentimes appeals to easily recognizable, rather concrete 
and physical experiences (Semino, 2008: 6). Applying this scheme to the matter at 
hand, the concept of NATION, as shown in the metaphorical expressions discussed 
above, is explicated at a conceptual level in terms of a FAMILY and the relations that 
emerge between its various members; we thereby arrive at the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor and its articulations. In contrast to that, the term 
21 Here, a lexical artefact is considered to be a lexical sequence that may contain a specific group of 
words, which are arranged along one or several sentences. 
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metaphorical expression makes reference to the lexical ‘surface realization of such 
a cross–domain–mapping’ (Lakoff, 1993: 203). Nonetheless, there is an implicit 
connection between the two: the ‘inherent, literal, nonmetaphorical skeleton, 
which is simply not rich enough to serve as a full–fledged concept’ is elaborated 
through ‘a collection of stable, conventional’ metaphorical expressions in various 
ways (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 128). Put differently, a conceptual metaphor ‘is a 
formal statement of any idea that is hidden in a figure of speech (e.g. metaphor, or 
metonym for that matter) that can be inferred from a number’ of metaphorical 
expressions and thereby enables the resolution of semantic tensions that the 
aforesaid expressions have given rise to in the text (Charteris–Black, 2004: 15). 
Even more so, conceptual metaphors can then be grouped into metaphorical 
clusters – which represent a cohesive system of metaphorical concepts and their 
adjoining discursive articulations that commence from a common condition or 
image to transmit a specific experience or idea. Analysing the interplay between 
the various conceptual metaphors that together constitute a metaphorical cluster, 
and their lexical manifestation in text through metaphorical expressions, unveils 
significant aspects concerning the coherence of a particular discourse and offers 
important cues about the underlying ideology in the discourse at stake: 
The purpose of inferring conceptual metaphors from surface ones is to 
enable us to identify patterns of interrelationship between metaphors that 
account for their meaning. Similarly, interrelating conceptual metaphors 
through the identification of conceptual [clusters] can assist in accounting 
for coherence in particular discourses. Identification and description of 
these conceptual levels enhances our understanding of their role in ideology 
and contributes to theory building because it provides a point of access into 
the thoughts that underlie language use. 
(Charteris–Black, 2004: 244) 
The main argument is hence that the use of metaphors is not ideologically 
innocent; rather they influence people’s fundamental social beliefs and their 
political manifestations (Charteris–Black, 2004: 24). The preference for a certain 
conceptual metaphor in a specific social context, researchers have argued, has a 
crucial impact on how one structures reality. It determines what is explained and 
with which means and what is left outside this framework of intelligibility; hence, 
it highlights the various power relations at work in that particular discourse 
(Boréus & Bergström, 2009: 267; Charteris–Black, 2011: 45). In relation to this, 
Jonathan Charteris–Black has noted that traditional Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
is preoccupied with the cognitive linguistic aspect at the expense of considering 
the wider discursive implication of metaphorical use. He has therefore argued for 
a critical study of metaphor that is aware of the importance of ideology in 
discourse. Charteris–Black demonstrated further the importance of such an 
approach to the study of politics: 
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Critical metaphor analysis provides us with a methodology for the analysis 
and interpretation of ideology and illustrates how rhetoric is used for the 
purpose of legitimisation. Identification of conceptual metaphors is 
inevitably subjective, like all qualitative judgements, but the analytical 
method is clear and the reader is free to challenge metaphor classifications. 
[…] When analysing political speeches using critical metaphor analysis the 
cognitive semantic approach needs to be complemented with a summary of 
the social context in which the speeches were made and of the overall verbal 
context of metaphor. 
(Charteris–Black, 2011: 49–50) 
This brings us one step closer to the matter at stake; the ideological 
underpinning of the utilisation of conceptual metaphors in political discourses – 
as was discussed at length in the first chapter, section 1.1.1. Acknowledging that 
politics is ‘the art of using power in order to achieve social goals’, some 
researchers have argued that utilising ‘the power of language’ can provide more 
easily and cheaply available results than for instance the power exercised 
forcefully, through the police and army (De Landtsheer, 2009: 60; Ringmar, 
2007: 119; von der Lippe, 1999: 230). And here metaphors play a critical role since 
they offer the speaker the power to organise/explain social life in a specific 
manner. More clearly, metaphors ‘tell you what things are and how they hang 
together; metaphors define the relationship between superiors and subordinates 
and between social classes; they identify social problems and their solutions and 
tell us what is feasible, laudable and true’ (Ringmar, 2007: 119). In this respect, 
metaphors have been considered to ‘act as discursive hubs, developing meaning in 
the interplay of texts and contexts’ (Carver & Pikalo, 2008: 3–4). Indeed, by 
concentrating their attention on the style of political language and the particular 
forms taken by political communication, some scholars have attempted to 
complement those studies that take only manifest content into account and argue 
that the manner politicians express their thoughts affects the meaning acquired by 
those words employed in their speeches (Vertessen & De Landtsheer, 2008: 271). 
Metaphor plays in other words a decisive role in the dynamic relationship 
between discourse and ideology. Not only that ‘discourses reflect particular 
ideologies, but also contribute to shape them and change them; ideologies result 
from discoursal and social practices but also determines and constrains these 
practices’ (Semino, 2008: 90). Under these circumstances, metaphorical 
expressions are an important element of discourse, and as such a constitutive 
feature of ideology, by purposefully emphasising a certain aspect while obscuring 
some others (Charteris–Black, 2011: 44; Chilton, 1996: 74; Hart, 2010: 128–129). 
Even more so, some metaphors can be actively employed both ‘to “name” and to 
“frame” particular initiatives, with which they become inextricably associated. 
Second, once a particular metaphor occupies a prominent position in the public 
domain, it can be alluded to and exploited in different ways by different 
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participants in political debates.’ (Semino, 2008: 117) In this light, the analysis of 
conceptual metaphors that uncovers the ideological underpinnings that motivate 
their presence in discourse is to be regarded as part of the wider scholarly 
endeavour of critical discourse analysis, concerned with how power relations are 
constituted and reified through discourse (Fairclough, 2003: 75–77; Hart, 2010: 
6–8; Stenvoll, 2008: 36–37; van Dijk, 1994: 164; Wodak, 2006: 179–181; Wodak 
& Meyer, 2009: 13–15). 
Of particular importance here are the different ways that the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor can be embedded in discourse. Nations are conceptualised 
in terms of extended families, incorporating the patriarchal and heterosexual 
underpinning of the family as made up of a father, mother, and their offspring. 
The aforesaid conceptual metaphorical construction has investigated by George 
Lakoff in his study titled Moral Politics (2002). The Lakoffian conceptualisation 
of the national family has been enunciated in the specific context of the political 
discourses in the United States of America (USA); accounting for the ideological 
battle between the right–conservative Republican Party, and the left–liberal 
Democratic Party. Indeed, Lakoff initially posited that the NATION IS A FAMILY 
represented the link between a moral stance founded on the concept of family and 
the conceptualisation of the national construct in family terms – more clearly, the 
existence of a ‘family–based morality’ at work in politics. The consequence of such 
an approach to politics is reflected in the different articulation of the national 
family metaphor in the conservative and liberal politics of the USA: 
The link between the family–based morality and politics comes from one of 
the most common ways of conceptualising what a nation is, namely, as a 
family. It is the common, unconscious, and automatic metaphor of the 
Nation–as–Family that produces contemporary conservatism from Strict 
Father morality and contemporary liberalism from Nurturant Parent 
morality. 
(Lakoff, 2002: 13) 
The metaphorical construction of the nation in terms of family relations and 
family morality rests on the suggestive power that family as a concept has across 
societies and its connotations of ‘close or “thick” relationships with a basis in 
descent’ (Honohan, 2008: 73). However, the very concept of family may vary 
greatly across time within one particular society, but also from one society to 
another (Howe, 2006: 64; Kövecses, 2005: 290–292; Ringmar, 2007: 123–124). 
Even more so, within one given society morality merges with politics and thereby 
determines a person’s political and ideological convictions (Kövecses, 2002: 63–
64). The two competing views on morality underlined in the Lakoffian model 
understand the national family in two different ways. The first as comprising of 
independent and self–reliant individuals whose morality is acquired through 
discipline and regard the head of state or party leader as the pater familias – 
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master of the house or STRICT FATHER – in its right–wing, conservative 
interpretation. Alternatively, the national family consists of people more inclined 
to cooperation and whose morality is achieved through nurturing rather than 
discipline and thereby entrust their leadership to a NURTURANT PARENT – in its more 
progressively liberal rendering22. 
More clearly, previous research suggests that in the discourse of the right–wing 
conservative Republican Party, the national family is portrayed under the 
leadership of a strict father figure (cf. Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2004; 2005; 2008; 
Lakoff, 2002). The conservative discourse displays a vocabulary that abounds in 
such words as ‘character’, ‘virtue’, ‘discipline’, ‘strong’, ‘punishment’, ‘individual 
responsibility’, ‘backbone’, ‘standards’, ‘authority’, ‘heritage’, ‘competition’, ‘earn’, 
‘hard work’, ‘traditional common sense’, ‘freedom’ used in a positive key. 
Concomitantly, there are also words with a negative connotation that are generally 
associated with their political opponents, such as ‘intrusion’, ‘interference’, 
‘meddling’, ‘dependency’, ‘self–indulgent’, ‘elite’, ‘quotas’, ‘breakdown’, ‘corrupt’, 
‘decay’, ‘rot’, ‘degenerate’, ‘deviant’, ‘lifestyle’ (Lakoff, 2002: 30). Reflecting the 
preference for this particular vocabulary, the interrelated conceptual metaphors of 
the NATION IS A FAMILY and that of the STRICT FATHER, which lies at its heart, 
articulate a distinctive metaphorical cluster that structures the intelligibility of 
right–wing conservative discourse and thereby provides it with a certain 
ideological consistency. 
I detail below several conceptual dimensions that structure the aforementioned 
metaphorical cluster, as discerned from the detailed description of the model 
provided by Lakoff (2002); I consider these dimensions of cardinal importance for 
the present study: 
• Order – expresses the legitimation of traditional hierarchy and power relations. 
It naturalises the view that ‘the rich are either morally or naturally superior to 
the poor’ (Lakoff, 2002: 100). Additionally, there is also a problematic gender 
aspect specific to this dimension that naturalises dominance, positioning ‘God 
over human beings; human beings over nature; parents over children; men over 
women.’ (Lakoff, 2002: 304) This is particularly important in justifying, from a 
conservative point of view, men’s authority over women, not only within the 
family but also in society at large. 
• Authority – articulates the notion of authority in terms of the dyadic 
relationship between legitimacy and illegitimacy. It thereby enables the transfer 
from resentment towards meddling parents to resentment directed against 
authority figures that are also perceived as intrusive (Lakoff, 2002: 100). On 
22 Translating the metaphor model to a European context, there is an arguably more progressive 
left–leaning political attitude, which emphasizes the parent’s figure as a nurturing presence at the 
head of family. It is noteworthy in this context that the head of family appears to be assigned an 
ambiguous gender identification – the ‘parent’ – which is possibly indicative of the aforesaid 
emphasis on the nurturing attribute and thereby the flexibility of the position that may be occupied 
by either a man or a woman. 
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this matter, I consider that the authority dimension of the cluster enables the 
portrayal of political opponents (especially the party/coalition in power) as 
illegitimate and intrusive. 
• Strength – is considered of great importance, as it enforces ‘the strict 
dichotomy between good and evil, the internal evils, asceticism, and the 
immorality of moral weakness.’ (Lakoff, 2002: 100) 
• Boundaries – provides a specific ‘spatial logic of the dangers of deviance’ 
(Lakoff, 2002: 100). This dimension makes reference to actions within a certain 
permissible path that is congruent with conservative values. Importantly, the 
actions ‘characterised metaphorically as “deviant” threaten the very identity of 
normal people, calling their most common and therefore most sacred values 
into question.’ (Lakoff, 2002: 85) 
• Wholeness – makes ‘moral unity and uniformity a virtue and suggest the 
imminent and serious danger of any sign of moral nonunity and 
nonuniformity.’ (Lakoff, 2002: 100) Indeed, this dimension allows for deeming 
those ‘deviants’ that transgress the ‘natural, strict, uniform, unchanging 
standards behaviour’ as societal threats, which are described in terms of 
‘degenerate people’ that trigger the ‘rupture’ or ‘tearing’ of society’s moral fabric 
(Lakoff, 2002: 90–91). 
• Essence – basically makes reference to an essence, a so–called ‘character’, to be 
inferred from significant past deeds and to provide reliable cues about future 
actions (Lakoff, 2002: 87–90). 
• Purity – generally paired with the above mentioned ‘essence’ dimension, in the 
sense that it envisages a process that differentiates between purity, be it 
physical or moral, and impurity, often seen in terms of ‘filth’, ‘corruption’. ‘Just 
as substances, to be usable, must be purged of impurities, so societies, to be 
viable, must be purged of corrupting individuals or practices.’ (Lakoff, 2002: 
92–93) 
• Health – it is somewhat interrelated with the previous two dimensions. The 
difference resides in the emphasis put on the logic of disease in addition to that 
of purity discussed above: abominable acts and attitudes are spreading like a 
disease in the healthy body of citizens, thus the fear of contamination and the 
necessity of isolation and control (Lakoff, 2002: 101). This needs to be 
supplemented, I argue, with the system’s ‘self–defence’ mechanisms (Lakoff, 
2002: 97–98), particularly with regard to opposition to feminism and non–
heteronormativity that are seen as ‘violating’ the natural order, thereby 
engendering the collapse of the ideological stance that entails this metaphorical 
cluster. 
• Nurturance – is a conditional dimension, tightly connected to authority, 
strength and discipline. More clearly, nurturance is envisioned as the reward 
aspect of the learning process, which is centred on such ideas as self–discipline 
and responsibility; its lack thereof is regarded as a means to punish the 
individual’s failing in the learning act (Lakoff, 2002: 101). 
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The conceptual model developed by Lakoff has nonetheless been criticised on 
several accounts. Indeed, several researchers have claimed that it is too strongly 
influenced by the nature model, in the sense of considering language, and thus 
conceptual metaphor, a universal property of the body/mind, thereby paying little 
attention, if any, to the importance of culture and ideology in shaping 
metaphorical concepts (Goatly, 2007: 383–388; Kövecses, 2005: 174–176; 
Ritchie, 2006: 4; von der Lippe, 1999: 221–226). Another criticism raised against 
the model suggested by Lakoff concerns its indebtedness to the tradition of 
generative grammar, in the sense that it relies heavily on ‘intuitively plausible 
sentences, but not attested examples of linguistic data from any identifiable 
source’ (Cienki, 2008: 241). Lakoff’s model has also been criticised by feminist 
scholars for its limitations in accounting for the gendered nature of the family 
construction and, hence, the gendered effects such a conceptual model entails (cf. 
Ahrens, 2011; Ahrens & Lee, 2009; Honohan, 2008). 
Despite its shortcomings noted above, the Lakoffian model has been developed 
further (cf. Cienki, 2004; 2008; Kövecses, 2002; Ringmar, 2008; Semino, 2008), 
and even utilised in other national contexts as well (cf. Charteris–Black, 2011; 
Hidalgo Tenorio, 2009; Musolff, 2003). The updated model was first employed by 
several scholars continuing the examination of the discursive articulations of the 
antagonistic conceptual dyad STRICT FATHER and NURTURANT PARENT in the USA 
political context (cf. Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2004; 2005; 2008). Noting the general 
difficulty to draw clear lines between the two systems of conceptual metaphors, 
Alan Cienki has recommended investigating the articulations of the NATION IS A 
FAMILY conceptual metaphor in connection with that of the STRICT FATHER in the 
political discourses of groups representing a strong political orientation, such as 
radical parties on either sides of the political spectrum in other political settings 
(Cienki, 2005: 305). Various researchers have since then utilised the model to 
study national politics in European context (cf. Charteris–Black, 2011; Hidalgo 
Tenorio, 2009; Musolff, 2003). A conclusion generally agreed upon by scholars of 
conceptual metaphor in Europe concerns the richness in metaphorical 
constructions specific to the discourses of radical parties, particularly those on the 
radical right fringe, and especially at election times (Charteris–Black, 2011: 59; De 
Landtsheer, 1998: 129–145; Vertessen & De Landtsheer, 2008: 274–275). 
In this light, I intend to employ the conceptual model detailed above to analyse 
the means afforded to radical right populist ideology to conceptualise the 
hierarchical gender binary in its discursive manifestations in Romania and in 
Sweden. My starting point is the observation that while conservative in its 
essence, the radical right populist interpretations of the metaphorical cluster 
actually expand further its borders of intelligibility. This is achieved through 
overstatement and oversimplification – emphasising acutely contrasting notions 
that underpin the metaphorical cluster. There are nonetheless several aspects of 
the Lakoffian model that need to be discussed and further amended in order to 
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allow for a comprehensive and clear articulation of the methodological apparatus 
at work in the present inquiry. Most importantly, the Lakoffian model of the 
national family under the stewardship of a strict father figure appears rather 
unconcerned with gender. Consequently, Conceptual Metaphor Theory is 
discussed from a gender perspective, and then its shortcomings are addressed by 
suggesting a genealogical perspective on the analysis of conceptual metaphors. 
4.1.3 FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS IN CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory does not seem to be aware of the far–reaching 
consequences of the articulation of ideological constructions along several 
interrelated dimensions, such as gender, ethnicity/‘race’, social class, sexuality. 
Key in this context is the fact that conceptual metaphor and its surface 
manifestation through metaphorical expression are never neutral (Cohn, 1987: 
716; Koller, 2004: 20; Wolf & Polzenhagen, 2003: 263). Metaphor is commonly 
utilised when political actors intend to exploit stereotypical portrayals of various 
groups within society, or simply manipulate and deepen people’s confusion on a 
specific political subject. For instance, metaphor may be used to naturalise a 
particular ideological conviction, such as depicting women as inherently weak and 
naturally subordinate (Lazar, 2005: 7–8); at the same time, certain social 
manifestations that are deemed undesirable may be stigmatised, such as women’s 
emancipation efforts, or the political participation of ethnic/‘racial’ and religious 
minorities (Momani, Badarneh & Migdadi, 2009). When accounted for in 
metaphorical form, gender is conceptualised as an antithetical binary, with 
profound implications for how individuals may interpret the gender performative 
and how we as individuals represent ourselves as masculine or feminine with the 
aid of metaphor (Koller & Semino, 2009: 9). Such a metaphor of gender plays a 
cardinal role in the reproduction and reinforcement of certain aspects of social 
interactions that become associated with the masculine–feminine duality, such as 
the public–private, active–passive, and rational–intuitive complementarities: 
The primary metaphor of gender is dualism and polarity. The metaphor of 
dualism automatically casts A in antithesis to B; it makes the definition of A 
as the negation of B. […] But the extra power of the metaphor comes from 
mapping other dualities on to gender, entwining masculinity and femininity 
with such dualities as active–passive, public–private, rational–intuitive. 
These enrich the meaning of masculinity and femininity, but they also 
become contaminated with associations of masculine and feminine. The 
whole operates as a continual feedback loop, reinforcing and reproducing 
itself. 
(Haste, 1994: 11) (Italics in original) 
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As constitutive and constituted element of discourse, conceptual metaphor 
depicts a deeply gendered hierarchy, in which men and masculinities are 
associated with leadership and power, reason, strength, and creativity while 
women embody deference, irrationality, weakness, and procreation. From this 
perspective, the metaphorical representation of gender performatives resonates 
strongly with the theorisations of gender I have reviewed in the previous chapter, 
in the sense that it reminds us of the antithetic description of the two genders 
entangled in the heterosexual matrix, and confirms metaphor as the 
power/discourse nexus previously discussed (cf. Butler, 1990: 151; 1995: 135; 
Carney, 2008: 168; Cohn, 1987: 696; Haste, 1994: 60–81; Kress, 1989: 202). 
Indeed, the polarised duality metaphor has immediate and unequal consequences, 
inasmuch as certain ‘representations of masculinity or femininity do ideological 
work in that they help to maintain […] notions of gender identity that benefit one 
group while disadvantaging another’ (Koller & Semino, 2009: 13).  
This often leads to the oversimplification of women’s sexual motivation as ‘a 
desire for parenting’. The underpinning conceptual metaphor is that of the woman 
as wife/Madonna. She desires children and sex has solely a reproductive purpose, 
and thereby her sexuality is defused and intimately associated to her fecundity. In 
this light, for the man to make love to her and have children is a form of worship 
(Haste, 1994: 172). There are however other depictions of women that have a 
strong metaphorical anchoring at conceptual level. These are the portrayals of 
women as whores (in the sense of women deprived of the marital bliss husbands 
provide to their wives), women as waifs (innocent and inexperienced young 
women offering themselves and their sexuality to the protecting man), and women 
as witches (sexually, socially and supernaturally powerful thus engendering the 
absolute threat to masculine superiority). Following the principle of 
complementarity, men are not only represented as family fathers. Men thus 
appear as warriors (loosely defined to accommodate both the figure of wanderer 
and wife–beater, thereby emphasising toughness and remoteness from and 
inability to understand women, unlike the successfully married men) and as 
whizzkids and warlocks (rationality is key here and women and marriage are 
perceived as obstacles, therefore men afford themselves a position of demiurgic 
solitude) (cf. Cohn, 1987: 699–702; Haste, 1994: 172–180; 247–249; Hooper, 
2001: 151–154). In other words, women appear always engaged in some 
relationship with a man, relationship which gives meaning to their social being; in 
contrast, men seem autonomous social beings. With this in mind, I call attention 
to the importance given to the family father and this metaphor's position among 
other metaphorical depictions of masculinity performative. As Helen Haste has 
aptly noted, the role of the ‘father’ is metaphorically equated with that of the 
natural and rightful ‘leader’, since: 
The prototype of masculinity includes the ability to provide for and protect 
one’s family; this is defined as a relationship between a person and his 
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‘dependants’ – a term which implies weakness, inferiority and immaturity. 
The male lives at the nexus of public and private worlds: he has power in 
relation to both. Femininity is identified with serving emotional and 
physical demands; woman’s own needs are subsumed by her definition as 
need–meeter to others. 
(Haste, 1994: 69) 
Particularly problematic here, Petra Meier and Emanuela Lombardo noted in 
their investigation of power as a conceptual metaphor of gender inequality, is the 
formulation of men’s political power as an invisible unstated norm that  is quietly 
naturalised in political discourses across Europe with the implicit effect of 
rendering women in a position of subordination. In this sense, ‘the maintenance 
in power of the male group is protected against possible changes by continuous 
processes of normalisation’ of such discourses (Meier & Lombardo, 2009: 248). 
There is I argue another, racialised dimension of the hierarchy, one which 
assimilates masculinity to ‘whiteness’, understood as hegemonic ‘normality’, and 
concurrently associates femininity to ‘racial’ difference and hence a position of 
subordinated ‘peculiarity’. Concomitant with the process of naturalisation of white 
masculine superiority there unfolds a similar discursive transformation, as 
Deborah Chambers has noted, one which erects the native white nuclear family to 
the position of universal standard to which all others cultural backgrounds and 
family constellations are compared: 
The underlying structures of racism that operate within […] political 
discourses on the family are crucial aspects of the systematic privileging of 
the [native], white nuclear ideal. The white nuclear family cannot be 
elevated to the status of an ideal without inferiorising other cultures. The 
inferiorisation of non–white families operates both materially and at the 
level of representations through academic research that supports political 
rhetoric, welfare reform and family policy. 
(Chambers, 2001: 14) 
Under these circumstances, the ‘racial’ aspect is juxtaposed with that of the 
patriarchal gender order. The ability to understand the gender performatives at 
the intersection between ethnicity/‘race’, social class, citizenship status, sexual 
orientation (cf. Collins, 1998; 2004; McClintock, 1995; Mohanty, 2003) enables a 
better understanding of how the various manifestations of gender in and through 
metaphorical conceptual structures are in their turn reifying a similar hierarchy 
among the various gender performatives at the intersection of the aforementioned 
systems of social organisation. The said hierarchy appears to be crowned by the 
conceptual representation of the traditional heteronormative family. In relation to 
this, those politicians who argue about an emerging crisis of family values 
generally relate this to the alleged crisis of gender identities that develops as a 
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consequence of the battle for gender equality (Chambers, 2001: 143; Stevens, 
1999: 234–235). The solution readily available is a return to traditional gender 
roles and a reinforcement of ‘racial’ divisions: not only that the nuclear family is to 
be preserved, but its inherent purity is to be safeguarded. Such a stance indicates 
the position of the nuclear family as a crucial element in the discursive 
manifestations of modern political ideology. In her study of politics in the USA, 
Karen Adams has compellingly argued that identification with the nuclear family 
and assertion of the parental responsibilities therein, or at least the promise of an 
impending heterosexual marriage, actively ‘protect against reading candidates as 
having alternative identities or not being “settled”, “stable” people’ (Adams, 2009: 
191). More clearly, unhesitant subscription to family values and active and actual 
participation into a nuclear family construct are expected on behalf of the 
politicians as a sign of seriousness and normality. 
Considering the above, a first conclusion is that the NATION IS A FAMILY is 
constrained to a compulsory family–centred heterosexuality. The addition of the 
STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor engenders a further entrapment of both 
women and men in patriarchal heteronormativity, which posits the family’s head 
as the source of authority and guardian of ‘natural order’. In this light, the STRICT 
FATHER projects the radical right populist leader’s authority over those who 
willingly subject themselves to his rule, and justifies the leader’s right to maintain 
order and discipline dissenters (Lakoff, 2002: 70). This embodies man’s ‘“natural” 
instrumentality’, which equips the radical right populist party’s chairman ‘for 
leadership in the home and the external world’ (Haste, 1994: 63). In this respect, 
the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor is aggregated into a diffuse symbiotic 
relationship with that of the NATION IS A FAMILY. This leads to a naturalisation of the 
leader’s masculinity understood as the apex of the patriarchal heteronormative 
national family. Attempting a systematisation of these arguments, the symbiotic 
relationship between the national construct and the leader as a fatherly figure 
described above, together with the metaphorical processes of metapherein, of 
‘carrying over’ meaning from the source domain of FAMILY to the target domain of 
NATION, are schematically depicted in the Figure 1 below. It corroborates the 
Lakoffian dimensions for articulating the metaphorical cluster for the NATION IS A 
FAMILY discussed in the previous section with the critique of feminist scholars on 
the gendered nature of such conceptual structures. In conclusion, I maintain that 
a feminist lens to the theorisation of conceptual metaphor sheds light on the 
discrete hierarchical gender binary at work in the conceptual construct of interest 
here. Furthermore, it shows that the analysis of such conceptual structures needs 
to be undertaken only once armed with a specific sensitivity to the intersection of 
various systems of social organisation, in terms of gender, ethnic belonging/‘race’, 
social class, and sexuality.  
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Figure 1  NATION IS A FAMILY – the process of metapherein  
 
 
4.1.4 CRITICAL METAPHOR THEORY AND THE GENEALOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: INNOVATIVE WAYS TO INVESTIGATE CONCEPTUAL 
METAPHORS 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory has nevertheless met with a series of criticisms. This 
has come along three main lines. First, several scholars have underlined the 
limitations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in its initial form. Some have 
suggested therefore a more dynamic conceptual construct, such as Conceptual 
Blending Theory. This attempts to address the alleged source domain to target 
domain directionality of conceptual metaphors and argues for the existence of an 
intermediary field of conceptual blending, thereby operating with a four–space 
model instead of the two–domain model to account for the new complexity (cf. 
Coulson, 2001; Fauconnier & Turner 1996; 2003; Ritchie, 2006). Second, some 
scholars have underlined the challenge of designing an appropriate 
methodological apparatus for the investigation of conceptual metaphors (Boréus 
& Bergström, 2009: 276–278; Cienki, 2005: 304; Kövecses, 2008: 168–169). 
Third, criticism has been directed at the circular reasoning that an analysis of 
conceptual metaphors can become entrapped in, in the sense that the postulation 
of a conceptual structure eventually leads to the finding of such a formation in the 
empirical material that is investigated (Kertész & Rákosi, 2009, 703–708; Ritchie, 
2006: 25–29). 
Addressing the first criticism, while acknowledging the inherent limitations of 
classical Conceptual Metaphor Theory, I contest the usefulness of the four–space 
model suggested by Conceptual Blending Theory. In fact, I maintain that on the 
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matter of interest for the present investigation, there is a strong directionality 
from the source domain, FAMILY, towards the target domain, NATION, as depicted 
above in Figure 1. In turn, I subscribe to a more innovative research tradition, 
namely that of Critical Metaphor Analysis (cf. Charteris–Black, 2004; 2011; Hart, 
2010; Kövecses, 2009; Semino, 2008), which maintains that metaphors exist as a 
fundamental feature of political discourse in different genres and ‘proclaims that 
in this context metaphor is both strategic and ideological’ (Hart, 2010: 127). 
More clearly, in my understanding of Critical Metaphor Theory, conceptual 
metaphors are employed strategically in political discourses since they focus 
attention on specific issues, and define their limits of intelligibility. For example, 
by insisting on the nation as a family construct with clear boundaries between the 
in–group and its immediate alterity, it obscures the contending account of viewing 
of the nation as a community of equals that is open to external influences. At the 
same time, conceptual metaphors are anchored in certain ideological convictions 
that are reflected in the way the national family is depicted in an exclusionary 
manner, as in the example above. I therefore argue that the Critical Metaphor 
Analysis is the most appropriate methodological perspective for the present study, 
inasmuch as it acknowledges that metaphors are intrinsically artefacts of 
discourse, and hence dependent on the context in which they are produced. 
Indeed, conceptual metaphors operate as discursive nexuses that generate 
meaning in the interlay of text and context. In other words, the analysis of 
metaphors needs to be undertaken having in mind the very discourse in which 
they are embedded (Carver & Pikalo, 2008: 3; Gibbs & Lonergan, 2009: 251; 
Semino, 2008: 30–32). Put simply, the stream of Critical Metaphor Theory at 
work in the present study is concerned with how power relations and ideological 
stances are defined and reified through metaphor at the level of discourse and, as 
such, it can be regarded as a branch of the wider effort to assess discourse 
critically (Fairclough, 2003: 75–77; Hart, 2010: 6–8; Stenvoll, 2008: 36–37; van 
Dijk, 1998: 164; Wodak, 2006: 179–181). 
When designing the methodology for this study, I have opted for a top–down 
deductive approach23. It involves a priori postulation of conceptual metaphors 
followed by their comprehensive examination, thereby placing the conceptual 
metaphors at the centre of attention, and treating them as higher–level cognitive 
structures (cf. Cienki, 2005; 2008). This is done bearing in mind the challenge of 
irregularity, which means that ‘the individual metaphorical expressions will be 
found predominantly irregular as regards their semantic behaviour despite the 
fact that, in the main, they come into existence as a result of regular cognitive 
23 The Corpus Linguistic Analysis, in turn, employs a bottom–up approach (cf. Pragglejaz Group, 
2007; Stefanowitsch, 2007). Corpora represent large collections of texts, originally crafted by 
hand, but more recently derived by automated processes. The qualitative study of metaphor in 
these corpora involves a computer aided search for metaphorical patters across the data, and in 
general limits these studies to simple string searches. Although it can provide a greater amount of 
metaphorical expressions for certain target domains in a particular corpus, such an approach does 
not necessarily entail a qualitative advantage (Kövecses, 2008). 
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processes, such as conceptual metaphors’ (Kövecses, 2008: 170). At the same 
time, the analysis accounts for the ‘the pressure of local context’ within the 
metaphorical construct. I thereby acknowledge that conceptual metaphors and 
their corresponding metaphorical clusters undergo a process of adaptation and 
change and may vary from one political context to another (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993: 
27; Dobrovol’skij & Piirainen, 2005: 355–356; Kövecses, 2008: 181). 
The present study is also a reaction to Véronique Mottier’s encouragement to 
broaden the analytical scope of metaphor research to account for the wider 
discursive context and inherent ideological entailments, while taking seriously the 
problem of researcher’s situated subjectivity. Following her recommendation in 
the design of the methodological apparatus that is detailed in the following, the 
aim has been to reposition the unit of analysis from the lexical level of statements, 
which enables the examination of superficial metaphorical expressions, to the 
level of discourse, which offers an insight on the higher cognitive structuring 
through conceptual metaphors. Such a move would allow, as she aptly puts it, a 
more comprehensive investigation of the ‘wider cultural horizon of meaning and 
the institutions and power relations that structure it, thereby allowing us to locate 
the analysis of metaphor in relation to wider issues of social and political action 
and transformation.’ (Mottier, 2008: 188) With this in mind, in the following the 
analysis of conceptual metaphors and their adjoining metaphorical clusters is 
undertaken at an intermediate level, the discursive level, as depicted in Figure 2 
below. This is done, however, commencing from a clear anchoring point – the 
conceptual metaphor to be studied – at the conceptual level, with a special 
awareness of the fact that the conceptual structure may not necessarily be 
expressed at all times with the aid of the same generic lexical artefacts (such as 
one clearly identified lexical metaphor, for example) – at the lexical level. 
I have attempted to do so by carefully depicting the genealogical 
transformations of the conceptual metaphors and their corresponding 
metaphorical clusters, as schematically depicted in the Figure 2 below. A caveat: 
the genealogy of conceptual metaphors need not be understood as a quest for 
their origins, nor for a depiction of their alleged linear development, since in 
Figure 2 the genealogical axis indicates temporal contingency. Rather, genealogy 
here involves the investigation across time of the multifaceted extensions and even 
at times contradictory turns that metaphors reveal across a certain discourse. In 
other words, there is not an exclusive left–right direction of reading the process 
thus described, as both the conceptual metaphor and the adjoining metaphorical 
cluster are subject to (re)iteration, (re)interpretation, and conceptual 
(re)positioning. The meaning of genealogy as a conceptual tool at work in the 
present study follows in the footsteps of Foucauldian scholarship that has 
consecrated the term (cf. Foucault, 1990; 1998; 2000). More clearly, my interest 
here is not to identify the original form of the conceptual metaphors at work in 
radical right populist discourses, but rather to trace their complex course of 
descent. In a sense, as I have already mentioned in the introduction, such a 
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methodological approach has some affinities with the ‘lifespan model’ of analysing 
radical right populist ideology (Meret, 2010). However, the emphasis in the 
present study is on tracing those various ideological transformations and 
adaptations of interest as manifest through conceptual metaphors at the level of 
discourse. On this matter, it echoes the appeals of researchers of rhetorical 
political analysis to examine the ‘genealogies’ of concepts taken for granted in 
political discourses, generally labelled political ‘common sense values’ and 
reminding of the conceptual structures of interest here (cf. Finlayson, 2007: 560; 
2012:763). 
 
Figure 2  Genealogical transformations: Multilevel manifestations of conceptual 
metaphor and adjoining metaphorical cluster 
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Finally, there are several means to address the challenge of circularity 
demonstrated by the critics of conceptual metaphor. Considering the 
methodological apparatus sketched above, the aim is to strive for a cyclic 
argumentation, or to be able to return to the point of departure but at a different 
cognitive level, ‘since a modified, prismatically re–evaluated, qualitatively new 
information state is created’ (Kertész & Rákosi, 2009: 718). More explicitly, the 
cyclic and prismatic qualities of such an analytical enterprise rest on the cyclic 
nature of reasoning, or more clearly on  the retrospective re–evaluation, which 
entails the continuous process through which previous decisions are revised and 
corrected, and alternatives are suggested (Rescher, 1987: 304). Nonetheless, the 
retrospective re–evaluation is not only cyclic but also prismatic, in the sense that 
the various cycles of revisions continuously change the perspective from which the 
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empirical material is analysed. Such a cyclic argumentation is considered to be 
effective, and thereby it differs from the circular reasoning that fails to re–
evaluate the context and hence witnesses the flat return of the analysis to its 
moment of inception (Kertész & Rákosi, 2009: 718; Rescher, 1987: 307). 
Corroborating the observations detailed above with the principal dimensions 
for articulating the metaphorical cluster of the NATION IS A FAMILY, as presented 
herein inspired by the scholars of conceptual metaphor (cf. Ahrens, 2011; Lakoff, 
2002; Kövecses, 2002; Ringmar, 2008; Semino, 2008), and amended with the 
feminist interventions (Haste, 1994: 172–180; 247–249; Lazar, 2005: 7–8), the 
following top–down grid of analysis has been developed to serve as a deductive 
chain of arguments (Steen, 2007: 31–33). It is worth noting that it has been 
crafted bearing in mind the inherent logic of articulation of radical right populist 
ideology, from a feminist perspective. More clearly, it accounts for the three key 
aspects discussed in the previous chapters: the intrinsic unity of the gendered 
people, perceived as a community of blood constructed along the bodies of women 
as signifiers of national differences; the Manichean opposition between the people 
and elites, manifested as a means of demarcation between the purity and 
normalcy of average citizenry from the abject and abnormal alterity of political 
elites; and the sovereignty of the people that is expressed through the relegation of 
its political will into the acts of the radical right populist leader, underpinned by a 
heteronormative masculinity (Bacchetta & Power, 2002: 8; Chiantera–Stutte & 
Petö, 2003: 3; Ignazi, 2003: 32–33; Jungar, 2010: 209 –214; Mudde, 2007: 63–
89; Petö, 2010: 190–195). In so doing, I agree with Alice Deignan that specific 
conceptual metaphors convey certain ideological positions through the 
relationships they suggest between the various parts of the discourse, and through 
the way they are extending into metaphorical clusters (Deignan, 2005: 131). The 
deductive chain of arguments, which extends the logical implications of Figure 1 
presented above, has been consequently structured as follows (cf. Steinhart, 2001: 
196–202): 
If the nation is a family then: 
• The members of the nation/ the people inhabit a specific space, either identified 
in terms of their home or their heartland – their ‘home country’ – which has 
come under threat. There is an inherent connection between the place they 
populate and appeals to a set of shared traditions. 
• The people submit to the parent’s authority, embodied by the radical right 
populist leader, whereby their position as dependants is acknowledged. 
• The people are replicating a traditional hierarchy and power relations, whereby 
women submit to the ideal of normative motherhood – and even renounce 
gender equality – and thus become dependent on their men for defence from 
the masculine Others. 
• The people need to defend their moral strength against corrupting influences, 
and clear boundaries are to be drawn between the morally pure members of the 
nation – which is perceived as a ‘healthy’ unitary whole – and the corrupted 
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deviant Others, understood to be embodied by the radical right populist 
leader’s political contenders, but also by Others – such as religiously different, 
non–majority ethnic groups, or sexually non–normative communities. 
• The parental authority comes to embody all the positive attributes of the people 
in the person of the radical right populist leader; in other words, the leader 
incarnates the interconnected conceptual metaphor of the STRICT FATHER. 
Importantly, the development of the aforesaid chain of arguments is to be 
understood from a genealogical perspective. Paraphrasing Foucault (2000: 374), 
the study entails maintaining the analysed events in their context, documenting 
the slight repositioning and (re)interpretation of the conceptual structure, and 
evidencing the development and ramifications of the metaphorical cluster of 
interest here. The following section describes how the designed grid of analysis 
has been applied to the study of conceptual metaphors in radical right populist 
discourses. It details the selection of cases that have been studied and explains the 
strategic choices and inherent limitations of the present investigation. 
4.2 A GENEALOGY OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AT WORK IN 
RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM IN ROMANIA AND SWEDEN 
Equipped with the methodological toolkit described above, this academic inquiry 
focuses on two particular manifestations of radical right populist discourses in 
Europe, namely Romania and Sweden. In selecting the two cases, I have been 
guided by a three–step process. First, following the theoretical propositions of the 
methodological model developed above, I have chosen to research the NATION IS A 
FAMILY and the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphors in the context of radical right 
populist discourses in Europe. Second, considering rival explanations, I have 
opted for those cases which I deemed that might offer competing views on the use 
of metaphorical constructions, given the countries’ different historical, socio–
economic and political developments in the European periphery or, put 
differently, making use of the cases’ complexity and specificity (Carmel, 1999: 143; 
George & Bennett, 2005: 83–84; Landman, 2005: 41; Platt, 2007: 110). Indeed, 
the Romanian case details the development of radical right populism in Central 
and Eastern Europe, serving as an example of the profound radicalisation of such 
discourses in the region. The country has witnessed to a dramatic return to a 
traditionally patriarchal gender structuring. In turn, the choice of the Swedish 
case was motivated by that fact that radical right populism had previously been 
deemed to have failed in the country and, in addition, Sweden has generally been 
considered a textbook example of a welfare state and the embodiment of a gender 
equality regime. Third, developing a descriptive framework, I have attempted to 
enable a clearer structuring of the analysis. It is worth noting that the two studies 
have been treated as two examples of ‘authenticated anecdote’ (Simons, 2009: 4), 
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in the sense that their investigation has been shaped by the theoretical 
propositions of Critical Metaphor Theory, amended with a thick description of 
each case study (Yin, 2009: 130). The selected cases fit nonetheless the label 
‘heuristic case studies’, as my ambition has been to tie directly to theory building 
in an active and deliberate manner, in a sense searching purposefully for 
generalisable relations in Critical Metaphor Theory (cf. Eckstein, 1992: 143–147; 
George & Bennett, 2005: 75). 
The first case study is the Romanian radical right populist party: the Greater 
Romania Party24 (Partidul România Mare, PRM). In the Romanian context, 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor – leader of the PRM – is representative of the 
preponderantly male radical right populist leadership in Central and Eastern 
Europe (with the noteworthy exceptions from Hungary and Ukraine). He 
embodies the radical right populist appeal for a return to traditional, patriarchal 
family values. Nonetheless, what sets him apart from other radical–right populist 
leaders is his constant praise of collectivistic traditions, and his continuous 
attempts not only to present himself as a providential leader, but to surround his 
persona with an aura of Orthodox messianism – a well–documented trait of 
Romanian radicalism (Dobrescu, 2003: 407–410; Tismaneanu & Pavel, 1994: 
408). Other Romanian political parties have also resorted to Orthodox 
messianism and appeals to charismatic leadership, but the PRM and its leader 
allow a better understanding of the interplay between nationalism, populism, 
Christian Orthodox faith, and reductionist gender interpretations25. Importantly, 
while during the communist regime, gender equality was legislated and efforts 
were at least announced to undermine patriarchal ordering, the post–
revolutionary Romania witnessed a backlash against feminism and a forceful 
advancement of an updated form of patriarchal imagery. The transition occurred 
from a ‘fatherless patriarchy’ of the communist parent–state to a modernised 
pseudo–Orthodox family–centred patriarchy, with women heavily dependent on 
men’s income and political decisions (Miroiu, 2010: 580–589; Verdery, 1996: 61–
82). 
The investigation of the NATION IS A FAMILY and that of the STRICT FATHER 
conceptual metaphors is detailed in the Romanian case through an analysis of the 
articles published in the PRM’s main media outlet, the weekly Greater Romania 
Magazine (Revista România Mare). The chosen sources are editorials authored by 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor, as they reflect the party’s recent history. Tudor has usually 
24 The appellation ‘Greater Romania Party’ is employed by most scholarship in the field and 
makes reference to the party’s irredentist appeals and constant reference to an alleged golden age, 
the so–called interwar ‘Greater Romania’ (Livezeanu, 2000: 1–28), although the direct literal 
translation from Romanian would be ‘Great Romania Party’. 
25 The Romanian political scene has also witnessed another radical right populist party, the New 
Generation Party (Partidul Noua Generaţie, PNG). However, the PRM is the most successful 
Romanian radical right populism to date. Tellingly, the former PNG leader George Becali, after an 
unsuccessful presidential bid in 2004, joined forces with the PRM. Becali was elected to the 
European Parliament on the PRM list in 2009. 
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been the PRM’s presidential candidate, though unsuccessful. His political activity 
and his editorials have been revealed to being xenophobic, anti–Semitic, anti–
Hungarian, and anti–Romani, but his discourse has rarely been analysed from a 
feminist perspective (cf. Andreescu, 2005; Chen, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Mudde, 
2005; Shafir, 2008; Soare, 2010). Tudor is the uncontested driving force of radical 
right populism in Romania, both in terms of political leadership and intellectual 
mentorship, exploiting the discontent that people feel in front of the market 
economy. 
With this in mind, I have collected those editorials that were published around 
three major events in Tudor’s political career. The first section of this empirical 
material elaborates on his activity around the Romanian presidential elections in 
2000, from the first issue in January 2000 until the first post–election issue in 
December that year, which witnessed Tudor’s surprising runoff against Ion Iliescu 
– the candidate of the centre–left. The second one contains Tudor’s editorials 
from around the 2004 Romanian presidential elections, following a similar 
pattern of selection as described above, which marked a serious decrease in 
Tudor’s political appeal. The third and final cluster concentrates on his writings 
amid the 2009 EU Parliamentary elections, from first issue in January 2009 to the 
last issue in June 2009, which led to the PRM gaining three seats in the European 
Parliament, including Tudor himself becoming an MEP. In total, 55 editorials or 
approximately 32,300–word text–discourse were selected. 
In the North European case, on the other hand, the analysis focuses on the 
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). Until recently the SD has been 
treated by scholars of populism as a failed case among other European radical 
right populist parties, since it constantly failed to achieve parliamentary 
representation (cf. Rydgren, 2002; 2006; Widfeldt, 2000). However, the party 
succeeded in gaining parliamentary representation as a result of the 2010 Swedish 
Parliamentary elections. The SD is to date the most successful radical right 
populist party in Sweden26, with a past tainted by close collaboration with openly 
undemocratic, neo–Nazi and other radical right groupings (cf. Larsson & Ekman, 
2001; Mattsson, 2009). While most of the public discussions have focused on the 
SD’s crypto–racism thinly dissimulated behind its discourse of law and order and 
tightened immigration rules, little attention has been paid to another aspect of 
their political platform, namely the idyllic depiction of the Swedish national 
welfare project. 
26 The SD is not the only radical right populist party in Swedish politics. New Democracy (Ny 
Demokrati, NyD) was a short–lived populist political entity that emerged in the early 1990s amid 
the painful restructuring of the Swedish welfare state. The NyD capitalised on popular 
dissatisfaction and surprisingly gained parliamentary representation in the 1991 elections, only to 
disappear just as abruptly from Swedish politics in 1994 (cf. Hannerz, 2006; Rydgren, 2006). On 
the other hand, the National Democrats (Nationaldemokraterna, ND) are the result of a former 
SD–faction founding its own party. The ND is so far represented only at the local level in a few 
municipalities across Sweden, thereby of little relevance at national level. 
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Consequently, this work concentrates on the discursive production of the SD 
party leader, Jimmie Åkesson, who succeeded in bringing the SD into the Swedish 
Parliament. The collected empirical material in this case consists of Åkesson’s 
editorials, interviews, and other interventions that were published in the party 
organ, the Sweden Democrat Courier (SD–Kuriren), from Åkesson’s rise to the 
SD’s leadership in 2005 until the 2010 Swedish Parliamentary elections. In this 
case, the episodes chosen for selecting empirical material were as follows. Firstly, 
the 2005 Swedish Lutheran Church elections: with material collected beginning 
with the newspaper’s May issue and Jimmie Åkesson’s election to party 
chairmanship, to the first post–election issue in October 2005. Secondly, the 2006 
Swedish Parliamentary elections: from the January 2006 issue until the October 
issue the same year, after the elections. Thirdly, the 2009 church elections and the 
EU Parliamentary elections the same year, following a similar pattern of selection 
as described above. And, finally, the 2010 Swedish Parliamentary elections: from 
the January issue to the October 2010 issue which discussed the party’s access 
into the Swedish Parliament. The choice is motivated by the fact that the 
newspaper has been one of the very few outlets available to the SD and Åkesson to 
discursively elaborate on the party’s social and political construct. In all, I have 
selected 95 editorials, interviews and articles, totalling an approximately 37,160–
word text–discourse. The slightly larger amount of empirical material in the 
Swedish case is motivated by the shorter timeframe than it was used in the 
Romanian study. 
At a first glance, the timeframes for the two cases appear to be rather short in 
comparison to the original genealogical analyses that stretched over several 
centuries (cf. Foucault, 1995; 1998). On this matter, I agree with other researchers 
that a genealogical analysis cannot have a pretension to totalising knowledge 
(Moi, 2008: 28–30); consequently, genealogy has neither an obvious point of 
inception, nor a definitive moment of conclusion (Tollin, 2011: 45–48). Such a 
genealogical analysis is an on–going project and, from this point of view, it has a 
striking resemblance to the housework chores. In other words, the scholar’s work 
resembles that of the housewife’s: 
Since there is no obvious end to the textual network explored by the 
genealogical project, the project can never lead to a final totalisation of 
knowledge: a genealogist’s work is never done. Genealogy is very much like 
housework: like the housewife, the genealogist stops [his] work for fairly 
pragmatic reasons: the floor is clean enough; it is time to start cooking 
instead; it is too late and one is too tired to continue. The next day, there is 
always a need for more cooking, more dusting, more cleaning; occasionally, 
nothing short of complete redecoration will do. 
(Moi, 2008: 30) 
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With this observation in mind, the grid of analysis described in the previous 
section has been carefully employed during the study of the gathered text–
discourses, resting on the conceptual metaphor’s structuring as a unified gestalt 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 77–86). As such, the collected empirical material, from 
both Romania and Sweden, has been analysed without the assistance of artificial 
intelligence, in a similar manner to other researchers’ analyses of conceptual 
metaphors from a gender perspective (cf. Lazar, 2009; Lim, 2009), thereby 
differing in my analytical method from researchers of corpus linguistics that rely 
heavily on computer aided analyses in the identification of certain bottom–up 
patterns for metaphorical expression (cf. Ahrens & Lee, 2009; Charteris–Black, 
2011; Koller, 2004; Pragglejaz Group, 2007). The reason for such an approach has 
been twofold. Keeping in mind the three levels on the cognitive axis depicted in 
Figure 2, I have been first motivated by Gerard Steen’s observation that although 
there is a systematic causal connection between a certain conceptual structure and 
a specific linguistic expression, such a connection is never complete (Steen, 2007: 
33). Second, I have taken into account Steen’s assertion that the process of 
‘carrying over’ from the source domain, FAMILY, to the target domain, NATION, is 
not necessarily contained in the space of one sentence, being able to transgress 
across sentences in extended metaphors, analogies or other such discursive 
constructions (Steen, 2008: 233–235). These stances build on the observation 
that at the level of discourse, conceptual metaphor need not be restricted to being 
expressed in literal, direct language, but in fact can be expressed indirectly, 
emerging from the specific topic of the discourse it is embedded in (Cameron et al, 
2009: 71; Hart, 2010: 129; Howe, 2006: 64; Lazar, 2009: 211–212; Steen, 2007: 
270). 
Consequently, the investigation has been undertaken in several steps, in a 
sense adapting the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) (Cameron et al, 
2009: 71–72; Pragglejaz Group, 2007: 3) to the specificities of a critical analysis of 
conceptual metaphors in discourse. Firstly, the collected material – all editorials 
and interviews for each case understood as a unitary text–discourse – has been 
carefully read several times in order to establish a general understanding of the 
major political issues in their respective context. Special attention has been paid to 
the ambient discourse in which the conceptual metaphor is thought to be 
manifested, and to the specificities of the original language the discourse has 
initially occurred (Deignan, 2005: 125; Kövecses, 2006: 150–151; Mühlhäusler, 
2012: 1–10). More precisely, a very detailed stage setting, which accounted for the 
political discourse in which conceptual metaphors have occurred and the wider 
cultural context that made their existence possible, has been deemed of crucial 
importance for the present project. This aspect has also been shown by Zoltán 
Kövecses’ extensive discussion on the principle of irregularity of higher–level 
cognitive structures (Kövecses, 2002: 186–189; 2008: 170). 
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Secondly, the main arguments of the aforementioned deductive chain have 
been given a generic lexical unit – be it word, or even a whole phrase when 
deemed necessary, inspired by the model’s initial description as discussed at 
length in section 4.1.2, to enable the systematic categorisation necessary for the 
screening of gathered empirical material. The first argument has therefore been 
contracted to such lexical expressions as ‘home country’, ‘heartland’, ‘motherland’, 
‘fatherland’ – with its specifically Romanian detailing, namely ‘patria’, ‘Romania’, 
‘Romanian people’, and respectively its Swedish variant, the ‘folkhem’, ‘Sweden’, 
‘Swedish people’. The second argument has been synthesised into the following 
constructs: ‘dependants’, ‘children’, ‘elderly’, ‘family members’, but also 
‘Romanians’, respectively ‘Swedes’; the third into ‘mothers’, ‘our women’ in 
general, with a focus on ‘Romanian women’, respectively ‘Swedish women’, but 
also ‘traditional family values’. The fourth included such lexical constructions as 
‘corrupt’, ‘elite’, ‘lifestyle’, ‘intrusion’, ‘pure’, ‘virtue’, ‘heritage’, ‘religion’, and 
references to possible minority groups (understood here in terms of 
ethnicity/‘race’, religion, or sexuality). Finally, the fifth has been contracted to 
such lexical expressions as ‘leadership’, ‘mentorship’, ‘guiding’, but also wider 
references to salvation in connection to people’s politics. These lexical units have 
been employed for analysing and structuring the empirical material; however, the 
lexical artefacts mentioned above have only served as initial cues in perusing each 
text–discourse and, whenever unsure, I have opted for an extensive search for 
synonymous expressions and related concepts, even across sentences within the 
same editorial or interview. 
Thirdly, the aforementioned conceptual structures have been monitored along 
the text–discourse in order to record their eventual transformations or possible 
(re)interpretations across time. Documenting their genealogical development in 
the analysis of the empirical material, I have attempted to give an account of the 
process of change and adaptation that conceptual metaphors and their 
corresponding metaphorical clusters undergo from one political context to 
another. More precisely, this entails the different manifestations of the chosen 
conceptual metaphor in the Romanian and Swedish political contexts, but also the 
clusters’ own transformation across time to accommodate new meanings, thereby 
striving to provide a cyclic argumentation and as such to avoid circular reasoning 
and the self–reinforcement of analysis. 
Finally, the results of analysis have been structured into five generic domains, 
which reflect closely the analytical grid that informed the investigation – the 
binding force of the national family; the national family and its dependants; 
women, politics, and the national family; the national family and its Others – 
which together provide a thick description on the present state of the national 
family; and last, but not least, the place of the political man in the national family. 
These domains have impacted directly on the internal organisation of the two 
following chapters, which present the case studies. Under these circumstances, 
special attention has been paid to the genealogical aspect, in the sense of 
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evidencing those instances – illustrated with direct citations from the analysed 
empirical material – in which the metaphorical cluster has been extended to 
incorporate new meaning from one election period to another. 
There are nonetheless certain inherent limitations in the employed method 
that I am well aware of. A major limitation, in this context, is that the analysis of 
conceptual metaphors relies on the scholar’s subjective interpretation that, in 
turn, may have an impact on the validity and reliability of present study if one is to 
apply to it the strictly quantitative assessment criteria. In this regard, I subscribe 
wholly to Michelle Lazar’s (2005: 14–19) appeals for feminist reflexivity as a 
praxis in undertaking my own research. More clearly, I am aware of my own 
abilities and limitations as a researcher to identify and interpret conceptual 
structures. These skills are in turn determined by my academic trajectory and 
exposure to certain scholarly communities (such as membership in the feminist 
research community), my acquired language skills – in both Romanian and 
Swedish  (having the former as my mother tongue, and the latter as a second 
principal language) – and my ability to decode and interpret specific cultural 
codes, from both Romania and Sweden ( and thereby my ability to express 
concisely and comprehensively the results of my analysis in English), and finally 
my own lived experience and submersion into the researched cultures. In other 
words, I have productively employed my complex relationship with the two 
countries, that exhibits both aspects of being an insider and outsider, which I have 
developed over years with the two countries, cultures, and languages, so that I am 
able to produce the most effective insights into the gathered empirical material (cf. 
Bevir & Rhodes, 2003: 34; Carmel, 1999: 145). More clearly, a perfect replication 
of the present study may not be possible, because I am a uniquely situated 
individual, as described above. However, this resonates with earlier calls for a 
situated subjectivity in the analysis of conceptual metaphor in discourse (Mottier, 
2008: 188). To paraphrase Peter Mühlhäusler (2012: 1), if the influential work on 
conceptual metaphors by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) has been 
preoccupied with the ‘metaphors WE live by’ – in which the pronoun ‘we’ seems to 
embody the conceptual metaphor of the (mainly) English–speaking Western 
academe –, in this study, I have attempted to show the ideological work certain 
conceptual metaphors OTHERS live by – in which ‘others’ is the mark of those non–
native English–speaking researchers from elsewhere27. 
Nonetheless, with regard to the issue of the generalisability of the findings in 
present study, it is necessary to underline that my feminist genealogical analysis of 
the conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses does not 
aim to solidify a certain normative take on the issue of the aforesaid ideology and 
its manifestations across Europe. At best, it can be regarded as an investigation of 
27 The results of my analysis have also undergone the process of blind peer–reviewing, having 
already been published in an array of academic journals, as noted in Acknowledgements (Norocel, 
2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b). 
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specific political contexts, in which the analysis of the ideological underpinning 
that conceptual metaphors and their corresponding metaphorical clusters are 
involved in enables the articulation of novel critical inroads that expand the 
understanding of the phenomenon from a feminist perspective. In conclusion, the 
aim of the present inquiry is to shed light on the ideological constructions of 
gendered identities with the help of conceptual metaphors in two specific national 
contexts within a well–defined period that I consider most suitable for my 
academic endeavour. With this in mind, I subsequently analyse the NATION IS A 
FAMILY and its symbiotic relationship with the STRICT FATHER metaphor in the 
Romanian context, followed by a separate chapter that analyses the family 
national construct in the Swedish setting. Then I summarise the findings of this 
work and indicate future avenues of research in a concluding chapter. 
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5 WE WILL BE AGAIN WHAT WE ONCE WERE AND 
EVEN MORE THAN THAT! THE TRIBUNE TO TAKE CARE 
OF THE ROMANIAN FAMILY (2000–2009)  
In this chapter I analyse the discursive articulations of the radical right populist 
ideology in the Romanian context. I start by indicating the particularities of 
Romanian democratic multi–party regime in the post–1989 context. In relation to 
this, I explain the specificities of the Romanian semi–presidential system of 
government, and introduce the main parties in national politics. Against this 
background, I discuss the consolidation of a conservative and masculine public 
sphere in the process of the transition to a democratic multi–party system, which 
consequently places women who choose to become engaged in party politics in a 
precarious position. In connection to that, I discuss the situation of political 
marginality experienced by ethnic minorities in the country: the Hungarian 
minority, which, numerically, is second in size to the Romanian ethnic majority; 
the Romani (Rroma) minority, which seems to be the source of most societal 
anxieties; and the Jewish minority – important for historical reasons despite its 
near invisibility statistically. In so doing, I connect the imposition of pseudo–
Orthodox family–centred patriarchy to the parallel processes of the consolidation 
of democracy, state consolidation, and fervent nationalism. Then I introduce the 
main radical right populist force in Romanian politics, its leader, and the party 
mouthpiece. 
Analysing the genealogical articulations of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
metaphor in Romania, I first explore the alleged moral wholeness of the 
Romanian national family. With this in mind, I show the centrality afforded to 
Orthodox Christianity in defining Romanian ethnic purity and how it confirms the 
moral superiority of the Romanian national family. At the same time, this enables 
a detailed examination of the different positions within the Romanian national 
family afforded to its various members. This includes the place of family 
dependants, the role of women in the life of the national family, the threat posited 
by the family’s Others (be them ethnic minorities or members of the LGBTQI 
community), and the position of the Romanian man in this context. In so doing, I 
analyse the discursive effects of constantly reinterpreting the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor and the place of the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor – 
describing the masculinity performative of the Romanian radical right populist 
leader – in the metaphorical cluster thus created. I then conclude the chapter by 
demonstrating the specificities of radical right populist discursive manifestations 
in Romania. 
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5.1 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN ROMANIA THROUGH A 
FEMINIST LENS 
In the aftermath of the violent uprising against the Ceauşescu regime in December 
1989, Romania entered a phase in which it appeared to embrace the principles of 
representative democracy and all too eagerly adopt market capitalism in a form 
that did not seriously dislodge pre–existing clientelistic political and economic 
relations (cf. Chiva, 2005a; Gallagher, 2005; Miroiu, 2010; Pasti, 2003; 
Tismaneanu, 1998; Soare, 2010; Sum & King, 2011). The new constitution 
acknowledged Romania as a semi–presidential republic, with a head of state 
directly elected through popular vote, and a bicameral Parliament (the Chamber 
of Deputies, respectively the Romanian Senate), in which the two houses have 
almost identical legislative powers. The Chamber of Deputies has between 327 and 
385 seats up for electoral competition between the parties. An additional 11 to 18 
seats have been directly allocated to the representatives of acknowledged ethnic 
minority groups of Romania28. The Senate has between 119 and 143 seats. 
The November 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential elections were considered 
a sign of democratic consolidation, in terms of democratic alternation of power 
between the formerly governing coalition and allied opposition parties. 
Furthermore, these elections marked the introduction of a 5 percent threshold for 
parties and 10 percent for party coalitions, which has actively limited the number 
of political forces gaining access into the Parliament. Up to the 2008 
Parliamentary elections, the voting system was on lists discretionarily determined 
by the party centre: a perfect means for the party leaders to form and exert control 
over extensive clientelistic networks. The new electoral law of 2008 replaced the 
proportional representation with a complex system based on a majority vote, 
which eventually turned out to disadvantage the PRM (Marian & King, 2010: 11; 
Stan & Vancea, 2009: 50). Another novelty was the decoupling of the 
Parliamentary elections (arranged in November 2008) from the Presidential 
elections (in December 2009), and the organising of the June 2009 elections for 
the European Parliament, the first complete five–year mandate, after Romania 
had joined the European Union in January 200729. 
The introduction of a democratic form of government in Romania has also had 
a significant impact on the participation of women in post–1989 politics. 
Romanian feminist researchers have argued that few women had been actively 
28 The seats reflects the number of officially recognised minorities in Romania: Hungarian, 
Romani (Rroma), Ukrainian, German, Russian/Lipovan, Turkish, Tatar, Serbian, Slovakian, 
Bulgarian, Croatian, Greek, Jewish, Czech, Polish, Italian, Armenian, and Csango people. 
According to the 2002 census, the ethnic Romanians constituted approximately 89.5 percent of the 
total population, while the most numerous ethnic minorities were the Hungarian (approximately 
6.6 percent of the population) and the Roma minority (approximately 2.5 percent). The remaining 
minority groups represented less than 0.5 percent each of the total Romanian population (INSSE, 
2003). 
29 In November 2007 there have been organised elections for a ‘short mandate’ (until 2009) for 
the Romanian representatives in the European Parliament. 
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involved in the process of crafting the configuration of the democratic political 
system to be implemented in Romania in the aftermath of the Ceauşescu regime’s 
fall (cf. Chiva, 2005a; 2005b; Miroiu, 2004; 2010; Miroiu & Popescu, 2004; Pasti, 
2003). This has had a negative effect on women’s opportunity to participate from 
a position of parity with men in Romanian democratic politics. Concomitantly, the 
advent of the multi–party system in Romania witnessed a return to traditionalist 
patriarchalism and a conception of the political arena as ‘improper’ for women 
and their assignment to a secondary space, that of the domestic enclosure or of the 
non–governmental environment30 (Chiva, 2005a: 971–972; Magyari–Vincze, 
2005: 204; Miroiu & Popescu, 2004: 299–300; Pasti, 2003: 214–215; Surugiu, 
2006: 229). Women in the Romanian transition did not only have to accept a 
relegation to an inferior position in relation to men, but have been confined to a 
situation in which they became objects of masculine pride and sexuality (Iancu, 
2006: 60; Ştefan, 2006: 28). Entering the public space, women lost their position 
as subjects, becoming objectified bodies; indeed, the woman’s bodily appearance 
has been valued not as an aesthetic quality per se, but as a potentially erotic 
attribute that could attract the attention of a man: 
In the public space, the woman is embodied as a femme fatale (although in 
a subaltern position to her chief), cementing the idea that success 
predominantly depends on physical qualities, not on job performance, 
coupled with other such misconceptions: the stereotype of the woman as a 
body, accompanied by her preoccupation with her bodily appearance […]. 
Here one must observe that the woman’s body […] becomes noticed if 
others can enjoy it, thereby becoming a ‘sex bomb’, in other words the result 
of masculine fantasy. 
(Ştefan, 2006: 28) (Italics in original) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly in this context, all politicians, irrespective of their 
political affiliation, have portrayed themselves as ‘staunch supporters of marriage 
and the family’ (Chiva, 2005b: 84) strengthening the conception that a man’s 
political participation finds its complementarity and fulfilment in the 
heteronormative context of family, where women provide the necessary sanctuary 
from politics, which is often depicted as a battlefield (Iancu, 2006: 61; Miroiu, 
2004: 272–279; Pasti, 2003: 217–226). In regard to women’s position in society, 
30 In 1985, the proportion of women in the Grand National Assembly, a rubber–stamp 
parliament, had been of 33 percent. The situation worsened significantly after the fall of the 
Ceausescu dictatorship, reaching a minimum of 3.65 percent (Chamber of Deputies) and 2.10 
percent (Romanian Senate) in the 1996 elections, and increasing only slightly to 10.70 percent 
(Chamber of Deputies) and 7.14 percent (Romanian Senate) in the 2000 elections, changing in 
2004 to 11.14 percent (Chamber of Deputies) and respectively 9.48 percent (Romanian Senate). As 
a result of the 2008 elections, the situation did not alter dramatically, with 11.30 percent (Chamber 
of Deputies) and 5.83 percent (Romanian Senate) (Băluţă, 2006: 142; Chiva, 2005a: 972–973; 
Miroiu, 2010: 582; Tănase & Moşneag, 2006: 178). 
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Mihaela Miroiu and Liliana Popescu (2004) have argued that women in Romania 
are subject to a double paternalism. On the one hand, the Romanian Army and the 
Romanian Orthodox Church31, ‘hardly pillars of liberal democracy, jointly occupy 
the foremost position in opinion polls studying people’s trust in institutions’ 
(Andreescu, 2005: 204). Such figures have been interpreted indicative of the 
citizens’ reliance on easily recognisable hierarchies, orders and constraints, and 
scepticism to a voluntary assertion of their rights and liberties. On the other, the 
post–1989 developments have witnessed ‘the massive dependence of women on 
men’s income and on men’s political decisions’ (Miroiu, 2010: 588). The result has 
been women’s subordination to both the authoritarian and patriarchal model, 
thereby occupying a position of double inferiority and dependence in Romanian 
society (Miroiu & Popescu, 2004: 300). 
Another thorny issue, as Cristina Chiva (2005b) has pointed out, has been the 
transition from the nationalist–fuelled communism of the Ceauşescu regime to a 
democratic multi–party system able to reflect the ethnic diversity32 of the country. 
The said transition has been marked however by the crystallisation of a male–
dominated political order under the national banner, thereby juxtaposing the 
exclusion of ethnic minority groups with the marginalisation of women: ‘state–
building, nationalism and democracy–building have been closely intertwined 
during the consolidation of a fraternal, masculine public political sphere in the 
wake of communism’ (Chiva, 2005b: 81). Such a development had direct and 
immediate consequences for those ethnic minorities that survived the politics of 
assimilation of the Ceauşescu dictatorship. These ‘national minorities’, the 
appellation of ethnic minorities in Romanian official texts, have now been faced 
with the challenge of accommodating to the new political context where the idea 
of the ‘Romanian nation’ in fact referred to the Romanian ethnic majority. The 
result has been ‘an understanding of the state as promoting the interests of the 
31 With concern to the confessional makeup, in the 2002 census a clear majority identified 
themselves as Christian Orthodox (86.8 percent), followed in descending order by Christian 
Catholic (4.7 percent), Reformed/Christian Lutheran (3.2 percent), and Pentecostal (1.5 percent). 
Among the other religious denominations, 0.3 percent claimed Islam as their religion, and 0.1 
percent registered as Jewish. Only 0.1 percent declared themselves to be atheist (INSSE, 2003). 
According to the preliminary data from the 2011 census, the Christian Orthodox faith was claimed 
by a majority (85.5 percent), followed by Christian Catholic (4.6 percent), and Reformed/Christian 
Lutheran (3.2 percent). There are no clear data concerning the amount of people claiming Islamic 
or Jewish faith as their religion. The number of atheists was recorded at 0.1 percent (INSSE, 2012). 
Comparing the data concerning confessional affiliation and ethnic identification (see footnote 28), 
one may notice that a clear majority of the ethnic Romanians identifies themselves as Christian 
Orthodox. The religious affiliations of the most important minorities, particularly the Hungarian 
and to a certain extent even the Romani minority, are more diverse. 
32 I am nonetheless aware of the internal heterogeneity of the ethnic labelling. On this matter, I 
agree with Enikö Magyari–Vincze’s (2005) observation that analysing more closely the ideas and 
practices that underpin the ‘proper gender order’ of post–1989 Romanian families, there are 
greater communalities to be found among women across the ethnic boundaries – and among men 
themselves, respectively – than between the women and men of the same ethnic group (Magyari–
Vincze, 2005: 222). 
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hegemonic ethnic group, at the expense of “national minorities”.’ (Chiva, 2005b: 
81) 
The ethnic minorities in Romania have reacted differently to these 
developments. At one extreme, there has been the quiet exodus of the German 
minority, which witnessed its numbers dwindling from approximately 200,000 in 
December 1989 to barely 60,000 people registered as Germans in the 2002 
census (Gallagher, 2005: 81–82), and to nearly half these numbers ten years later. 
At the other extreme, the Hungarian minority in Romania has been mobilised 
around a political entity to represent its interests in the emerging political 
framework. The Hungarian minority in Romania has long been represented by a 
political party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea 
Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR/Romániai Magyar Demokrata 
Szövetség, RMDSZ), that has competed in elections side by side with the other 
major parties in Romania. The UDMR/RMDSZ has generally received some 6 to 7 
percent of the national votes in each post–1989 poll, which is indicative of the 
percentage of Hungarian minority population among the overall Romanian 
citizens (Chiva, 2005a: 976; Popescu, 2003: 325–326; Stan & Vancea, 2009: 48). 
In turn, the second most numerous minority, the Romani (officially referred to 
as Rroma, but disparagingly identified as Ţigani), has experienced a tremendous 
pressure towards acculturation and assimilation into the Romanian ethnic 
majority33. With a history of enslavement until 1858, victims of Romanian state–
sponsored deportations and systematic extermination (the Porajmos – the 
Romani equivalent of the Holocaust) during the Second World War, and 
stereotypical depiction as a ‘parasitical’ presence during the Ceauşescu 
dictatorship, ‘the Ţigan Other has been used as the symbolic node for a wide 
variety of social anxieties’ (Woodcock, 2007: 495). There has been no Romani 
political party or mobilisation, comparable to the UDMR/RMDSZ, able to 
compete on an equal footing with the Romanian mainstream political parties. 
Rather, the Romani minority’s interests have been generally defended by its sole, 
constitutionally guaranteed, representative in the Chamber of Deputies. As such, 
the two most visible minority ethnic groups (the Hungarian and Romani minority, 
respectively) have become the main subjects of nationalistic attacks. 
Concomitantly, interwar anti–Semitism resurfaced in Romanian politics, despite 
the significantly diminished number of Jews still living in the country, leading 
33 According to the 2002 census, the Romani represented approximately 2.5 per cent of the total 
population; in the 2011 census there were registered 3.2 per cent as Romani (INSSE, 2003; 2012). 
However, the accuracy of this data has been disputed. A major criticism pertained to the lack of 
reliable statistics for the Romani living in Romania, since not all of them have been officially 
registered. A second criticism regarded the Romani’s position as the socially and economically 
most disadvantaged minority in Romania. Arguably, few Romani had registered their ethnic 
belonging, a consequence of social stigma and pervasive discrimination (cf. Magyari–Vincze, 2005; 
Woodcock, 2007). Some scholars have even maintained that the Romani minority amounts to 
between 5 and 9.2 per cent of the total population in Romania (Barany, 1998: 313; Crowe, 2003: 
87). 
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researchers to talk about an anti–Semitism without Jews (cf. Oişteanu, 2001; 
Shafir, 2008). 
Indeed, the post–1989 Romanian political scene has witnessed the emergence 
of several radical parties, both on the left and right. The Socialist Labour Party 
(Partidul Socialist al Muncii, PSM), an unrepentant successor of the Romanian 
Communist Party; the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM); 
and Party of Romanian National Unity (Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a Românilor, 
PUNR) were most important of these. However, the PUNR leader defected to the 
PRM in 1998, together with a significant number of party representatives, thereby 
leading to the disappearance of the PUNR from national politics and imposition of 
the PRM as the sole serious radical right populist contender in Romanian national 
politics in the 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential elections (Gallagher, 2005: 
101–107; Sum, 2010: 21). 
Ideologically, the PRM seems to have continued the hybrid line of ‘nationalist 
communism’ of the Ceauşescu regime (Miroiu, 2004: 215). The Ceauşescu 
dictatorship operated a juxtaposition of the legacy of authoritarianism of the pro–
Nazi military regimes of the Second World War and the mysticism of the 
extreme–right – especially manifest in the marriage between organicist 
nationalism and Orthodox religious fervour – on ‘the institutional body of 
Romanian Stalinism’ (Tismaneanu, 2001: 246–247; Tismaneanu & Pavel, 1994: 
402). The PRM appears to have carried over this legacy into the new political 
environment. Some scholars have compellingly argued that, on the one hand, the 
PRM’s economic programme has constantly been left–wing, characterised by 
paternalist statist thinking. On the other hand, the corollary of the PRM’s right–
wing inclinations has been its hyper–nationalistic, xenophobic populism draped 
in Orthodox mysticism (Gallagher, 2005: 272; Mungiu–Pippidi, 2001: 235; Soare, 
2010: 113; Sum, 2010: 27; Tismaneanu & Pavel, 1994: 417–418). On this matter, 
Vladimir Tismaneanu and Gail Kligman (2001) have maintained that the PRM 
‘locates itself in an elusive amalgamation of nostalgia for communist and fascist 
ideals, hostility to modernity and diversity, and a militaristic, some would say 
phallocentric, cult of the nation (racially defined), associated with a Greater 
Romania movement and with a supreme leader (conducător)’ (Italics – mine) 
(Tismaneanu & Kligman, 2001: 83). However, it is noteworthy that the 
interpretation of nationalism in a religious key has long been a characteristic of 
the radical right populism across the whole Europe, with no clear–cut distinctions 
between its Western and Eastern regions (Glick Schiller, 2005: 527; Kitschelt & 
McGann, 1997: 19–20). 
The position of the weekly magazine Greater Romania Magazine (Revista 
România Mare, hereafter RRM34) in the Romanian political context is a singular 
34 The magazine’s slogan reads: ‘We will be again what we once were and even more than that!’ It 
is attributed to Petru Rareş – a descendent of Stephen ‘the Great’ mentioned in the previous 
chapter – and it was often employed in the interwar period to justify the crafting of the Greater 
Romania polity. The title of present chapter makes direct reference to it. 
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one. According to several researchers, the RRM has been, since its founding in 
May 1990, not only the mouthpiece of the main radical right populist party in 
Romania. In fact, the RRM was central to the founding of PRM party itself in 
November of the same year (cf. Andreescu, 2005; Gallagher, 2005; Soare, 2010; 
Stewart, 2008). The PRM party leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, would later claim 
to have founded the party at the request of the faithful RRM readership, which 
according to his own descriptions embodied the oppressed people who 
‘demanded’ that Tudor establish his party (Soare, 2010: 105). It is noteworthy that 
the RRM has not been the sole media project under the patronage of the PRM and 
its leader35; however, Tudor has continued to employ the weekly RRM as the main 
vehicle for disseminating his political message and by mid–2000s the RRM had a 
readership of around 400,000, or about 60,000 copies per week, a figure 
unrivalled by any other party–affiliated newspaper in Romania (Gallagher, 2005: 
274; Stewart, 2008: 414). Towards the end of the decade, the RRM was still a 
significant actor in the Romanian printed media landscape, with a self–reported 
circulation of approximately 46,000 copies per week (Stewart, 2008: 412). 
The RRM has represented, according to Gabriel Andreescu, a ‘textbook 
example of hate speech’ that targeted equally the ‘usual culprits: Hungarians, 
“Gypsies” [Romani], and Jews’, and those ‘political or cultural groups that 
advocated a democratic regime’ (Andreescu, 2005: 187). Even more so, reflecting 
the fact that most Romanian mainstream media has been actively scrutinising and 
at times even boycotting the PRM and its leader, the RRM has always published 
verbatim Tudor’s speeches delivered in the Romanian Parliament and his 
statements issued at the PRM’s regular Friday press conferences (Gallagher, 
2005: 289). Generally, the RRM has been dominated by minute coverage of 
Tudor’s speeches, reporting extensively on his engagements at home and abroad 
(Gallagher, 2005: 295). As such, the collected editorials reflect Tudor’s direct, 
unmediated and unaltered discursive articulations of the radical right populist 
ideology from his position as unchallenged leader of the PRM. 
5.2 ROMANIA IS A FAMILY ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER 
As mentioned earlier, the November 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential 
elections represented a sign of maturity for the Romanian political system (cf. 
Gallagher, 2005; Popescu, 2003). The then governing coalition grouped a wide 
array of political parties: a centre–right conservative party – the Christian–
Democratic National Peasants’ Party (Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin 
35 In March 2007 Tudor launched another newspaper (Tricolorul) that was thought to 
complement the RRM. However, neither newspaper appealed to a larger audience via the Internet 
until rather late, perhaps a sign of Tudor’s preference for a tangible media product and for an 
already faithful following. 
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Democrat, PNŢ–CD); a liberal party – the National Liberal Party (Partidul 
Naţional Liberal, PNL); two centre–left parties claiming different traditions – the 
Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat, PD), a break–away branch from the party 
built on the ruins of the Romanian Communist Party (at that time the main 
opposition party), and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social 
Democrat Român, PSDR) that claimed to be the continuation of the interwar 
Romanian social–democrats; and the UDMR/RMDSZ representing the 
Hungarian minority. The main opposition force, the Social Democratic Pole (Polul 
Social Democrat), reunited the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (Partidul 
Democraţiei Sociale in România, PDSR) – the main successor of the defunct 
Romanian Communist Party – and the smaller Romanian Humanist Party 
(Partidul Umanist Român, PUR). 
In the given political context, the PRM under Tudor’s leadership chose to 
contest the elections on a platform that apparently lacked a clear programme, 
characterised by nationalist and anti–systemic appeals. Shrewdly capitalising on 
the general discontent of Romanian citizens with the performance of the political 
system, Tudor presented himself in the analysed editorials as a strong leader in 
the Christian tradition of Romanian people. In a similar vein, the PRM appeared 
as an option outside the political establishment, thereby in a unique position to 
bring about political change, economic prosperity, and justice (Gallagher, 2005: 
253–254; Pop–Eleches, 2001: 163–164; Popescu, 2003: 327–328). The much 
discussed change was to be achieved, to judge from Tudor’s editorials in the RRM, 
by radical means: immediate confiscation of illicitly–acquired fortunes, public 
trials and executions in football stadiums, governing by the machine–gun and 
purging the motherland of its traitors – with a special focus on the Hungarian 
minority and Jewish presence in Romania. Illustratively, attempting to present his 
party’s radical right populist agenda as a benign manifestation in Romanian 
politics, Tudor dismissed the accusations of radicalism and nationalism voiced by 
his political adversaries, and chose to present nationalism as a constitutive quality 
of the Romanian national construct. He retaliated by emphasising the allegedly 
constructive aspect of Romanian nationalist zeal: 
Romanian nationalism has never been aggressive, as it has never been 
directed against someone, but it has manifested in support of something, 
namely of independence and national unity, of identity, of dignity and self–
awareness. [...] We are not obstinate, neither anachronistic – we are, as 
simple as it may sound, the way we are and if something needs changing or 
modernising in Romanian mentality, then this cannot be nationalism, for 
without it we are anything else but Romanians.  
(RRM 523, 2000: 14) (Italics in original) 
In the same editorial, Tudor strove to cement the idea of perennial nationalist 
fervour among the ‘Romanian People’ on the basis of an alleged ‘preservation of 
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its purity, ethnically speaking’ for the past half a millennium. Even more so, Tudor 
added yet another layer, one that astutely overlapped Romanian national kinship 
with belonging to Orthodox Christianity. To enforce this image, the Romanians 
were deemed to be undoubtedly a saintly folk, since their ‘martyrdom had no 
limits’ (RRM 523, 2000: 14). It is noteworthy that Tudor signalled his allegiance 
to the nationalist cause not only in terms of describing the genealogy of Romanian 
nation in heroic terms, but also utilising capital letters when referring to the 
‘Romanian People’ and ‘Romanian Nation’ (which appear to be completely 
synonymous), the ‘Romanian mentality’ and ‘Romanians’ (easily apparent in the 
quotation above) as a manner to distinguish Romanianness among other such 
‘national’ characteristics and elevate it to a privileged and revered position. 
5.2.1 ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL FAMILY 
From the perspective of the Lakoffian description of the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor (Lakoff, 2002: 85–100), in the studied empirical material, 
Tudor indicated schematically the boundaries of intelligibility of the Romanian 
national family, evidencing its moral wholeness understood in terms of ethnic 
‘purity’ and Orthodox Christianity as a birthright36. The allegedly inborn Orthodox 
Christianity of the national family in this context plays a dual role. The assertion 
that the Romanian people was born Christian has been often used in Romanian 
historiography to underline the Roman filiation – Romanians as the easternmost 
outpost of Latin–Europe – and the nationalist claim of continuous inhabitation of 
the lands that would later become Romania by the Romanian people (Boia, 2001: 
63; Dobrescu, 2003: 395; Leustean, 2007: 729–730; Stan & Turcescu, 2007: 44–
46). It is worth noting that the relationship between the Romanian state and 
Romanian Orthodox Church has a rather tortuous history. However, being the 
religious institution for the largest part of the Romanian ethnic majority, and 
being autocephalous – it is governed by a national synod, and appoints its own 
patriarch – has enabled the Romanian Orthodox Church to claim to be the 
national church, despite the nominally secular character of the Romanian state 
(cf. Leustean, 2007; Stan &Turcescu, 2007). This notwithstanding, Tudor’s claim 
that Romanian people are born into Orthodox Christianity seems to indicate their 
moral superiority, thereby naturalising a hierarchy of ethnic belonging and 
worthiness crowned by the figure of ethnic Romanians – claims which appear 
strengthened with the help of nouns that were capitalised. The national minorities 
were, in turn, named using non–capitalised nouns, in accordance with the 
common grammatical rules of Romanian language. Such a stance was further 
36 In contrast, the Hungarian minority can ‘only’ claim baptism to Catholic Christianity by Saint 
Stephen/István sometime during the tenth century, while the Romani (Rroma) have no attestation 
of their Christianity – a consequence of their centuries–long status as slaves in the Romanian 
Danubian principalities. 
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emphasised in a subsequent editorial in which Tudor attributed to the people of 
that ‘part of Europe’ a certain naïvety or even childish innocence ‘because they 
have a genetic heritage similar to that of the first Christians – selflessly helping 
others – but certainly not suicidal and not inclined to love out of interest’ (RRM 
528, 2000: 14). 
In the 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential elections, the PRM and Tudor 
proved to be major adversaries to the political establishment. Participating 
actively in the Romanian political arena – marked by authoritarianism and 
electoral competitors more interested in protecting and expanding their personal 
interests, rather than democratic pluralism and serving the public good (Miroiu, 
2004: 222) – the PRM and its leader finished the election as the second largest 
political force, behind the centre–left Social Democratic Pole of presidential 
candidate Ion Iliescu. The PRM polled 19.5 percent of the votes for the Chamber of 
Deputies (84 seats), and 21 percent for the Romanian Senate (37 seats), becoming 
the main opposition party. Equally astonishing was Tudor’s qualification for the 
presidential run–off with 28.3 percent of the votes, second only to Iliescu who 
received 36.4 percent (Andreescu, 2005: 188; Chen, 2003: 169; Mungiu–Pippidi, 
2001: 230; Pop–Eleches, 2001: 156; Popescu, 2003: 331–332; Sum, 2010: 19). His 
strong electoral support notwithstanding, Tudor lost to Iliescu in the run–off. The 
elections were a very tense moment that witnessed a rallying of the centre–right 
supporters behind the centre–left candidate as the sole way of preventing Tudor 
from acceding to power. This was nevertheless interpreted as a rather ominous 
sign as Iliescu appeared to embody the ‘father figure’ preferred by the Romanian 
electorate, despite criticism concerning his tainted past as a member of the 
Romanian nomenklatura (Chen, 2003: 173–174; Gallagher, 2005: 267–268). 
Nonetheless, Orthodox Christianity was subsequently reified as a 
distinguishing feature of the common Romanians, as it was the case in one 
editorial published on the eve of 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential elections. 
Indeed, the Romanian national family was not only depicted as ‘devoured’ by its 
love for Jesus Christ by Tudor, but also steadfastly conservative, in the sense of 
piously following and obeying uncritically the Church hierarchy that was revered 
as holy in itself: 
I always look in awe at the crowds of simple people that sweep with their 
knees the church floors; that stand still on the dusty roads, transfigured by a 
devouring love for our Saviour Jesus Christ; and that lay their meagre 
garments at the feet of priests, abbots, bishops and metropolitan bishops 
for these holy men to brush against the clothes and to transfer onto the 
garments a piece of their holiness. 
(RRM 737, 2004: 12) 
Elevating the said hierarchy of moral worthiness, which distinguished between 
‘pure’ ethnic Romanians and ‘other’ ethnicities inhabiting the ‘Country’, Tudor 
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indicated the symbolic boundaries of the national family. Importantly, such 
boundaries were used to define not only the ‘essence’ of Romanianness, but also to 
mark the difference between the ‘strong’, ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’, on the one hand, 
and the ‘weak’, ‘diseased’ and even ‘abnormal’, on the other. A case in point was 
Tudor’s vehement opposition to the decriminalisation of homosexuality37 in 2000, 
a year which was mystically referred to as ‘the very year when we celebrate two 
thousand years from the birth of Our Lord Jesus’. Tudor then saluted in his 
editorial the Romanian Orthodox Church’s appeal though its highest prelate 
Patriarch Teoctist to boycott the new law. He attempted to exploit this occasion 
politically, noting deridingly that the governing coalition – reuniting the aforesaid 
centre–right, liberal, and centre–left parties – that had ‘the unimaginable 
irresponsibility’ to pass the aforementioned law, was ‘in itself an alliance against 
natural laws’ (RRM 521, 2000: 14). Opposing such ‘unnatural’ political solutions, 
which threatened to push through ‘irresponsible’ policies, Tudor subsequently 
appealed to an idealised, naïve and uncorrupted Romanian nation. The Romanian 
national family was depicted as obeying the ‘natural laws’ of compulsory 
heteronormativity – denoted by opposition to decriminalising homosexuality; 
abstention from raping defenceless women, thereby performing their 
(reproductive) sexuality exclusively within the family’s private enclosure; and 
over-potent masculinity – marked by the pious submission to the exclusively male 
organisation of the national Orthodox Church (cf. RRM 528, 2000: 14; RRM 737, 
2004: 12). This underlined further the pivotal role the national Orthodox Church 
played in defining Romanianness, thereby superseding regional specificities and 
uniting coreligionists, in an ever closer collaboration with the Romanian state 
power – and strongly reminiscent of the interplay between Orthodoxy and 
ethnocracy of the interwar period (Leustean, 2007: 720–721; Livezeanu, 2000: 
303–304; Stan & Turcescu, 2007: 44). 
The 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential elections witnessed the 
crystallisation of several electoral alliances, and a clearer profiling on the left–
right ideological cleavage. As such, the incumbent Social Democratic Party 
(Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) – the result of a merger between the two main 
centre–left parties, the PDSR and PSDR – entered the elections on their allegedly 
satisfactory governmental record: significant economic growth (a GDP increase 
with 8 percent), accession to the NATO/OTAN, and progress on the path towards 
EU–membership. The PSD renewed its previous alliance with the PUR, forming 
the National Union (Uniunea Naţională) electoral alliance. Their main 
competitors, the ‘Justice and Truth Alliance’ (Alianţa Dreptate şi Adevăr) – 
37 Article 200 of the 1968 Basic Penal Code defined homosexual relationships as criminal; prior to 
1989 it had been applied with the purpose to persecute and to force collaboration with the 
Ceauşescu’s secret police. In the post–dictatorship context, the article was often employed 
discretionarily by the police and had drawn harsh criticism from the human rights organisations 
and from the Council of Europe (Turcescu & Stan, 2005: 291–292). Article 200 was eventually 
repealed in June 2001, by the centre–left Năstase government. 
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reuniting the PD and PNL – focused on the imperative of reining in 
institutionalised corruption, which they associated with the political and economic 
oligarchy crystallised around the PSD. In turn, the PRM entered an electoral 
alliance with a trade union block (Downs & Miller, 2006: 412; Ieţcu–Fairclough, 
2008: 373). Under these circumstances, Tudor emphasised the PRM’s 
righteousness in a renewed attempt to make use of religious arguments for 
electoral purposes. He described the PRM as ‘the party that does not change allies’ 
– indicative of moral uprightness and steadfastness – and that ‘has the decency 
not to participate’ in ‘dishonouring trade–offs’. In conclusion, he maintained, ‘the 
PRM is the sole Christian and moral force’ in Romanian politics (RRM 754, 2004: 
12–13). The PRM and Tudor lost some of their political appeal, despite Tudor’s 
promise to improve on the results of the previous elections. Indeed, the PRM’s 
support decreased in the 2004 Parliamentary elections, polling 13.0 percent for 
the Chamber of Deputies, and 13.65 percent for the Romanian Senate (Downs & 
Miller, 2006: 413–414). 
Another illustrative example of policing the borders of the nation was Tudor’s 
own interpretation of the wider European anti–Islam attitudes in the aftermath of 
the 11 September 2001 suicide attacks in the USA, and its adaptation to the 
Romanian specificities. The translation into Romanian politics was a gradual 
process, at first noticeable in 2004 and becoming most vicious on the eve of the 
2009 European Parliamentary elections. In this changed political context, 
criticising a Turkish–owned TV channel for unveiling a case of corruption among 
the Orthodox high prelates, Tudor maintained this was a matter for ‘the 
Romanian Orthodox Church’s Holy Synod to decide, not the business of newly 
arrived Muslims’. He subsequently warned that ‘Muslims should not touch the 
Romanian Orthodox Church; otherwise they will have to put up with me! Romania 
is not a village without watchdogs!’ (RRM 982, 2009: 13). The suspicion of 
terrorism was easily connected to religious difference – especially with the Islamic 
faith – Tudor making reference to a deeper, ‘immutable difference’ that could be 
used to deny the Muslim population the rights and legal protection guaranteed to 
his own folk (Glick Schiller, 2005: 529). The radicalisation of Tudor’s use of 
conceptual metaphors might be explained by several factors. The PRM did not 
manage to maintain its grip on its faithful electorate with its old nationalist litany 
directed against the Hungarian minority; the fact that the UDMR/RMDSZ had 
supported the various governmental coalitions in the past decade convinced the 
Romanian majority of their democratic commitment to the Romanian state. In 
addition, a significant percentage of the population had emigrated after Romania’s 
accession to the EU, which might also help explaining the decrease in nationalist 
fervour. In the context of an altered electoral law on the eve of the 2008 
Parliamentary elections, which were for the first time decoupled from the 
Presidential elections, with a higher national electoral threshold of 5 percent and a 
significantly altered structure of the electoral districts, the PRM failed to gain 
parliamentary representation for the first time in its history. The PRM polled only 
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3.2 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies, and 3.6 percent for the 
Romanian Senate, being the biggest loser of that electoral cycle (Marian & King, 
2010: 13; Stan & Vancea, 2009: 51). Tudor has apparently succeeded in 
maintaining a loyal base, the PRM receiving 8.6 percent of the votes in the 2009 
European Parliament elections, thereby sending three parliamentarians out of a 
total of 33 Romanian MEPs (Sum, 2010: 21). 
In this respect, Tudor’s anti–Islamism appears in many ways similar to his 
xenophobic attitude against all those not narrowly defined as belonging to the 
Romanian national family; Muslims were thus portrayed as the menacing 
religious Others. Indeed, he claimed that Romanian youth was dangerously ‘lured 
into the most embarrassing sub–culture, […] of Oriental–Gypsy dances, of 
immoral parties, of rapes, of street language that disfigures our sweet language, 
and finally, of drugs, of prostitution […].’ The Romanian nation was thus depicted 
as on the brink of self–destruction, and Tudor urged the Romanians to ‘open the 
eyes and minds of the young generation to the glory of God – the sole source of 
true beauty, truth, and wisdom.’ (RRM 736, 2004: 13) The cultural and religious 
regression was manifested through the adoption of ‘Oriental–Gypsy dances’ – 
with Gypsy here in the sense of Ţigan Other (Woodcock, 2007: 494) – and social 
gatherings that could lead to young Romanian women being raped by those 
engaging in such actions – hyper–masculine Others symbolically reuniting the 
most threatening presences: that of the ‘uncivilized’ Romani (‘Ţigan’) and of 
‘Oriental’ Muslim. These expressed Tudor’s paternalist preoccupation with the 
danger of pollution and of the irremediable degeneration of the Romanian 
national fabric. Consequently, the return to a patriarchal morale enforced by 
Romanian Orthodox Christianity was to ensure, in his view, a safe return to ‘true 
beauty, truth, and wisdom’. Tudor’s usage of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
metaphor thereby extended the metaphorical cluster towards portraying the 
Romanian ethnic majority as facing an imminent disaster and the identification of 
those that endangered its existence. 
5.2.2 THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL FAMILY AND ITS DEPENDANTS 
Preparing for the 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential elections, in the analysed 
editorials, Tudor described Romania as a country reduced to being ‘a crossroad of 
beggars’, a ‘toxic dump’, and ‘a brothel’ (RRM 521, 2000: 14). He exploited the 
dual function of the family as a fundamental principle of the organisation of social 
life and as an ideological construction that ‘naturalises’ hierarchies of gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality, and social class (Collins, 1998: 63–64), portraying Romania as 
a national family on the verge of social collapse: 
Mothers kill their newborn infants because they cannot afford to care for 
them. Elderly couples throw themselves, hand in hand, from the rooftops of 
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high–rise apartment buildings […]. Unemployed, and more recently even 
those living in rented homes, are setting themselves alight turning into 
living torches. 
(RRM 526, 2000: 15) 
The apocalyptic description above makes reference to a dehumanised folk. 
Women, that are commonly portrayed in the radical right populist discourses as 
merely ‘retaining the traces of putatively historical, quasi–organic community 
within the modern state’ (Cusak, 2000: 543), cannot afford the costs of family’s 
perpetuation, and thus fail in their collective role as mothers of the Romanian 
nation. The other ‘dependants’ – the elderly and the socially vulnerable – are 
forced to commit suicide as a result of similarly dire economies. Tudor continued 
this line of reasoning in his later editorials, problematising the difficulty of a 
population living below poverty levels, an image rather uncomfortably familiar to 
the great majority of Romanians. Appealing to the religious devotion of his fellow 
citizens, he described a tragic situation in which the elderly were forced ‘to steal 
the oil from oil lamps across the country’s cemeteries, to be able to fry a meagre 
portion of potatoes’ and to use the crumbled ‘antidoron [blessed bread in 
Orthodox liturgy] over a cut tomato to appease their hunger’ (RRM 529, 2000: 
14). 
The description of the national family’s dependents as extremely vulnerable 
and in need of special attention was then cemented through a series of media 
campaigns that focused on Tudor’s visits across the country that targeted 
hospitals, retirement homes, orphanages, and canteens for the poor. Such visits 
built on the previous charitable actions of the PRM’s women’s organisation – 
whose actions effectively strengthened the women–charity–maternity axis specific 
to nationalist inspired radical right populism (Miroiu, 2004: 227). On this matter, 
Vladimir Pasti (2003) has observed that Tudor adopted in these campaigns a 
paternalist attitude, heavily reliant on a hegemonic masculinity embodied in the 
figure of the ‘political hero’: more often than not making a donation to the visited 
establishments and entertaining a colloquial discussion with the hosts. 
Importantly, he needed not to be involved in the caretaking process itself; it 
sufficed that he, as a family father, indicated his willingness to contribute 
financially to the dependants’ wellbeing (Pasti, 2003: 226). Such a move only 
cements the idea of a hierarchical structuring of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
cluster, whereby women are portrayed as ‘the natural’ caregivers of other 
dependents in the family – the elderly and children, the sick, and (even) the poor 
– and men are confirmed in their position of leadership as ‘political’ entities and 
family breadwinners. 
Closer to the election date, Tudor radicalised the tone of his editorials. Even 
more problematic, according to Tudor, was the treatment of children, understood 
here as the promise of continuation for the Romanian family into the new 
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millennium. Indeed, Romanian mothers were portrayed as unable to provide for 
the most basic needs of their children. ‘[H]aving lost their sanity because of 
poverty they live in’ they agree to the ‘most barbaric aggression against the 
biological fibre of the Romanian People’, a ‘truly Satanist attack against 
Christianity’ – selling their children for the organs: 
The REAL Country is the belly of the woman that has commenced to sell her 
babies, even before they are being born, as if she were a breeding dog with 
its puppies pledged two months in advance of delivery – at least those 
puppies are alive and well, whilst the children sold this way await an 
inescapable death, supplies for the organ banks of the world’s richest. […] 
Romania has thus become the largest exporter of hearts, livers, eyes, spinal 
cord, skin, blood, of hands and feet in the whole Europe.  
(RRM 534, 2000: 14) (Emphasis in original) 
The NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor was extended in this context to 
describe a country about to be completely annihilated, transformed into a cheap 
producer of organs. Women appear to have lost their quality as ‘mothers of the 
nation’, and have been transformed into mere reproductive devices responsive to 
the demands of a global market. The explanation for such a development resided 
in the fact that the Romanian mothers have lost their sanity, an extreme 
consequence of the outrageous poverty that the ‘REAL Country’ was living in. 
Although not directly indicated, Tudor pointed an accusing finger at the 
incumbent government and its attempts to modernise the country by way of 
massive privatisations and indiscriminate adoption of ‘Western’ standards in 
economy and society at large. Nonetheless, because of the weak and divided 
governing coalition, manifest in the absence of a strong leader, Tudor added, 
‘everyone can come whenever they want, can steal whatever they wish, can rape 
children and women, desecrate holy places’ with no consequences (RRM 527, 
2000: 15). 
Under these extreme circumstances, the PRM participation in the 
Parliamentary elections, which was coupled with Tudor’s presidential candidacy, 
was envisaged to put an end to the foreigners’ impunity for acts of assault and 
domination of the nation’s dependants – women and children – narrated as acts 
of pollution of the nation. It is noteworthy that pollution was presented as having 
extended beyond the limits of physicality – rape of defenceless people – into the 
transcendental; manifested in the desecration of the country’s ‘holy places’.  
Even more so, in true populist tradition, Tudor recreated a plebiscitary 
atmosphere, imagining a ceremony for the restitution of sovereignty to the 
Romanian nation, in which people ‘from all corners of the country’ would gather 
and collectively reject the political establishment and acclaim ‘Vadim President!’ 
(RRM 743, 2004: 12). According to Tudor, what led the people to support the 
PRM and its leader was ‘HUNGER, the best electoral agent’ (Emphasis in original) 
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– as he argued in one of his 2009 texts (RRM 977, 2009: 12). A definitive end to 
hunger required the coming to power of his party, since the PRM was ‘the only 
political force not in Power, because it has been prevented from acceding to 
Power, for it would have switched off the machinery of plunder’ (RRM 977, 2009: 
12). 
In sum, it appears that Tudor has portrayed the Romanian national family as 
on a road to self–destruction, resorting to exaggerations depicting a dehumanised 
folk. Indeed, the dependants of the national family seem to be on the verge of 
catastrophe. Women have been portrayed as having lost their motherly instincts – 
killing their offspring or selling their infants to organ traffickers. The elderly, in 
turn, have been described as experiencing absolute poverty, and being forced by 
famine to disrespect the national family’s century–old Orthodox Christian 
traditions. Under these circumstances, the PRM and its leader have been 
presented as the nation’s providential saviours. 
5.2.3 WOMEN, POLITICS, AND THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL FAMILY 
Considering Tudor’s insistence on viewing the Romanian nation as a family, it is 
perhaps surprising that in the examined empirical material he makes only rather 
sporadic and indirect references to women in politics. Indeed, women were often 
depicted as mothers or as defenceless beings, together with other ‘dependents’ – 
the elderly and children – thereby denied autonomy and positioned as 
subordinated subjects, either in relation to their husbands or to Romanian (male) 
political leaders. In Romanian politics, the consecrated model has been that of the 
omnipotent heroic man who is uncontested leader of his (political) clan – thereby 
appealing to the structuring of the political sphere according to a logic of political 
kinship. This brings forth the idea of political competition between political 
families commanded by father–like leaders. This has resulted in the rigid vertical 
structuring of politics, and relegated women to a position of ‘tolerated’ 
participants in the political field (Băluţă, 2006: 155; Iancu, 2006: 61; Miroiu, 
2004: 219–225; Pasti, 2003: 223–224). In this light, Tudor has portrayed the 
ideal Romanian woman as the embodiment of his own mother. She incarnated an 
ideal of subordinate femininity – a selfless mother and a devoted wife (Kandiyoti, 
1991: 434) – often being described in her position of a nurturing mother, who 
initiated Tudor into fanatic nationalism (RRM 524, 2000: 14). Limiting her role to 
that of a mother (of a man’s offspring), Tudor enforced the heteronormative 
structuring of Romania as a national family, following closely the traditional 
family ideal, which underpinned child–bearing and child–rearing as measures of 
national well–being (Collins, 1998: 66). 
Few women have taken part in Romanian politics and even fewer have drawn 
Tudor’s attention. Those that have include Zoe Petre, the president’s chief of staff 
from 1996 until the 2000 Presidential elections, and Madeleine Albright, the US 
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Secretary of State of that time. Zoe Petre challenged the deep–seated Romanian 
prejudices against women playing a visible and active role in politics. Women have 
often been associated with the ‘monstrous’, as ‘Communist–feminists’, in a 
genealogical line that included Ana Pauker, the first woman Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in Romania (1947–1952) and of Jewish origin; and Elena Ceauşescu, wife 
of the Romanian leader and the second most influential political person during 
Ceauşescu’s dictatorship. Given the context, Petre has been a disquieting presence 
in politics, and the RRM has been particularly active in portraying the incumbent 
president as a tool in the hands of Petre. Even more so, Petre’s employing her own 
son in a subordinate position in the presidential entourage was regarded as a 
confirmation of her domineering attitude in relation to the men around her 
(Gallagher, 2005: 147–148; Miroiu & Popescu, 2004: 305). In Tudor’s editorials, 
Petre was elevated to the position of absolute leader of the country, a position 
shared solely with the president’s wife, thereby indicating not only the incumbent 
president’s emasculation but the unmanliness of the whole political establishment 
Tudor opposed (RRM 527, 2000: 15). 
Petre was subsequently portrayed by Tudor as a ‘real commissar–woman’ who 
deserved to ‘wear a beard’ (RRM 534, 2000: 15). She appears to have transgressed 
the heteronormative rules of intelligibility, which preserve public life and politics 
as the exclusive domain of masculine competition, and reduce women to mere 
trophies and vessels for nation’s reproduction. Her ‘wearing a beard’ underlined 
her unnaturalness, on the one hand, and confirmed politics as a domain 
exclusively masculine and masculinising, on the other. Dealing with her was 
deemed extremely difficult, and Tudor concluded in a later editorial that such ‘an 
impossible woman’, the puppeteer of Romanian politics from behind the scenes, 
was to be left to the will of Rex, the dog of the infamous Târgovişte military 
regiment – remembered for its role in the Ceauşescus’ execution in December 
1989 (RRM 536, 2000: 15). In other words, in the metaphorical construction of 
Romanian nation as a family, women’s roles were strictly constrained to that of 
devoted mothers, while men were depicted as protectors of their subordinated 
wives and offspring. Any attempt to transcend their status was suggested as 
deserving of an exemplary punishment: public execution. 
Madeleine Albright was also criticised by Tudor38 for her decisive role in the 
Bosnian and Kosovo wars in neighbouring former–Yugoslavia. Tudor attacked 
Albright characterising her as a superficial outsider, referring to her alleged 
unfamiliarity with the Serbian nationalist ‘rights’ in former Yugoslavia, and 
accusing her of hypocrisy and of being a woman, which was seen as a major 
handicap; more concerned with embellishing her appearance with broaches than 
38 Internationally, Tudor has cultivated the friendship of Jean–Marie Le Pen, then leader of the 
French FN, and Slobodan Milošević, the late Serbian president whose presidency marked the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and the savage wars that followed. Tudor has also had close relations with 
several leaders in the Arab world, including Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi (Andreescu, 
2005: 189; Gallagher, 2005: 303; Mungiu–Pippidi, 2001: 235). 
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preventing the killing of innocent people. He asked rhetorically if one: ‘[should 
rely] on what a boisterous analphabetic, who adorns herself with a cowboy hat and 
lots of golden broaches, with no Country, and no God, by her name the Jewish 
Madeleine Albright, who, without doubt, is the greatest serial killer in history?’ 
(RRM 528, 2000: 15) Very much like Petre, Albright was considered by Tudor to 
be unable to transcend her position as a woman – more preoccupied with 
accessorizing her outfits rather than saving lives, thereby politically incompetent 
(cf. Pasti, 2003; Ştefan, 2006). Albright was also found guilty of mimicking 
patriotism and religious attachment – ‘with no Country, and no God’, an 
intimation of her personal history as a Czech émigré to the USA. The disclosure of 
Albright being a converted Jew was built on a deep–seated stereotype about the 
maleficence of Jews in the Central and Eastern European context (cf. Livezeanu, 
2000; Oişteanu, 2001; Shafir, 2008). 
Such portrayal of women active in politics, in my view, seems to cement the 
naturalisation of women’s containment to the private enclosure of their homes 
and maternity as the most suitable form of ‘serving’ the national family (Parker et 
al, 1992: 7). Those few women that have ventured outside the domestic sphere 
appear portrayed by Tudor as incomplete (less–than–men) politicians, unable to 
transcend their position of women. This is taken to the extreme, I argue, as Tudor 
threatens these women with physical extermination, should they not comply with 
reverting to their traditional roles as caretakers of the national family. 
5.2.4 THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL FAMILY AND ITS OTHERS 
In the analysed empirical material, Tudor’s attempts to separate Romanians from 
less–than–Romanian ethnic minorities were arguably founded on his 
understanding of Romania as a national family, ‘the people–as–one’, and the 
elevation of Romanian language to a liturgical status (Tismaneanu, 1998: 68). On 
a closer look, the PRM’s political existence was attributed by Tudor to the 
stringency of counteracting the plans of ‘chauvinistic Hungarians’ to ‘federalise 
Romania’ (RRM 525, 2000: 15); Tudor translated the federal project into a direct 
danger to Romania as a tightly knit family: the threat of territorial separation thus 
became the danger of severance of family connections. Tudor even advocated for a 
new form of citizenship, similar to that of France and Greece, thereby 
transcending ethnic belonging and proclaiming that all those born in Romania 
were to be solely seen as Romanians, regardless of them being ‘Hungarians, and 
Ţigani [Romani], and Armenians, and Jewish, and all other ethnic minorities that 
came here uninvited’ (RRM 523, 2000: 14).  
Those particularly targeted were the ethnic Hungarians and their ‘whining to 
all international forums’ for their collective ethnic rights; the ‘Ţigani’ (the Romani 
– that are always referred to disparagingly in Tudor’s texts) who needed to ‘come 
to their senses and work honestly’, and the Jews personifying international 
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finance (RRM 523, 2000: 14). On this matter, it is noteworthy that the much 
detested Hungarian minority has been ascribed somewhat ambiguous masculine 
attributes: financially endowed, saboteurs of Romanian statehood and spies for 
the Hungarian state, thereby instilled with a sense of mischievous masculine 
potency. At the same time, the Hungarian minority and the UDMR/RMDSZ 
appeared unable to stand their ground, resorting to such unmanly acts as 
‘whining’ for their collective rights to ‘international forums’ (RRM 523, 2000: 14), 
treason – ‘Trojan horses’ for the ‘New World Order, and its stillborn child, the 
European Union’ (RRM 527, 2000: 14) –, and ‘meaningless gossiping’ (RRM 983, 
2009: 13). 
Another problematic aspect, identified by Tudor in the 2000 editorials, 
pertained to the ‘serious threat’ posed by the ‘alarming fertility of the Ţigani 
[Romani], who no longer can be assimilated; they will soon assimilate us in turn’ 
(RRM 523, 2000: 14). The Romani men were portrayed as menacing hyper–
sexual Others, roaming the country in ‘packs’ – like wolves – terrorising the 
Romanian majority population (RRM 526, 2000: 15); and ‘raping, torturing, and 
even killing Romanian young girls’ (RRM 529, 2000: 15). Put differently, he 
painted an apocalyptic scenario – echoing the ‘demographic race’ discourse 
(Yuval–Davis, 1997: 26–27). Romanians were depicted being in danger of turning 
from ‘assimilators’ of ethnic Others – through their implied civilisation 
(Romanians’ ‘honest work’ and individuality, as opposed Romani’s gathering like 
predators in ‘packs’) – to being ‘assimilated’ – through corruption of their genetic 
heritage, a consequence of ‘the alarming fertility of Ţigani [Romani]’. Such a 
stance reveals that the radical right populist fear of the uncontrollable 
reproductive sexuality of the Other is strongly interlinked to fear of degeneracy, of 
being numerically and genetically overwhelmed. 
At a deeper level of analysis, Tudor arguably operated a more radical extension 
of the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster. He made a distinction between 
ethnically/‘racially’ civilised and, thereby, worthy Romanian women and the 
uncivilized ‘Ţigani’ [Romani] women who threatened to undermine the 
ethnic/‘racial’ balance in the country with their uncontrollable fertility. In Tudor’s 
heteronormative hierarchy, Romanian women were depicted as inherently better 
than the Others’ women, but necessarily preoccupied with reproduction of 
Romanianness – thus subordinated to their Romanian men. His stance on the 
matter became even more clearly articulated in his 2004 campaign when he 
conflated the poor housing conditions the majority of ‘Ţigani’ [Romani] has been 
forced to live in, with homes where prostitution and drug trafficking were an 
undeniable aspect of the daily life (RRM 731, 2004: 12). As such, the Romani 
women were not only devoid of agency, simply embodying fecund vessels at the 
disposal of a hyper–masculine undesired Other, they were even lacking in 
maternal instinct, manifesting a state of promiscuity that was perceived as a direct 
threat to the purity and health of the Romanian ethnic majority. Within the 
 
126 | Ov Cristian Norocel 
ethno–patriarchal social order envisioned by Tudor, Romani women were thereby 
subject to a double process of degradation, at the intersection of ethnicity/‘race’ 
and gender (Magyari–Vincze, 2005: 224; Woodcock, 2007: 515). 
Perhaps the most easily recognizable Other in Tudor’s writings is the 
‘imaginary Jew’ (Oişteanu, 2001), employed whenever anti–Semitism proved to 
be a winning card. In 2000, Tudor denounced the ‘mercenary with no country, 
and no God, aggressive, swaggering’ Jew who threatened him for his announced 
presidential candidacy, saying ‘Israel can resort not only to financial means to 
control Romania, but also to political ones’. Subsequently, Tudor made use of the 
whole anti–Semitic lexicon to describe his Jewish interlocutor: ‘a dangling beech–
mast filled boar–head, a narrow forehead, a double, trembling chin, big ears, 
rapacious claw–like hands’ (RRM 524, 2000: 14) – in short, a non–hegemonic 
racialised masculinity. Under these circumstances, the national family was 
threatened – though financial manipulation – with exploitation by, and 
subordination to a type of masculinity sine qua non non–dominant. Surprisingly, 
this did not prevent Tudor from eventually employing an Israeli consultant for his 
presidential campaign in 2004, only to return to his anti–Semitic discourse ‘as a 
central feature of party mass–appeal once that EU–eyeing recipe proved 
inefficient at the polls’ (Shafir, 2008: 156). 
As tentatively discussed in the section regarding the connection between 
Orthodox Christianity and Romanianness, Tudor employed the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor to depict Romania as a staunchly heteronormative family 
that did not accommodate ‘deviancy’. In so doing, he identified an Other that 
endangered the national construct from within, failing to submit to the rules of 
heterosexual reproduction and patriarchal family structuring. In equating 
normalcy with heterosexuality, Tudor simply regarded heterosexual relations as 
‘innocently moral, consistent with nature and health’ (Warner, 1999: 5), thereby 
further expanding the metaphorical cluster to incorporate the health and purity 
aspects of the said conceptual metaphor. Tellingly, opposing the abrogation of the 
infamous Article 200 of Romanian Penal Code, Tudor wore the mantle of public 
outcry: 
We are offended by the daring attitude of these sick individuals, who call 
their fetid stinking mud love. […] We use this occasion to remind everyone 
that the Romanian People are Christian and have healthy morals. And we 
also want to remind you that it is among the homosexuals that the killer 
paedophiles are recruited from […]. To set free and encourage these 
behavioural extravagances represents a deathly danger to the Country’s 
youth. […When] one is on all fours and uses his mouth and other orifices 
for disgusting means, one has no moral right to lecture others. 
(RRM 521, 2000: 14) 
 
OUR PEOPLE – A TIGHT–KNIT FAMILY | 127 
 
Romanians were thereby praised for their ‘healthy morals’, and their normalcy 
was contrasted with that of the homosexual ‘killer paedophiles’, who are to be 
rejected, refused membership of the heteronormative national family. Tudor 
voiced his fear of degeneration, of deadly danger for Romanian youth once 
homosexuality was decriminalized. It is noteworthy that his focus was on male 
homosexuality. He underlined the heteronormative masculinity’s violent 
opposition to the ‘receptive pleasure of the anus’ (Connell, 1995: 219), which in 
such a view renders homosexual men inferior, emasculated and reduced to a 
feminine subordinated position, thereby morally inappropriate and foreign to the 
Romanian family. The EU Parliament’s vote supporting same–sex marriages in 
2009 prompted Tudor to publicly condemn those Romanian MEPs that ‘had 
agreed to a disqualifiable attack against the Family and Christian Church’. He then 
wondered if this was what Romania needed, ‘legalizing the marriage between 
homosexuals, and probably followed by legalizing their adoption of children?’ 
These ‘twelve horsemen of Apocalypse’ who voted in favour were to be eternally 
remembered as unworthy representatives of the Romanian family, he concluded 
(RRM 984, 2009: 13). 
In other words, developing the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster, Tudor, 
in my opinion, has constantly explicated the borders of the Romanian national 
family. In so doing, he has pointed at both the outside Others – be they 
Hungarians, Romani, or Jews – and internal Others – those that failed, in his 
view, to meet the heteronormative expectations of the national family. 
5.3 CORNELIU VADIM TUDOR EMBODYING THE TRIBUNE AS A 
STRICT FATHER 
Several researchers have compellingly argued that the intricate relationship 
among various political parties active in Romanian politics, but also between these 
parties and their electoral supporters is defined by inherently masculine 
patriarchal attributes (cf. Marinescu, 2010; Miroiu, 2004; Pasti, 2003; Soare, 
2010). Especially the leaders of political parties embody a specific heroic 
masculinity, displaying certain characteristics that remind the electorate of the 
military hero, of the man as head of his clan – understood both in political terms, 
and as a community of blood. He demands absolute submission from his 
clansmen. This has led to an articulation of politics in terms of a war–like 
competition: political figures become leaders of faithful clans that act like armies, 
engaging in combat with the armies of opposing politicians (Miroiu, 2004: 22; 
Pasti, 2003: 223–224). 
One important aspect of Tudor’s use of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
metaphor has been to present Romania as in search of a representative leader – a 
generic pater familias – or a strict father able to rise to the challenge of leading 
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Romania into a prosperous future. Indeed, in Tudor’s writings in the RRM, the 
radical right populist leader embodies the conceptual metaphor of the STRICT 
FATHER – a typology of masculinity of a providential nature, of modest yet 
distinguished origins, entrusted with a Messianic task to build a new moral order, 
and to establish an unsullied society, a closer copy of the primordial world. The 
PRM leader has cemented in this context an image founded on a genealogy that 
takes the medieval prince Vlad the Impaler, the interwar pro–Nazi Marshal Ion 
Antonescu; and the nationalist communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu as its 
forefathers (Tismaneanu & Kligman, 2001: 83). 
Tudor has become known in the Romanian public sphere after his nickname 
‘the Tribune’ (Soare, 2010). The appellation makes reference to the tribuni plebis 
(political representatives of the common people in the Roman Republic of 
Antiquity) thereby recycling the alleged Latin descent of the Romanian nation, 
and concurrently emphasising the supposed masculine righteousness of the 
aforementioned political ancestors39. Preparing for the 2000 Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections, Tudor positioned himself in stark contrast to his political 
opponents. According to some researchers, the constant feuding within the 
centre–right governing quintet had a negative impact on the perception of 
Romanian parliamentarism, boosting the electoral appeal of those candidates that 
embodied the image of strong leaders (the opposition PDSR leader – Ion Iliescu, 
and the PRM leader – Tudor) (Gallagher, 2005: 243; Mungiu–Pippidi, 2001: 231; 
Pasti, 2003: 224–225). 
Tudor wrote extensively about the type of politician he represents, and 
oftentimes placed his image as at odds with the rest of Romanian political 
establishment. In one illustrative example from 2000, he declared from the title of 
his editorial that he was ‘inapt for politics’, since – he detailed later in the body of 
the article – he was incapable of theft, deception, and betrayal (RRM 524, 2000: 
1). The Romanian political establishment was painted as the STRICT FATHER’s 
Manichean opponent, ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2004: 543) characterized by 
such attributes as a propensity to steal, lie, and lack any morality. Indeed, Tudor 
claimed to embody the providential man that would defend a folk polluted by the 
intrusion of other men’s semen in the national body, and the loss of its religious 
reference points; a truly incorruptible leader: 
I can declare, from the bottom of my heart, with a thundering voice: yes, I 
am incorruptible! Neither my religion allows me, nor my austere education. 
From the height of the position I have acquired (through renunciations, 
sacrifices, a fierce inner battle […]), I can fight both the internal and 
external Mafia. While living in a time of ‘gold rush’, I am waving from the 
battlements the flag of primordial honesty. 
39 There is also a clearly populist aspect to it, which has been shown in other political contexts as 
well, especially when it concerns the populist leader’s claim to both be part of, and represent the 
‘true voice’ of the people (Stanley, 2008: 105). 
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(RRM 525, 2000: 14) 
At a closer reading of the text above, it appears that his political opponents 
were not only portrayed as his antagonists but as unworthy members of the 
national family. Their masculinity was derided, and their leadership abilities were 
questioned and ridiculed. Their political stances were unveiled as being motivated 
by greed – the mirage of quick gains of the ‘gold rush’ – serving a selected few, 
and nefarious foreign interests. The Manichean opposition between ‘good’ and 
‘evil’, researchers have noted, ‘nurtures and is nurtured by, simply but highly 
effective rhetorics of wounded national pride; an injury which goes to the heart of 
ideals of “heroic manhood”.’ (Zalewski & Parpart, 2008: 5) 
The STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor, which Tudor asserted to represent, 
becomes the result of an ‘austere education’, of consecutive renunciations, of 
sacrifices and inner battles. Steadfastness proves to be a necessary element for 
crafting such a strong leader. The ability to hold ‘the flag of primordial honesty’ 
was traced back to his close family, his cultivated and fervently nationalist mother, 
but above all Tudor’s own father; who he was portrayed as a war veteran who had 
fought for defending the borders of interwar Romania, the Greater Romania that 
the very name of Tudor’s party makes reference to (RRM 524, 2000: 14). The 
patriarch’s figure was completed by descriptions of his Christian erudition: he 
‘was reading enormously, but only one book: the BIBLE, on which he used to 
make annotations like a Benedictine monk’ (Emphasis in original) (RRM 522, 
2000: 14). Nevertheless, his father not being Orthodox but member of a Baptist 
church is rather perplexing considering Tudor’s parading of Orthodox beliefs. 
Potential criticism is nonetheless silenced by directing the attention to his solitary 
study of the Bible. In this light, Tudor posited himself as the continuator in 
Abrahamic tradition of a strict gender differentiation manifest in ritual practices 
that ‘comprise a form of cultural labour in which only males can approach what is 
culturally designated as sacred’ (Condren, 2009: 363) 
Tudor’s claim to embody an uncommon masculinity was underlined in the 
texts by his constant commitment to fight evil in its various disguises, be it 
temptations and evil thoughts he himself experienced, or evil in the world, 
warning that humanity lived in an ‘Era under the sign of Satan’ (RRM 526, 2000: 
1). In this, I argue that Tudor embodies the masculine logic that conceptualizes 
‘courage, rationality, and discipline as different aspects or gradations of 
masculinity, that is to say, as having in common as well as being hierarchically 
differentiated’ (Hutchings, 2008: 30). Surprisingly, being a providential figure the 
STRICT FATHER actually thrived in this war–ridden environment, and Tudor 
portrayed himself gathering his forces for the coming presidential battle: 
Fighting evil is, paradoxically, beneficial to my wellbeing. The fight keeps 
me alive. The eruption of this volcano of misfortunes is nearing its end. It is 
time to move from speech to act. I have, now, an excellent corridor towards 
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[Romanian presidency] and I assure you that no force in this world will stop 
me. ‘The Vadim Epoch’ will be a time of peace, plenitude, and national 
dignity. Be afraid, wrongdoers! Be happy, Romanians! I will rid you, very 
soon, of the paedophiles and necrophiles that brought you on the verge of 
despair! 
(RRM 526, 2000: 15) 
It is noteworthy that he not only established himself as ‘the Tribune’ of modern 
Romanian politics in the public consciousness, but he became a figure of great 
familiarity becoming the only politician known to other politicians and the 
common citizens alike by his forename – Vadim. From this perspective, the 
anticipated ‘Vadim Epoch’ is an attempt to construct a heroic and distinguished 
genealogy, in a rather familiar manner, in line with the ‘Epochs’ of great 
Romanian ‘forefathers’, like Stephen ‘the Great’, or Michael ‘the Brave’ – those 
who are seen as having in the past built a unified Romanianness (Leustean, 2007: 
720; Livezeanu, 2000: 7). To highlight the unique position he claimed to occupy in 
Romanian politics – father/political man – Tudor reduced his political opponents 
to being a gathering of ‘paedophiles’ and ‘necrophiles’; thus he actively exiled 
them at the peripheries of morality and reduced them to an essentialist 
representation of their corrupt and evil nature. Their dichotomous positions made 
any compromise impossible as this would, in turn, corrupt the purity of people 
and their leader (Mudde, 2004: 544). 
Tudor has constantly attempted to cast doubt on the ability of other 
presidential candidates to lead Romania. In the context of the 2000 elections, the 
incumbent president Constantinescu was dismissively labelled ‘a political corpse’ 
(RRM 524, 2000: 15); Iliescu, the centre–left candidate, was considered too old 
and sterile – being in his seventies and in a childless marriage (cf. RRM 530, 
2000: 14; RRM 739, 2004: 12). In turn, Mugur Isărescu – the ‘technocratic’ 
candidate who had served multiple times as governor of the Romanian National 
Bank – was considered to be ‘too sensible and modest intellectually to rule a 
Country’; adding insult to injury, Tudor added in the same text that Isărescu 
lacked ‘blood in his penis’ (RRM 524, 2000: 15). In the same register, the PNL 
candidate Theodor Stolojan was deemed to be so ‘charismatic, that he would 
surely decrease Romania’s fertility rate, since pregnant women would undergo 
spontaneous abortion at the sight of him’ (RRM 527, 2000: 15). The discursive 
strategy at work in these cases can be easily identified to be one aimed to 
undermine the masculinity of Tudor’s political opponents, since masculinity ‘is 
permeated with metaphors of prowess (in all areas of human endeavour) that are 
essentially sexual, metaphors of maintaining an erection and producing seminal 
fluid […].’ (Haste, 1994: 169) Despite his calls for a new ‘Epoch’ of ‘national 
dignity’ and his surprising qualification for the presidential run–off, Tudor 
nonetheless lost to Iliescu, as previously mentioned. 
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The 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential elections witnessed the redrawing of 
the political map. President Iliescu could no longer seek election for another 
mandate, thereby opening the presidential race to a wide array of contenders. 
Among them, Tudor chose a rather unambiguous attitude: the entire electoral 
campaign was centred on Christian values; he conspicuously wore only white 
garments resembling the patriarch’s white–only vestments, thereby implying 
religious devotion, purity, honesty and correctness; he concluded each debate, 
demonstration and political declaration with the chanting that he would be ‘the 
first Christian president in Romania’s history’ (Stan & Turcescu, 2007: 143). 
During the campaign, Tudor argued that the reason for his presence in politics 
was ‘the misery in hospitals, in schools, in elderly homes, in orphanages’ (RRM 
731, 2004: 12), in other words picturing the appalling situation of the ‘forgotten 
people’, of vulnerable ‘dependants’ neglected by an elite who have become a 
Mafia–like cartel that ‘clings, desperately, to all possible means to prevent the 
people from finding out the truth about it, and stops from the coming to Power  a 
patriotic and incorruptible squad [Tudor and his party] that would put the country 
in order’ (RRM 735, 2004: 13). The solution was a sweeping ‘moral reformation’, 
which became central to Tudor’s presidential bid. His attacks focused on the 
government’s failings to tackle corruption (Downs & Miller, 2006: 411). He 
portrayed himself as the leader whose aim was to open the path for a much 
needed moral awakening: 
Only I can exterminate the Mafia that suffocates Romania. Only I can 
instate the New Moral Order in our beloved Country, an order founded on 
honour, social justice, national solidarity and fervent love of Christ. You do 
not vote for me – you vote for yourselves! Romanians, vote for the great, 
true change! You shall shoot me if this does not turn right! 
(RRM 749, 2004: 1) 
The metaphorical cluster at work in this text – the STRICT FATHER as a source of 
authority, justice, and moral strength – performs, I argue, a symbolic restitution 
of the leader in the eyes of his followers. More clearly, their votes would not be to 
his own personal gain, but they would benefit them all, highlighting yet again the 
manly bound developed between the leader and his followers in this community of 
fate. There is also a certain air of Christian martyrdom, as Tudor declared to be 
ready to be sacrificed by his fellows if he fails to improve their situation. There is, I 
maintain, a class aspect present in Tudor’s editorials from 2004, a reflection of his 
temporary alliance with a branch of the Romanian trade unions. Detailing further 
the figure of his father, Tudor added a new descriptive layer, which emphasised 
his ‘natural’ connection with the working class: 
As a worker’s son, I will remain, till my death, together with the workers, 
and regardless of what may happen in the future, I will sweep the grounds 
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with the profiteers, barons and Taliban. This is the sole reason for my being 
labelled an extremist – in comparison to the cowardice of the political class, 
among which many do not have a backbone, I was and still am a man of 
courage,; upright and who calls things by their real name. 
(RRM 741, 2004: 13) 
Time and again, Tudor exploited the dyadic opposition between a ‘spineless’ 
elite described as a gathering of ‘profiteers’, ‘barons’, and even ‘Taliban’, and an 
upright and courageous working folk, from which he claimed his patrilineal 
genealogy. This allowed Tudor to envisage an electoral battle in which he would 
‘sweep the grounds’ with his political opponents and ‘call things by their real 
name’, confirming his fearless masculinity. In the context given, I understand the 
‘Taliban’ appellation to symbolise a backward masculinity, characterized by 
exploitation – through its proximity to ‘profiteers’, and ‘barons’ – and intrinsic 
commitment to political extremism. In contrast to that, embodying the divine will 
and displaying positive warrior–like attributes, Tudor portrayed a new masculine 
typology of political leader, dynamic and capable of stimulating his brother 
citizens to fight against injustice. 
Nonetheless, the main danger identified by Tudor was Romania’s rapid 
depopulation since approximately ‘two million Romanians had taken their lives 
into their own hands, working abroad and sending money back to their families at 
home’; most worrisome, he added, it was ‘the youth and university graduates’ who 
left the country never to return (RRM 740, 2004: 12). This reflected the new social 
reality Romania had experienced – increased and accelerated immigration to the 
EU and USA. The Romania described by Tudor was a family neglecting its 
members most in need, deserted by those envisaged as ensuring its survival as a 
nation – its youth and future intellectual elite. More clearly, he warned of a 
distressing demographic decline coupled with a significant brain–drain, which 
risked leaving the country vulnerable to the whims of internal Others and 
concomitantly deprive the national family of its intellectual energies. In this 
apocalyptical tableau, the only ones prospering were the political establishment, 
presented as ‘triumphant primitives, illiterates, and professional criminals’ (RRM 
743, 2004: 12). 
The difference between his various competitors was at best one of nuance. 
Criticising Adrian Năstase, the PSD presidential counter–candidate, Tudor argued 
Năstase was Iliescu’s ‘immature’ protégé. Tudor then commented that ‘one does 
not rule a country through never–ending scandals, indecisions’ – with reference to 
Năstase’s on–going premiership. He continued disparagingly comparing Năstase 
to ‘a spoiled child, who threatens to take his toys and run to mummy when 
something is not to his liking’ (RRM 731, 2004: 12). In a more personal register, 
Tudor attacked Năstase for his alleged homosexuality. Dividing his time between 
actions of ‘frantic populism’, and countless cultural events under his patronage, 
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Năstase was depicted as eagerly awaited by the association of hunters and 
fishermen whom he presided over in order ‘to fool around together’ (RRM 742, 
2004: 12). These unsubstantiated accusations positioned Năstase as representing 
an inferior typology of masculinity with regard to Tudor’s; alleging Năstase’s 
passivity in the homosexual act, he marginalized his opponent in the realm of 
inferior beings, among ‘effeminate men’, the ‘feminine’, and subordinated Others 
(Peterson, 1999: 38). 
In contrast to that, Traian Băsescu, the presidential candidate of the opposition 
centre–right coalition, was portrayed as a primitive and vindictive political 
‘pirate’, an allusion to his former career as a seas captain (RRM 745, 2004: 13). In 
relation to this, it is noteworthy that hegemonic forms of masculinity proclaim the 
superiority of reason over brute force (Connell, 1995: 164); I thereby argue that 
Tudor simply used the aforesaid metaphorical construction – political ‘pirate’ – to 
present his adversary as embodying an undesirable, aggressive, and inferior 
masculinity. Some researchers have claimed that a certain populist rhetorical 
affinity unites Tudor and Băsescu (Downs & Miller, 2006: 412; Ieţcu–Fairclough, 
2008: 374–375; King & Marian, 2011: 40–43; Mişcoiu, 2010: 38; Shafir, 2012: 
418–420). In their view, Băsescu appears to have learned a valuable political 
lesson from Tudor’s electoral success in the 2000 Presidential elections. In 2004, 
Băsescu successfully exploited the vulnerability of the Romanian electorate to 
anti–systemic, anti–establishment rhetoric, over which Tudor previously had a 
near–monopoly. This helped Băsescu secure his victory in the 2004 presidential 
election, and his subsequent re–election in 2009. Under these circumstances, it 
appears that the figure of the STRICT FATHER was preferred by the majority of 
Romanians, who nonetheless opted for a more mainstream presence at the helm 
of the country. 
Somehow acknowledging this, Tudor remarked in 2009 that Băsescu was 
characterized by an ‘animal instinct’ of ‘political survival’ (RRM 975, 2009: 12; 
RRM 976, 2009: 12). This did not preclude Tudor from announcing his plan to 
participate in the coming Romanian Presidential elections, and to draw a quick 
sketch of his opposing candidates – while still campaigning for the 2009 
European Parliamentary elections: ‘Who would have the courage and moral right 
to face the furious crowds? That impostor, [Radu] Duda – a professional son–in–
law? Effeminate Crin [Antonescu] – nicknamed Mireille Mathieu […]? Or perhaps 
[Traian] Băsescu – with his uncivilised laughter and offensive jokes?’ (RRM 979, 
2009: 12) His potential adversaries were thus at once portrayed as unworthy of 
election. Through scathing one–liners, Radu Duda, the husband of Princess 
Margareta of the Romanian royal family and an independent candidate for the 
presidency, was dismissed as ‘a professional son–in–law’, alleging his self–
interest and inability to attain social and political visibility on his own merits. Crin 
Antonescu, the PNL candidate, was portrayed as an effeminate presence, alluded 
to by his nickname ‘Mireille Mathieu’ that made reference to Antonescu’s hair-
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style. Băsescu, who stood for re–election on behalf of the conservative centre–
right PDL, was depicted as inferior and brutalized, making ‘offensive jokes’ and 
having an ‘uncivilised laughter’. In so doing, I argue, Tudor forcefully indicated 
that the NATION IS A FAMILY whose leader, or better said FATHER, must embody a 
domineering heteronormative masculinity, characterised by ‘courage’, endowed 
with a ‘moral right’ to represent the Romanian nation, and thus untarnished by 
either cowardice and effeminacy, or brutish, barbaric features. 
In conclusion, in the context of confrontational and masculinised Romanian 
politics the masculinity performative that Tudor depicts for himself circumscribes, 
in my view, the ideal of pater familias, confirming the presence of the STRICT 
FATHER conceptual metaphor as part of the wider NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical 
cluster in the Romanian context. In contrast to this, and in spite of the proven 
political superiority of his adversaries, these are often presented as imperfect, and 
incomplete in their masculinity performatives – at either one of the extremes of 
hyper–masculine violence or of emasculated effeminacy. Embodying what he 
considered a distinguished lineage of righteous people, Tudor has claimed to be 
able of understanding the Romanian people, and to defend the family folk and 
their religious beliefs against the threats of dissolution and degeneration: the 
embodiment of a true guardian of the national family. 
5.4 THE USE OF GENDERED CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN 
ROMANIAN RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM  
From the analysis of the genealogical articulations of the NATION IS A FAMILY 
metaphorical cluster in Tudor’s editorials in the RRM, a first conclusion that can 
be drawn concerns the moral wholeness of the Romanian national family. In 
Tudor’s writings, the national family is characterised by the juxtaposition between 
putative ethnic ‘purity’ and Orthodox Christianity as quintessential values. This 
confirms the Romanian national family’s moral supremacy, which naturalises a 
hierarchy with the figure of (male) ethnic Romanians at the top. The analysis of 
Tudor’s editorials published in the RRM appears to strengthen what researchers 
in the field have previously shown in their analyses: the institutionalisation of 
masculinity in politics in general, and the aggressive and violent nature of political 
discourses in particular, has been a consequence of men’s unchallenged 
domination of the public sphere. The few women participating actively in the 
Romanian public sphere have been forced to adopt a masculine model of 
behaviour, and as such to deny their own femininity or a feminine manner when 
present in the political sphere; they have morphed into mothers (thereby ensuring 
the patrilineal descent), administrators, owners, and politicians. In short, when 
entering politics they had been compelled to turn into men, since the ability to be 
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political agents has been reified as a masculine attribute (cf. Băluţă, 2006; Chiva, 
2005a; Miroiu, 2004; Pasti, 2003). 
Put differently, in Tudor’s texts the NATION IS A FAMILY underpinned by deeply 
patriarchal values, which consolidate the distinction between men’s public 
visibility and their unhindered participation in politics and women’s containment 
in the domestic sphere of maternity and their less–than–men position in politics. 
The metaphorical cluster thereby developed in a direction that portrayed women 
as ‘natural’ caregivers of other dependants – the offspring of their Romanian men, 
the elderly, the sick, and those socially disadvantaged – and confirmed Romanian 
men in their position of social hegemony as the epitome of political agency and 
financial supporters of their extended families. In the genealogical expansion of 
the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster, Tudor made direct reference to those 
failing the conditions of being part of the Romanian national family, in the form of 
outside Others – the Jews, Hungarians, and Romani – and those not fulfilling the 
heteronormative expectations, the internal Other – the homosexuals, with 
particular attention being given to male homosexuality as a mark of effeminacy 
and degeneracy. Furthermore, the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster was 
developed in the direction of depicting the Romanian national family as in need of 
immediate help. In such uncertain times, the future could only be safeguarded 
under the condition that Romanians were willing to subject themselves to his 
leadership, since he presented himself as the true embodiment of the STRICT 
FATHER conceptual metaphor. 
In the given context, Tudor’s political opponents were subject to a process of 
transformation into less–than–perfect Romanians, becoming some menacing 
internal Others usurping the upper echelons of the Romanian national construct. 
More importantly, despite their eventual political superiority, the other political 
actors were presented as failing to fulfil the pater familias ideal: they were either 
hyper–masculinised – unreliable and violent – or emasculated – effeminate and 
thereby unworthy of the people’s trust. Among such politicians, imperfect and 
incomplete in their masculinities, Tudor appeared as the providential STRICT 
FATHER with the messianic task of enforcing a new moral order because he was the 
incarnation of rightful masculine leadership. He embodied a distinguished 
genealogy of simple and righteous people, understanding the common citizens 
and truly representing their needs. He was able to defend the family folk and their 
century–old Christian Orthodox beliefs against the threat of dissolution and 
degeneration, posited by ethnic, religious and sexual Others. Indeed, the 
heteronormative matrix was kept in place and proved flexible enough to allow for 
ever more coordinates of exclusion. 
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6 WHEN THE FUTURE ALREADY HAPPENED40. THE 
COMMON SWEDE RECLAIMING THE FOLKHEM (2005–
2010) 
In this chapter I analyse the discursive manifestations of radical right populist 
ideology in the Swedish context. I begin by presenting the specificities of the 
established democratic multi–party regime in Sweden, indicating the particularity 
of the Swedish constitutional monarchy system of government. I then introduce 
the main parties in national politics. Under these circumstances, I focus on the 
political importance of the concept of folkhem (the home/house of [Swedish] 
people) – taken to materialise the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor in 
Sweden – from its conservative origins to the social–democratic emancipatory 
interpretations as the epitome of Swedish welfare model. On this matter, I show 
the construction of the folkhem with the aid of the allegedly Swedish values of 
solidarity and gender equality, which disguise according to researchers, an updated 
version of gendered heteronormative hierarchy. I then discuss the increasing ethnic 
diversity of those building and inhabiting the Swedish home, and show the growing 
opposition in radical right populist quarters to transforming the folkhem into an open 
construct. In so doing, I juxtapose the naturalisation of a modernised family–centred 
patriarchy represented by the folkhem with the parallel processes of reinterpreting 
gender equality ideals, redefining the boundaries of the welfare state, and an 
emerging nationalism. Consequently, I introduce the main radical right populist force 
in Swedish politics, its leader, and the party newspaper. 
Investigating the genealogical articulations of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
metaphor in Sweden, I analyse at first the alleged moral wholeness of the folkhem. 
I then show the centrality afforded to Lutheran Christianity in consecrating the 
inherent Swedishness of the folkhem and how this generates the moral superiority 
of the Swedish national family. This facilitates the subsequent analysis of the 
various positions within the Swedish national family afforded to its members: the 
place of family dependants, the role of women in the life of the national family, the 
threat posited by the family’s Others (be them persons with migrant background 
or members of the LGBTQI community), and the position of the Swedish man in 
this context. In so doing, I analyse the discursive effects of constantly 
reinterpreting the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor, and the specific 
conceptual metaphor depicting the masculinity performative of the Swedish 
radical right populist leader in the metaphorical cluster created in this manner. I 
then conclude the chapter emphasising the particularities of radical right populist 
discursive articulations in Sweden. 
40 The title is a direct translation from Swedish of a book by Jenny Andersson (2009b), in which 
she has investigated the Swedish social–democracy’s dilemmas in the wake of globalization, and 
the longing after a ‘lost future’, the future so tangibly embodied by the folkhem at its zenith. 
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6.1 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN SWEDEN THROUGH A 
FEMINIST LENS 
Generally heralded as the epitome of a welfare society, Sweden faced at the 
beginning of the 1990s a series of challenges that were reverberations, to a certain 
extent, of the dramatic regime changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and the 
ensuing economic recession that swept across the whole Europe. The following 
decades witnessed the full effects of ‘the shift to the right’, an ideological 
repositioning marked by a vociferous contestation of the previously unchallenged 
position of social–democracy at the core of Swedish democracy, and the 
‘normalisation’ of ‘the free market’ and ‘free choice’ as forms of conservatism in 
neoliberal clothes (Agius, 2007: 589–590; Andersson, 2009a: 239; Boréus, 1994). 
These changes were reflected in the Swedish political landscape as well, with the 
emergence of new political entities with strong populist appeals (cf. Dahlström & 
Esaiasson, 2013; Hannerz, 2006; Rydgren, 2002; 2006; Widfeldt, 2000; 2008). 
Part of a wider democratisation process, the implementation of the Instrument 
of Government of 1974 had sanctioned constitutional monarchy as the form of 
government in Sweden. As a consequence, the Swedish monarchy was stripped of 
all executive authority – which was in turn vested in the Prime Minister (PM) and 
his/her Government (Regeringen) – morphing into little more than a 
‘constitutional curlicue’ (Åse, 2009: 50). The transformation of the Swedish 
monarchy into a ceremonial institution, Cecilia Åse has persuasively argued, 
enforced nevertheless the idea that the monarch symbolises the totality of Swedish 
nation (Åse, 2008; 2009). The monarchy became elevated to a position ‘beyond 
and above’ politics. This has cemented the linkage between the concepts of royal 
family, heredity and reproduction, and that of the Swedish nation, seen in terms of 
harmonious unity, thereby silencing issues of democratic representativeness, 
conflicting party politics, and competing ideologies (Åse, 2009: 107–108). The 
monarchy’s transformation into a unifying national symbol moved all political 
conflict into the democratic political arena with the ideological battle between the 
parties in the Swedish Parliament. 
The Parliament of Sweden (Sveriges riksdag/Riksdagen), a unicameral 
national legislative body, has 349 members (MPs) elected every four years; 
Swedish Parliamentary elections are based on the principle of proportionality. The 
parliamentary political landscape in Sweden has been particularly stable, 
characterised by the virtually unchallenged position of the Social Democratic 
Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) that has been at the helm 
of government since 1945, with the exception of some brief periods in 1976, 1982, 
1991, and since 2006 being the main opposition force. More to the left on the 
political spectrum, the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) has supported SAP minority 
governments. For the 2006 Parliamentary elections, the SAP entered a coalition 
with the V, and Swedish Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, MP). The ‘red–green 
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block’ would be reconfirmed as an electoral block in the eve of 2010 Parliamentary 
elections. 
Swedish politics have traditionally been more fragmented on the right. The 
main opposition to the SAP has long been the agrarian–liberal Centre Party 
(Centerpartiet, C), more recently replaced by the centre–conservative Moderate 
(Coalition) Party (Moderata samlingspartiet, M). Also right of centre there have 
been the Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet liberalerna, FP) and the Christian 
Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD). Preparing for the 2006 Parliamentary 
elections, the centre–right parties constituted an electoral coalition titled the 
Alliance (for Sweden) (Allians för Sverige/Alliansen), uniting the C, FP and KD 
under the leadership of the M and its newly elected party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt. 
Reinfeldt declared to be largely in favour of the Swedish welfare model, toned 
down some of the M’s more drastic demands to cut taxes, and generally cultivated 
an image as a consensual and reasonable party leader (Wendt, 2012: 52–56, 110–
113; Widfeldt, 2007: 820). All parties described above have had a major impact on 
the key concepts that have been employed in political debate in Sweden; they have 
been duly identified as the ‘political establishment’ by the various radical right 
populist parties that have attempted to gain parliamentary representation. 
Swedish parties have not solely contested parliamentary elections. Since 1930, 
membership to church councils of parishes belonging to the Swedish Lutheran 
Church has been open for electoral competition amongst both Swedish parties and 
apolitical, non–aligned organisations. This has mirrored both the democratisation 
efforts within the ‘people’s church’, as the national church has often been named, 
and the inherent process of the politicisation of church structures that 
accompanied the hegemonic position of state–church, a position that the Swedish 
Lutheran Church enjoyed until 2000 (Gustafsson, 2003: 55–68). Despite a steady 
decline in numbers over the years, as of 2011 approximately 69 percent of the 
Swedish population was nominally registered as belonging to the church. 
Consequently, the Swedish Lutheran Church has opted to continue styling itself as 
‘one of Sweden’s largest popular movements’41 – although no longer a state–
church – thereby emphasising the religious communion of the Swedish people 
and, in so doing, strengthening the saliency of the concept of people or, said 
better, of folk in the Swedish context. 
As previously discussed, the national family construct has been expressed 
through the concept of the folkhem42(the home of [Swedish] people), which is 
41 The data presented above has been obtained from the Swedish Lutheran Church’s official 
website (http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/). However, the numbers above do not reflect accurately 
the numbers of church–goers, which has always been significantly lower (Gustafsson, 2003). This 
confirms in a sense the general opinion that Sweden is one of the world’s most secularised 
societies. 
42 The concept is strikingly similar to the German heimat in that it synthesizes references to both 
the home and homeland. Not only that the two concepts share the difficulty of a precise and 
comprehensive translation in English, but they both have been very productive, each in their own 
way, at the contact point between the religious and secular. And to achieve this, the heimat, too, 
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deeply seated in Swedish political discourse and makes an implicit reference to the 
Swedish people and their inherent Swedishness – in the sense of specific cultural 
markers which distinguish them from the country’s Other inhabitants. The 
folkhem has marked the construction of Swedish nation around the idea of a 
(unified and homogeneous) Swedish people gathered together under the roof of 
their familial home, in a way reifying the idea of a non–nationalist Swedish 
national project (Andersson, 2009b: 218–220; Hall, 2008: 146–148; Hellström, 
2010: 95; Trägårdh, 2002: 131; Wendt, 2012: 61–64). 
Initially, in the nineteenth century, the folkhem embodied the harmonious 
relationship between the king and his people, similar to the portrayal of a 
bourgeois family under the careful authority of its patriarch/housemaster, thereby 
emphasizing the ideals of organic conservatism43. In this conservative 
interpretation, the folkhem’s core values were orderliness, national cohesion and 
naturalised patriarchal hierarchical structuring (Götz, 2001: 104–105; Hall, 2000: 
261). However, the national home metaphorical construct became a part of the 
SAP’s modernisation discourse in the early twentieth century, epitomising its 
efforts to construct a society based on equality, solidarity and confidence in 
progress, in which the emphasis was put on the figure of the unionised (male) 
worker as symbol and measure of ‘the common folk’ (Hall, 2000: 260; Hellström, 
2010: 97). From early on, however, the folkhem was characterised by a certain 
ambiguity: it made reference to a patriarchal model of authority that structured 
the family according to a father–mother–children hierarchy; concomitantly, it 
strengthened the principle of equity between siblings and the idea of social 
contract (Götz, 2001: 109; Möller, 2011: 98). The interplay between these two 
features has been crucial to its success. The concept’s religious aspect had, in turn, 
a less visible trajectory across time. The folkhem, in its social–democratic 
interpretation, did not involve a radical rupture from the past and a profound 
secularisation of its content. The religious values that previously underpinned the 
construction of Swedish people – especially the Lutheran–Calvinist puritanical 
ethos, emphasising the value of work and individual responsibility, and the belief 
in future prosperity as a sign of blessing and redemption – have simply been 
reinterpreted in a secularised way and mobilised for the achievement of the 
social–democratic folkhem (Johansson, 2001: 206; Stråth, 2002: 127). 
The decades that witnessed the almost uninterrupted presence of the SAP in 
government44 epitomised ‘the folkhem’s period’ (approximately between 1930s 
has been employed in a deeply patriarchal, gendered way of making sense of the world (Blickle, 
2002: 1–24). 
43 The concept had been heralded by Rudolf Kjellén – political scientist and influential 
conservative politician at the beginning of twentieth century – as a catalyst for bringing to life a 
vision of the future that was intimately connected to an essentialised past and epitomised by 
Swedish nationalist ideology (Götz, 2001: 105; Stråth, 2001: 166). 
44 The SAP’s unchallenged position in Sweden was acknowledged through the coining of a specific 
concept that referred to the SAP’s presence at all levels of Swedish political, social and economic 
life: statsbärandeparti (in a free translation, understood as a party bearer of the national interests; 
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and 1980s). The 1950s and 1960s have generally been considered the apex of that 
period – seen as incarnating the Swedish belief in a prosperous future achieved 
through carefully planned social engineering seconded by rational modernisation 
(Agius, 2007: 588; Andersson, 2009a: 231–232; Hall, 2000: 283; Linderborg, 
2001: 97). In this sense, the folkhem has been intimately tied to the idea of an 
original model of ‘strong state’ that manoeuvred between monolithic collectivistic 
ideals – embodied to a certain extent by the dictatorial communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe – and those of atomised consumerist individualities – 
specific to the liberal capitalist regimes in the USA and so–called Western Europe 
– thereby crafting a specific type of individual responsive to the social contexts she 
was a part of (Agius, 2007: 589; Stråth, 2002: 139–142). 
Notwithstanding its universalistic claims, the folkhem had a restrictive and 
disciplining nature, drawing clear demarcation lines between those included in 
the community and their duties, and those who were not deemed worthy of it 
(Andersson, 2009b: 114–115; Hall, 2000: 262–265). This was translated along the 
years into social engineering, forced sterilisations and overall tight social control: 
the subjects of forced sterilisations were not only those considered genetically 
unfit – a consequence of their physical or psychological disability – but also those 
undesirable elements, such as ethnic minority members – especially Romani and 
Sámi – and women who did not fulfil the traditional patriarchal ideal (cf. Broberg 
& Tydén, 2005; Hirdman, 1995; Runcis, 1998). The folkhem project thereby 
emphasised a definition of the ‘healthy’ and ‘authentic’ citizenry that was in a 
sense contiguous with the boundaries of Swedish nation, but without making use 
of racist terminology, instead emphasising the idea of ‘productive quality’ of its 
people (Spektorowski & Ireni–Saban, 2011: 179–183). Of a more recent time are 
the social democratic attempts to modernise and enlarge the metaphor, to include 
a multicultural aspect and become environmentally conscious, while proclaiming 
the concept’s indisputable Swedishness (Andersson, 2009a: 237; 2010: 145; Götz, 
2001: 113; Hall, 2000: 285; Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012: 195–196). This has 
nonetheless given rise to a nostalgic mood, a longing ‘for a future lost, a nostalgia 
which might quite simply be called [the folkhem] nostalgia’ (Andersson, 2009a: 
238). 
However, several feminist scholars have convincingly argued that the Swedish 
national family metaphor was from inception had a deeply gendered structure, 
underpinned by men’s superposition and control over women’s bodies (cf. 
Eduards, 2007; Hirdman, 1995; Lennerhed, 2002). It posited men as protectors, 
as gentlemen defending dependant women and children, as guardians of their 
wives and daughters, as visionary and rightful statesmen and experts that secured 
the well–functioning of Swedish society (Eduards, 2007: 21). A case in point is the 
widely used linguistic metaphor of ‘the man working at the Volvo car factory’ and 
in English , scholarship simplistically refers to it as an example of a one–dominant party system) 
(Agius, 2007: 592; Therborn, 2000: 5). 
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‘the woman working in the healthcare’ that ‘are fighting together for their salaried 
rights’, which has been shown to contain an inherent gendered heteronormative 
hierarchy that serves a twofold purpose (Gottzén & Jonsson, 2012: 7–14; Jansson, 
Wendt & Åse, 2010: 141–145; Nordberg, 2006: 216–219; Wendt & Eduards, 2010: 
38–40). It reflects, on the one hand, the fact that Sweden has a labour market 
characterised by an extreme polarisation; certain labour branches are dominated 
by men – such as the private sector, and those occupations perceived as 
traditionally ‘manly’ – while some others register an overrepresentation of women 
– such as the public sector, especially healthcare, childcare and service 
occupations (Nordberg, 2006: 213–214; Wendt & Eduards, 2010: 23–24). It 
naturalises men as (political) doers and women as (objectified) beings – men on 
industrial platforms, as active agents; women as unselfish providers of care 
services, whose main agency rests in giving voice to the needs of dependants 
through a proxy who is the politically active agent. 
It offers, on the other hand, the impression of a genuine commitment to gender 
equality in Sweden – men and women fighting together for the common goal of a 
fair compensation for their work – reifying the Swedish self–image as a gender 
equal welfare society45. Such a stance has been reinforced further by the implicit 
distinction between gender equal Swedes, both women and men, and those 
immediate (migrant) Others, generally understood as men, that did not fulfil the 
criteria for gender equality and individualism (Gottzén & Jonsson, 2012: 12–14; 
Hübinette & Lundström, 2010: 48–49; Mulinari, 2003: 111–118; Mulinari & 
Neergaard, 2012: 16–17). Put differently, gender equality has become an ethnic 
marker. It has served as a means to silencing the violence (of men) occurring 
within Swedish families, the purchase of sex by Swedish men, and the generally 
claimed but rarely assumed gender equality practice coupled with a tacit 
reinforcement of patriarchy by Swedish men. At the same time, it has posited the 
ethnically different Others, men and women alike, as in need of emancipation 
from their traditional family constructions (Jansson, Wendt & Åse, 2011: 131; 
Mulinari, 2003: 115–116). 
The issue of building the folkhem around the allegedly Swedish values of 
solidarity and gender equality proves its saliency when looking closer at the 
country’s inhabitants. Notwithstanding the high levels of ethnic homogeneity that 
characterised Sweden in the first half of twentieth century, the translation into the 
reality of the social democratic project of modernisation, in other words the very 
45 Sweden is not a singular case; together with the other Nordic countries (especially Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway), it has come to embody what feminist researchers have labelled as a 
‘women–friendly welfare state’ or ‘state feminism’. This discourse once hegemonic has proved 
nonetheless problematic for addressing such issues as gendered violence within the ethnic 
majority community in each country, or the continued gender–based discrimination in the labour 
market, especially because gender equality has been considered a fait accompli(cf. Borchorst et al, 
2012; Dahlerup, 2011; Freidenvall, Dahlerup & Skjeie, 2006; Holli, 2003; Kantola, 2006). 
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construction of the folkhem, has been undertaken with the help of migrants46. 
Consequently, the overall makeup of Sweden’s population has diversified greatly – 
around 20 per cent of its population is of foreign origin (naturalised) and second–
generation Swedes; of these, according to some scholars, around half are from 
non–European backgrounds (SCB, 2010: 20, 24; Schierup & Ålund, 2011: 46). 
Several researchers have shown the presence of a two–fold process – 
identification with the real Swede, accompanied by distancing from what does not 
meet the criteria of such naming – at the intersection of gender, class, 
ethnicity/‘race’ and religious affiliation, and sexuality (Gottzén & Jonsson, 2012; 
Hübinette & Lundström, 2010; Jansson, Wendt & Åse, 2011; Mulinari, 2003; 
Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012). The process has also become an arena of 
contestation for radical right populist parties. Making use of the folkhem’s 
saliency, these political forces have depicted it as besieged and vehemently 
demanded a return to the patriarchal homogeneous home of (only) Swedish 
people (Andersson, 2009a: 240). 
The SD has not been the only radical right populist party in Swedish politics; 
New Democracy (Ny Demokrati, NyD) was a short–lived populist political entity 
that emerged in the early 1990s amid the painful restructuring of the welfare state. 
The NyD capitalised on popular dissatisfaction and gained parliamentary 
representation in the 1991 Parliamentary elections, only to disappear just as 
abruptly from mainstream politics in 1994 (cf. Hannerz, 2006; Rydgren, 2006). 
Until recently, the SD has been treated by researchers as a failed case among the 
other European radical right populist parties (cf. Rydgren, 2002; 2006; Widfeldt, 
2000; Zaslove, 2009). Ideologically, it has been argued that what the SD and 
other European radical right populist parties have in common are an exaggeration 
and distortion of dormant notions of insecurity about national identity. In relation 
to this, the SD’s position to the right becomes apparent especially with regard to 
social and cultural issues. The SD not only has proposed a restrictive approach to 
immigration and citizenship but also ‘a staunchly conservative or even 
authoritarian outlook on issues such as law and order (tougher punishment) and 
the family (advocating traditional gender roles and renouncing feminism).’ 
(Rydgren, 2006: 11) The SD has also displayed what several researchers have 
labelled ‘welfare chauvinism’ (cf. Mudde, 2000; 2007; Rydgren, 2006). Indeed, 
the SD has been blaming the increasing constraints on the welfare state, such as 
lower pensions, higher social expenses and long queues for medical services, on 
immigration. From this perspective, I argue that the SD’s take on egalitarianism 
has been to enforce uniformity, which most often ‘intersects with experiences of 
46 Traditionally, a significant number of these migrants have come from neighbouring Finland. In 
a sense, this has rendered the bulk of newcomers to a status of invisibility, since Finns have 
generally fitted into the stereotypical description of Nordic ‘whiteness’, and they have been 
expected to assimilate into the Swedish majority, having in mind the two countries’ common 
history and the fact that a significant percentage of the Finnish migrants had Swedish as their 
mother tongue (Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003: 70; Korkiasaari & Söderling, 2003: 3–6). 
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status and economic insecurity to fuel hostility towards non–majority group 
immigration, towards programs that support multiculturalism, […and] towards 
gays and lesbians’ (Laycock, 2005: 134). 
Nevertheless, the SD has undergone a series of transformations, from being 
founded as the successor of several neo–Nazi and nationalist fringe parties in 
1988 to electing a succession of party leaders who toned down the SD’s radicalism 
and gave it a more mainstream appeal (cf. Hellström, 2010; Larsson & Ekman, 
2001; Mattsson, 2009). As such, in the latter half of the 1990s party leader Mikael 
Jansson banned uniforms at party rallies, and deleted provocative paragraphs 
from the party manifesto – such as calling for capital punishment, banning of 
abortions, and stopping non–European adoptions (Mattsson, 2009: 19; Rydgren, 
2006: 108). In 2005 Jimmie Åkesson was elected chairman on a mandate to lead 
a more combative party, and create a new image for the allegedly cleansed party 
(Hellström, 2010: 48; Mattsson, 2009: 23). Arguably, the concept the SD has 
employed to give coherence to its political platform and unify its exclusionary and 
welfare chauvinist stances is that of the folkhem (cf. Hellström, 2010; Mulinari & 
Neergaard, 2010). 
The position of the party’s official bimonthly magazine, the SD–Courier (SD–
Kuriren, henceforth SD–K) in the wider media landscape is telling of the party’s 
own place as a radical right outlier in the Swedish political context. According to 
Jens Rydgren, the SD has not only been subject to an avoidance strategy by the 
mainstream parties, which have successfully erected a cordon sanitaire around 
the SD and its anti–immigration rhetoric, but has also been actively boycotted by 
most of mainstream Swedish media; these two concerted strategies playing a 
decisive role in the party’s low level of support among Swedish voters (Rydgren, 
2006: 106–108). In those few exceptional cases in which the SD has been given 
attention, the Swedish media has taken a very critical stance against the party, 
leading the SD to complain of being treated unfairly in comparison to the other 
parties (Lodenius & Wingborg, 2010: 20). However, after Åkesson’s election as 
chair, the SD has witnessed an ascending trajectory in terms of electoral support, 
from the 2005 Swedish Lutheran Church elections when it polled some 1.7 percent 
of the votes, then the 2006 Swedish Parliamentary elections (2.9 percent), 
followed by the Church elections (2.8 percent) and the European Parliamentary 
elections (3.3 percent) in 2009, to its breakthrough in the 2010 Swedish 
Parliamentary elections, when the party received 5.7 percent of the total electoral 
support. The Swedish Lutheran Church elections have been of particular 
importance for the SD, both ideologically and strategically. Ideologically, the SD 
positioned itself among the Christian–conservative political actors; strategically, 
the SD tested its political ambitions and this allowed it to maintain its supporters 
mobilised in between the parliamentary electoral cycles (Mattson, 2009: 35). 
Given the circumstances, the SD–K has been one of the very few mediums 
available to the party and its chair, Jimmie Åkesson, to explain and defend the 
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socio–political construct they envision. It is worth noting that the SD–K has 
printed a fluctuating number of copies for each of its issues, if one is to rely on the 
magazine’s self–reported numbers, ranging from 28,000 copies in 2005 (SD–K, 
issue 64) to a maximum of 100,000 copies in 2007 (special issue 74 dedicated to 
immigration) and even 600,000 in 2009 (special campaign issue), then returning 
to a more modest level: 25,000 copies in late 2009 (issue 84) and 30,000 copies 
in 2010 (post–elections issue 88). Nevertheless, for some time, until the hacker 
attack against the SD official webpage in the aftermath of 2010 Parliamentary 
elections, SD–K issues could be accessed freely by the site’s visitors. The SD–K 
has also closely reflected Åkesson’s declared agenda to lead a more competitive 
party, and most importantly to create a new image for the SD, with the purpose of 
taking the party into the Riksdagen (Mattsson, 2009: 23); his blog entries on the 
party’s official website have been reproduced verbatim in the SD–K, and ample 
space has been reserved in each issue for his interviews or comments on topical 
political issues. Subsequently, the research material is analysed in depth, 
evidencing Åkesson’s use of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor to depict 
the SD as the political incarnation of a conceptual metaphor of contesting 
conservative masculinity. This sheds light on the metaphorical articulations of 
masculinity, family and heteronormativity in the Swedish context; the concluding 
part provides with an overview of the findings. 
6.2 THE BESIEGED FOLKHEM: THE HOME OF SWEDISH FAMILY 
REINTERPRETED 
Once elected party chair, in the examined empirical material, Åkesson drew a 
clear distinction between the elites and the Swedish people, in what may be 
regarded as a classically populist move. Referring to the existing political context 
in Sweden, this was translated into a political elite – more clearly all the 
parliamentary parties, with no ideological distinction, were generically labelled 
‘those seven in Riksdagen’ (SD–K 70, 2006: 1). He argued that they did little more 
than preserve their monopoly over the opinions allowed to gain prominence in the 
public sphere. Their ‘true’ opponents, on the other hand, were represented by the 
SD, which in his view incarnated the Swedish people and represent their political 
will. The SD, ‘the party of and for common people’ (SD–K 66, 2005: 2), in this 
context was also situated in contrast to those ‘newly founded populist parties’ – 
namely the Feminist Initiative (Feministiskt initiativ, F!), established in 2005, 
and the ephemeral Eurosceptic June List (Junilistan, JL), founded in 2004, which 
were portrayed as mere political instruments in the hands of wealthy 
representatives of the Swedish establishment. Åkesson called them ‘populists’ in 
the sense of that they were manipulative forces against the ‘true’ will of the people. 
These ‘power hungry populists’ had, following Åkesson’s argument, only one 
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reason to exist; that is to divert the people’s attention from their true 
representatives, the SD, which aimed to reactivate the original democratic popular 
movement (SD–K 66, 2005: 2). 
Announcing the SD’s political agenda for the coming elections – ‘to breathe 
new life into the Swedish democratic popular movement’ – Åkesson depicted his 
party as a legitimate, natural branch of the genealogical tree of a highly revered 
popular movement that has played a crucial role in the establishment of the 
Swedish welfare. By so doing, he placed the SD closest to the common citizens, the 
‘true’ inhabitants of the Swedish folkhem. In Åkesson’s usage of the concept, the 
emphasis on the sense of (national) community morphed into exclusively 
underlining those elements that separated and individualised that community 
from those falling ‘outside the home’s enclosure’ (Hellström, 2010: 106). Even 
more so, the conceptual metaphor was developed across time in Åkesson’s 
contributions to the SD–K according to a line of argumentation that integrated 
biological and hierarchical principles specific to the metaphorical use of the family 
concept (Ringmar, 2008: 60). Indeed, in Åkesson’s writings were expressed 
nostalgic welfare chauvinism and a staunchly conservative attitude, tinted with an 
unapologetic xenophobic stance. More clearly, the idealised folkhem was 
portrayed as on the brink of collapse at the hands of outside intruders, of norm–
disrupting social forces; in other words, under threat from a foreign Other. In so 
doing, the conceptual metaphor was assimilated into a logic subjected to the laws 
of nature, naturalising the portrayal of a common home that the Swedish people 
are set to cherish: 
The reasons for the collapse of the Swedish welfare [system] are not difficult 
to identify. […] The pursued policy of mass immigration sits against the 
Swedish welfare model on at least two levels. First, it is extremely costly, 
and those funds could have been used for other areas of society. Second, it 
marked the death of internal solidarity which is a crucial fundament for a 
common welfare state model. It is obvious that we must choose: 
multiculturalism or welfare? For us the choice is easy! 
(SD–K 65, 2005: 2) 
Presented as a mass movement of people, immigration was thereby deemed to 
be the single responsible force for the demise of the Swedish welfare system, 
‘extremely costly’ and bringing about ‘the death of internal solidarity’; the 
presence of the migrant Other in the folkhem was thus presented as an economic 
burden and dissolving force. Nonetheless, because the threat of ‘mass migration’ 
was only reluctantly acknowledged by the ruling political elite, the SD found a 
justification for its existence and for its insistence on turning immigration into a 
key political issue in the coming elections. The suggested ‘total ban on asylum and 
family–reunification migration’ was motivated by the ‘failed integration policy’, 
which endangered the very existence of the folkhem, and was presented to the 
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Swedish electorate in an overly simplistic manner: multiculturalism was opposed 
to (the Swedish people’s) welfare (SD–K 68, 2006: 4). More clearly, diversity was 
threatening the wholeness (in terms of morality, purity, solidarity, and welfare) of 
the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor. Nonetheless, Åkesson’s criticism was 
not only directed at the undesirable ‘newcomers’. It also targeted the political 
force that could claim ownership of the folkhem in its modern shape – the SAP. 
Åkesson criticized the SAP and its leadership – in government at that time – for 
leniency and mismanagement of the national fortunes and particularly for its 
attempt to alter the exclusionary meaning of the folkhem, demanding fiercely that 
the SAP should ‘give us back Sweden!’ – a demand that would become the party’s 
slogan for the coming electoral confrontations (cf. SD–K 75, 2008: 16; SD–K 81, 
2009: 11). 
Despite Åkesson’s efforts immigration did not become a major issue on the 
mainstream political agenda in the 2006 Parliamentary elections. The elections 
witnessed instead the narrow defeat of the SAP and the red–green block it led, 
which collectively received 46 percent of the votes. The SAP’s performance was 
under its usual level of support (35 percent), followed by the V (5.8 percent) and 
MP (5.2 percent). The elections victors, the centre–right Alliance, in turn got 48.2 
percent of the votes; the M received most votes (26.2 percent), followed by the C 
(7.9 percent), FP (7.5 percent), and KD (6.6 percent) (Widfeldt, 2007: 822). 
However, some 5.7 percent of the votes were given to parties that did not pass the 
4 percent parliamentary threshold; among them, the SD received 2.9 percent of 
popular support, more than doubling their vote share compared to the previous 
elections (Agius, 2007: 586; Widfeldt, 2007: 823–823). The electoral support was 
interpreted by Åkesson to be indicative not only of the demand for a ‘Swedish–
friendly politics in the Riksdag’ to reassess the misguided policy of ‘mass 
migration’ (SD–K 74, 2007: 1). It also marked the need for a clearer definition of 
the folkhem’s constitutive values, and a more explicit reference to their inherent 
Swedishness (Andersson, 2009a: 240; Hellström, 2010: 99–100). 
Essential to Swedishness, ‘Swedish culture’ was subsequently defined by 
Åkesson as a product of processes that have taken place within the Swedish 
borders, in a sense detached from outside influences. In this regard, the ‘basic 
norms and values, social codes, symbols, traditions, customs, language, art […], 
but also such things as collective memories, behaviours and beliefs’ were deemed 
to be ‘unique to Sweden’, thereby conveying a sense of unifying solidarity – a 
‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 2004) – around such issues as shared conceptual 
constructs, typically, the folkhem – for the whole Swedish national family (SD–K 
77, 2008: 4). In reclaiming the folkhem, Åkesson contrasted the concept’s idyllic 
picture with the contemporary situation, depicted in terms of a divided society, 
with ever growing frictions between the native Swedes and migrant Others, 
experiencing increased insecurity and uncertainty and a disconnection of the elites 
from the needs of common people: 
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Despite its many shortcomings the Swedish folkhem was for quite a while a 
society characterized by confidence in a better future, security and 
community. This time, however, is past and Sweden has become a colder 
and distant place to live in. The social elite have become ever more 
alienated from us the citizens. The frictions between different [social] 
groups, the escalation of criminality, the dismantling of the welfare system 
and the ever more blurred morality have created a widespread sense of 
insecurity and uncertainty. 
(SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3) (Italics – mine) 
In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, the quadripartite centre–right Alliance 
increased their total share of the vote – with the lion’s share seized by the M (30.1 
percent), which nonetheless did not equal the support received by the SAP (30.7 
percent). The other Alliance parties, however, suffered serious setbacks; the FP 
(7.1 percent) being followed by the C (6.6 percent), and KD (5.6 percent – very 
close to the 4 percent electoral threshold). Among the parties of the red–green 
block, although the SAP registered a setback in electoral support, the MP has 
improved its electoral score (7.3 percent), followed by the V (5.6 percent). 
Consequently, the Alliance has won a plurality of 173 seats in Riksdagen, falling 
short of the 175–seat majority. These elections also witnessed the SD’s 
parliamentary breakthrough (5.7 percent – translated into 20 parliamentary 
seats). This has placed the SD in the position of ‘kingmakers’ – being able to tip 
the political balance in favour of one political coalition or the other. However, both 
the Alliance, and red–green block have rejected negotiations with the SD for 
building up a majority; as a result of that, Reinfeldt has continued to govern with a 
minority government (Widfeldt, 2011: 586–587). 
It is important to underline in this context that the SD and Åkesson have 
exploited the ambiguity around the ideological positioning of radical right 
populism in becoming such significant players on the Swedish political stage. 
Indeed, in his utilisation of the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical construct, Åkesson 
made use of the inherent equivocalness of the concept of folk. On the one hand, he 
drew a line between the disenchanted common citizenry, the folkhem’s ‘true’ 
inhabitants, and the remote and unresponsive elite. He then positioned himself 
and the SD in opposition to ‘those seven in Riksdagen’. On the other hand, 
Åkesson defined the folkhem’s righteous inhabitants along cultural lines, and in so 
doing emphasised the importance of ‘traditions’ and ‘beliefs’ that needed to be 
strengthened and safeguarded if Swedes were to preserve and further their 
‘stability and prosperity’ (SD–K 77, 2008: 4). This allowed him to present the SD 
as a protector of the genuine values of Swedishness and to show the position of 
Lutheran Christianity as constitutive of the original folkhem; this aspect is 
detailed in the section below. 
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6.2.1 THE PLACE OF LUTHERANISM IN DEFINING THE SWEDISH 
NATIONAL FAMILY 
As discussed earlier, the application of the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor 
in Sweden has been less direct, with emphasis being put on the coming together of 
the Swedish national family under the folkhem’s common roof. The concept had 
initial specifically right–conservative attributes that centred on issues of a 
tradition of shared religious denomination, a commitment to preserve the 
Swedish way of life, and generally safeguard Swedish society from radical 
structural changes. It is precisely this right–conservative tradition that Åkesson 
appealed to in his attempts to present Lutheran Christianity as key to 
understanding the Swedish national family. In the analysed empirical material, 
Åkesson has constantly claimed that Lutheranism – and by extrapolation 
Christianity – was an important reference point in these ‘tumultuous insecure 
times’ for understanding Swedish identity – in a sense, constructing a religious 
identity without explicit religiosity (cf. Storm, 2011). Nonetheless, his move 
positioned the SD in direct political competition with the KD, which coalesces the 
political interests of religious right–conservatives from the various Christian 
denominations in Sweden. Preparing for the 2005 Church elections, Åkesson 
accused both the ‘socialists’ – more clearly the SAP in government at the time – 
and the ‘liberals’ – in this case stripping both the KD, and M of their conservative 
credentials and amalgamating them with the C, and FP under the same 
disparaging label – of transforming the ‘church of our fathers’ ‘beyond 
recognition’. He decried the degradation of Swedish Lutheran Church from its 
status of state church to a position of parity with such unfamiliar ‘religious 
communities’ as the Islam or Scientology. Under these circumstances, ‘those seven 
in the Riksdagen’ were collectively portrayed as the SD’s malevolent opponents 
and their push for a clearly secularised state decoupled from the Lutheran state–
church was judged to be an act of aggression against Swedishness: 
For me, the Swedish Church is much more than just faith in God and 
prayers. […] The church has played a crucial role in the development of the 
society we live in, and for the values we carry with us. […] I am obviously 
deeply concerned that the church of our fathers suddenly becomes a 
religious community among all the others and now it can be equated with 
Islam or Scientology. In these tumultuous and insecure times, we need a 
fixed point in life to fall back on. Here the Swedish Church has an important 
role to play. 
(SD–K 64, 2005: 2) 
On closer reading of the quote reproduced above, I maintain that Åkesson has 
operated a contraction of the official appellative, erasing the reference to the 
specificity of the Swedish Christian denomination – Lutheranism – and in turn 
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presenting it simply as the ‘Swedish church’ – thereby enforcing the folkhem’s 
Christian genealogy. He has concurrently constructed an entire hierarchy of 
religious respectability, with Swedish Lutheranism at the top and Islam demoted 
to the same level with a controversial sect – Scientology. This may be regarded as 
an act of symbolic restitution, since the Swedish Lutheran Church had been 
recently ‘dethroned’ from its status of official state–church. There is, I argue 
further, another aspect to the contraction. The ‘Swedish church’ discursive 
construction comes to embody not only the specificity of traditional religious 
convictions in the Swedish folkhem, but also the allegedly universal values of 
Christian tolerance characteristic to Swedes, which Åkesson opposed to those of 
the Muslim Others. As such, in the context of Muhammad cartoons controversy47, 
Åkesson attempted to present the Muslim community in Sweden as intolerant and 
foreign to the folkhem. In one of his editorials in September 2006, Åkesson 
contrasted the vehement reactions across the Muslim world caused by the 
publication of the cartoons depicting Muhammad in irreverent situations with the 
reactions generated by the Ecce Homo exhibition48, in which ‘Jesus was presented 
as a transvestite’, when there were ‘no embassies being burned, and no people 
being killed’. Framing the circumstances as illustrative for ‘the Swedish freedom of 
expression’ he expressed further his doubts that the Muslim Others would ever 
reach such a stage of tolerance to allow their religious symbols to be called into 
question by artists (SD–K 69, 2006: 5). His opposition to the Islam became in 
time more vehement; later the same year, he protested against policies that 
accommodated Muslim religious practices in Sweden, and opposed the 
introduction of holidays other than those associated with traditional, Christian 
celebrations arguing that such a move would fall ‘on its own absurdity’: 
The Christian tradition is an indispensable part of the Swedish culture and 
identity, and those who intend to live here permanently must simply accept 
it. The request that all ethnic and religious groups should have their own 
school holidays falls on its own absurdity and I see no reason that why 
Muslims should be treated differently. [...] we demand that the school 
breaks linked to religious holidays must be limited to traditional Christian 
holidays. 
47 The 12 cartoons, printed in Jylands Posten’s on 30 September 2005, were apparently thought 
to problematise such issues as the freedom of speech in the Western societies with a Muslim 
community that was dismissive of secularism, the oversensitivity of these societies towards Muslim 
religiosity, and the increase of self–censorship on these matters. Their publication caused uproar 
in the Muslim world resulting in hundreds of deaths and burnt embassies, but received the vocal 
support of radical right populist parties in both Denmark and Sweden (Lindekilde, Mouritsen & 
Zapata–Barrero, 2009). 
48 The exhibition had a highly polarising effect, being accused of blasphemy. It consisted of 12 
photo installations, in which classical Christian motifs were invested with new meaning by making 
direct reference to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender–related (LGBTQI) topics (homophobic 
attacks, AIDS–epidemic, gay counterculture, etc.). The photos emphasised the similarity between 
the marginality experienced by the biblical characters and the situation of the LGBTQI community 
in modern times (Cherry, 2008: 48–50). 
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(SD–K 70, 2006: 10) 
Åkesson’s constant appeals to Christian conservatism as the party’s core value 
need to be understood, however, in a wider context. These enabled Åkesson to 
portray the SD as yet another rightist party in direct competition with the KD for 
Christian–conservative votes. Illustratively, in 2009 Åkesson dismissed the KD’s 
attempts ‘to present themselves as the representatives of conservative values and 
talk about themselves as “real people”’ as empty rhetoric. Interestingly, as 
Åkesson aptly noted in the same interview, the claim to be and to represent ‘real 
people’ was a slogan first introduced in the Swedish political arena by the short–
lived NyD, which used it as a means to oppose the political establishment 
(Hellström, 2010: 150–151). However, Åkesson stripped his opponent of 
legitimacy, accusing the KD leader Göran Hägglund of being a member of the very 
political elite that Hägglund claimed to be against, and thereby unrightfully laying 
claim to be ‘the interpreter of the people’s will’. Åkesson claimed that, rather, the 
common Swedes ‘often think as we [the SD] do’ (SD–K 84, 2009: 10). The 
reference to the ‘realness’ of Swedish people was eventually appropriated by 
Åkesson on the eve of 2010 Parliamentary elections, though this time spelt it with 
capital letters – ‘Real people’ (cf. SD–K 85, 2010: 3; SD–K 86, 2010: 3) (Italics – 
mine), which in this context appears to strengthen further the bond that he 
alleged to exist between the SD and Swedish people. 
6.2.2 THE SWEDISH NATIONAL FAMILY AND ITS DEPENDANTS 
Extending the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor, in the analysed empirical 
material, Åkesson details across time whom he deems to be the ‘real’ Swedish 
people and described them in a position of dependency on the SD, portrayed as 
the genuine embodiment of their sovereign will. Illustrative of such a genealogical 
process, I argue, are his comments with regard to the decision to pursue in court 
the complaint of a man of Islamic faith by the Discrimination Ombudsperson 
(Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, DO) The DO’s legal support lent to ‘a Muslim 
fundamentalist’ that refused to adapt to the ‘norms’, on which the ‘Swedish social 
construct is built upon’ – another indirect reference to the physicality of the 
folkhem – was compared to the DO’s active opposition to ‘Swedish traditions’ – 
namely Advent candlesticks in public institutions and graduation ceremonies 
performed in church. Åkesson concluded that the institution should be closed 
down (cf. SD–K 85, 2010: 4; SD–K 86, 2010a: 6). The common people were 
depicted as at the mercy of a state institution (DO), which forgot about its 
responsibility towards Swedish society – insisting on decoupling the state and 
church – but in turn opted to enforce ‘multiculturalism’ against people’s will – 
defending the Other against the Swedish norms. 
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These aspects notwithstanding, the claimed discrimination against common 
people – understood in ethnic/‘racial’ terms to be solely comprised of Swedes – at 
the hands of the political and bureaucratic establishment – portrayed as forces 
enforcing multiculturalism at any cost – was further extended to the areas of 
private economy and employment. Liberalisation of labour–based migration was 
labelled by Åkesson as a ‘betrayal of Swedish workers’ both by the SAP and other 
parliamentary parties. He depicted the idea as an omen for the Swedish 
proletariat: increased unemployment among the Swedish workers, a weakened 
safety–net for the unemployed, and ‘worsening cultural clashes’ between the 
Swedish majority and migrant Others. The available solution was electoral 
support for the SD, which would allow his party to prevent such policies from 
being implemented (cf. SD–K 68 2006: 5; SD–K 73, 2007: 12). The situations 
presented above exemplify Åkesson’s discursive strategy of portraying the ‘normal’ 
Swedes as victims of the whims of the political establishment and state 
institutions, preoccupied with protecting various minority groups. They also 
enabled him to present the SD as the people’s defenders in what he labelled the 
party’s ‘Sweden–friendly politics’. 
With regard to the portrayal of the Swedish working class in the analysed 
empirical material, a closer analysis uncovers the deeply gendered terms which 
structure the folkhem that Åkesson has attempted to describe to his readers. A 
case in point is Åkesson’s emphasis on his party’s growing support among the 
male–dominated trade unions from the metal and paper industries at the expense 
of the SAP (SD–K 75, 2008: 4). This is a reinterpretation, I argue, of the 
previously discussed linguistic metaphor that portrays men working in industry 
and women in healthcare. Åkesson ignores women to enable a restoration of a 
deeply stereotypical masculinised view of the working class, in a similar manner to 
earlier representations of the folkhem (cf. Hirdman, 1995). Consequently, Åkesson 
appears to have overlooked the reality of the significant numbers of Swedish 
women in poorly paid positions, and immigrant women and men limited by 
precarious temporary contracts. By so doing, he has emphasised the importance of 
men’s agency in the political process – in this case as voters and possible SD–
supporters – and has concomitantly reiterated women’s lack of such agency in 
political matters. The folkhem depicted by Åkesson thereby unveils a longing for 
‘social cohesion’ understood in terms of the supremacy of Swedish patriarchal 
norms, underpinned by the essentialised roles for men as breadwinners and 
women as (almost) invisible Others – ever contained to the private sphere of their 
homes, or at best out of sight in caring occupations. Swedish heteronormative 
masculinities have thereby been positioned at the heart of the NATION IS A FAMILY 
conceptual metaphor; such a nostalgic restoration of patriarchalism led Åkesson 
to conclude emphatically in 2009 that ‘[there] is no coincidence that the SAP is 
taking our successes so seriously. We are the only real threat to a pure left–wing 
government in 2010’ (SD–K 80, 2009: 1, 5). 
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This brings the analysis to explore another category among the dependants of 
NATION IS A FAMILY: Swedish women. Examining closer the empirical material, 
Åkesson’s claims to safeguard the folkhem appear centred on the issues of 
reinstalling Swedish white masculinity at the head of national family, and of 
controlling women’s bodies for the reproduction of the right kind of offspring. 
Swedish women are assigned in this context a compulsory heteronormative 
sexuality and domesticity; forced into a merely decorative position as sexual 
objects for masculine heterosexual competition and reward as subservient wives 
and dedicated mothers to their Swedish offspring (Hübinette & Lundström, 2010: 
49; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010: 56–57). Åkesson reiterates in a heteronormative 
gender key the topic of discrimination and hostility that the Swedish majority has 
allegedly been the subject of arising from multiculturalism. He portrays Swedish 
women as victims of physical violence and rape at the hands of immigrant (male) 
Others. The intention appears to be twofold; on the one hand, it was alleged that 
Swedish women fall victim to such incidents because of their sexual emancipation 
and disregard of patriarchal structures that would provide them with a (Swedish 
male) guardian. On the other hand, he maintains that the immigrant male Others, 
especially those from ‘Africa and the Middle East’ belong to a ‘culture’ 
incompatible with the Swedish values of gender equality, and are consequently 
incapable of seeing in the emancipated women of the ‘majority population’ 
anything but ‘Swedish whores’ (cf. SD–K 78, 2008: 8; SD–K 81, 2009: 9). 
Åkesson’s intention to control Swedish women and their sexuality extended 
past the depiction of intermixing with the masculine Other via rape. More clearly, 
reproductive patriarchal heteronormativity was praised as the desired ideal for the 
Swedish national family. This becomes more clearly articulated on the eve of the 
2010 Parliamentary elections, when Åkesson proclaimed the social importance of 
the (Swedish) ‘nuclear family’; tellingly, the party’s prioritised policy areas 
concerned immigration (anti–immigration policies), addressing criminality and 
law enforcement (law and order policies), and last but not least welfare (cf. SD–K 
Kampanj, 2009: 3; SD–K 86, 2010: 1). Referring in gender neutral terms to the 
parents’ right to stay at home with their children – which may be regarded as a 
thinly veiled reference to women’s alleged natural place in the private sphere – 
Åkesson condemned the alternative childcare options – a direct counterattack to 
the on–going debate about increasing men’s role in the upbringing of children and 
the terms of paternity leave schemes, which were dismissed as ‘ideologically 
motivated’ and thereby unnatural: 
The SD views with concern the societal changes that have occurred in the 
past decades, during which the importance of the traditional family and the 
value of family life have been continuously challenged and belittled. Parents 
that choose to stay at home with their children are discriminated against on 
ideological grounds in favour of other childcare options and the state has 
increasingly taken over the parents’ role in the childrearing. An increasingly 
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strong questioning of the traditional family and every children’s right to a 
mother and a father risks to deepen the feelings of insecurity and 
rootlessness among many of our children. 
(SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3) 
To sum up, in his attempt to define and categorise the national family’s 
dependants, Åkesson has actively opposed the people – depicted as the innocent 
and real inhabitants of the folkhem – to the remote and detached elite – portrayed 
as mercilessly promoting a multiculturalist agenda against the common will – but 
also to the menacing migrant Others – presented as the main beneficiaries of that 
multiculturalist push. Such categorisations are nonetheless deeply gendered. The 
genuine character of the people has been unveiled to be closely associated with 
heteronormative patriarchalism, and the common Swedes have been rendered in 
need of a political entity to enforce ‘Sweden–friendly politics’ understood to be a 
return to an idealised conservative reinterpretation of the folkhem’s golden 
decades. 
6.2.3 WOMEN, POLITICS, AND THE SWEDISH NATIONAL FAMILY 
Notwithstanding Sweden’s self–description as the epitome of a ‘women–friendly 
welfare state’, particularly with regard to the relatively high percentage of women 
elected in the Riksdag (from a maximum of 47.3 percent women MPs as a result of 
the 2006 Parliamentary elections to a relative decline of 45 percent women MPs 
as a consequence of the 2010 elections49), several feminist researchers have 
denounced the perpetuation of gender inequalities that have so far precluded any 
woman from being elected as prime minister(cf. Dahlerup, 2011; Freidenvall, 
2006; Hammarlin & Jarlbro, 2012; Wendt, 2012). On this matter, Maria Wendt 
(2012) has noted that even in the Swedish political context, under at least a 
nominal discourse of gender equality, men are often still portrayed as ‘natural’ 
leaders, being referred to simply as ‘politicians’. At the same time, women are 
depicted as a tolerated abnormality, shown by their constant characterisation as 
‘female politicians’. Under these circumstances, the gendered attribute – ‘female’ 
– is setting women in a sense ‘next to’, but also somewhat ‘under the protection of’ 
49 The percentage of women present in the Riksdag has continuously increased since the 
introduction of universal suffrage in 1919/1921, with two notable exceptions; the first dip occurred 
as a result of the 1991 Parliamentary elections, which witnessed the NyD accession into the 
Riksdag with only 12 percent women among their MPs (3 out of 25) (cf. Dahlerup, 2011: 68; 
Freidenvall, 2006: 129). The second came as a result of the 2010 Parliamentary elections, when the 
SD entered the Riksdag with only 15 percent of its MPs being women (3 of an initial 20). According 
to Åkesson, responsibility for women’s underrepresentation in the SD was not the party’s own 
‘view on the gender concept’ repelling women, as some opponents had alleged, but the fact that 
activists ‘throw stones at us when we try to reach out with our message’ (SD–K 73, 2007: 4). 
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(male) politicians, both in terms of trajectory of their political career and their 
ability to act as full–fledged political subjects (Wendt, 2012: 76–98). 
Against this background, Åkesson’s contributions to the SD–K have been 
centred on several women active in the mainstream Swedish politics. Among 
them, there are two women with different ideological convictions that together 
synthesise the defects of ‘Swedish state feminism’ and support for 
multiculturalism pushed to the extreme. By far the most contested has been Mona 
Sahlin, a key figure in the SAP with extensive political experience as an elected MP 
and minister in several cabinets. Long seen as possible SAP leader and even a 
potential PM, her political career suffered a serious setback with the ‘Toblerone 
affair’ in mid 1990s, when she was accused of the alleged misuse of the tax payers’ 
money, though later cleared of all charges (Hammarlin & Jarlbro, 2012: 120–123). 
After a timeout, Sahlin returned to national politics. In the aftermath of the 
honour killing of Fadime Sahindal and the intensive integration debate that 
followed, Sahlin presented the folkhem as an open social construct that welcomed 
people of diverse ethnic backgrounds. She downplayed the importance of 
traditional Swedish culture – calling midsummer’s eve celebrations ‘silly’– whilst 
mentioning the richness of ‘cultures’ and ‘identities’ that characterised the 
migrant Others (Aksakal, 2002: 10–15). Sahlin’s remarks were met with outrage 
in radical right populist quarters, for which she was accused of political 
‘radicalism’ in favour of multiculturalism. When Sahlin was elected the SAP chair 
in 2007 – in an effort to address the loss in the 2006 Parliamentary elections in 
favour of the centre–right Alliance –, Åkesson called her election a betrayal of the 
party’s original social–democratic ideals. Sahlin’s leadership signalled the dawn of 
a period of ‘cultural radicalism’, understood in terms of exacerbated 
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘social division’, marred by social convulsions as a 
consequence of her ‘extreme stance on immigration and on integration issues’. 
Sahlin’s efforts to query hegemonic Swedishness and position it within a wider 
multicultural discourse were dismissed by Åkesson as ‘contempt for Swedish 
cultural heritage’: 
With Mona Sahlin instead of Göran Persson at its helm, the SAP will no 
longer be able to play on an image of false traditionalism, rusticity and 
nostalgia for the folkhem. The fact that the SAP has become a culturally 
radical, multiculturalist and socially divisive party would finally be obvious 
to the whole electorate […] Sahlin’s extreme stance on immigration and 
integration issues […] coupled with her publicly acknowledged contempt for 
Swedish cultural heritage would only intensify the voters’ flight from the 
SAP [towards the SD]. 
(SD–K 72, 2007: 12) (Italics – mine) 
At a closer look, it appears that Åkesson opposed Sahlin’s attempts to open up 
the folkhem to a tolerant accommodation between the Swedish majority and 
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migrant minority groups – and the subsequent reinterpretation of the concept’s 
key values. He concomitantly resisted her feminist endeavour to break the 
aforesaid masculinist power monopoly and become the first woman to chair the 
SAP, and thereby be a serious challenger for the supreme position in Swedish 
politics. The two combined – promoting multiculturalism and being a woman in 
politics – were depicted, in my view, as sources of dissolution of moral standards 
– which threatened to dismantle the simplistic binary of order, authority and 
manliness versus chaos, submission and femininity that fuel the conceptual 
metaphors articulated in radical right ideology (cf. Carney, 2008; Haste, 1994; 
Lakoff, 2002). Time and again, Åkesson underlined how Sahlin’s alleged 
‘extremism’ had an estranging effect on a large portion of the electorate. The 
motivation for such reaction was readily provided: Sahlin ‘hates everything 
genuinely typical Swedish’, she ‘enters the mosque with a scarf on her head’ and 
‘considers that Muhammad should get a job ahead of Kalle’ (SD–K 72, 2007: 2). 
Put differently, Sahlin was depicted as embodying the ‘extreme’ politician – a 
female politician at that – belonging to the mainstream elite who ‘hated’ those 
genuine elements of the folkhem, whilst indiscriminately submitting to the Islamic 
prescriptions – wearing a headscarf. Even more so, she was committed to 
‘discriminate against the Swedish (men)’; considering the employment 
opportunities for the symbolic masculine Other (Muhammad) more important 
than those of the generic Swedish man (Kalle). 
It is worth noting that the other women politicians Åkesson mentioned in his 
subsequent editorials were also criticised, albeit not as aggressively as Sahlin. For 
instance, Maud Olofsson, the C chairperson and deputy prime minister (2006–
2010), was belittled as a politician by Åkesson for not being rational, and thereby 
lacking real (manly) political stature. More clearly, Olofsson was criticised for 
‘being lost in the world of fairy tales’ – disconnected from the reality of common 
Swedes and incapable of critically assessing their situation. In relation to this, 
Åkesson described her ‘inability’ to ‘take a position’ concerning the alleged danger 
of Islamism in Sweden and the imperious need to come to ‘the defence of Western 
values’ that define the folkhem. Even more so, her attempt to acknowledge the 
contribution of the different waves of immigrants to the folkhem’s construction 
was dismissed as ‘lacking credibility’ (SD–K 84, 2009: 5). 
In this regard, Åkesson described both Mona Sahlin and Maud Olofsson in a 
manner strikingly similar to what Suvi Keskinen (2011; 2012) has shown in her 
research as the common means used by Finnish radical right populist politicians 
to portray their political opponents: women in positions of power (high–ranked 
politicians or bureaucrats) that are the main promoters of multiculturalism and 
who are alleged to be blinded in their political judgment by their commitment to 
help the immigrant (male) Other (cf. Keskinen, 2011: 117–120; 2012: 269–270; 
Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012: 14). Put differently, the women active in Swedish 
politics were criticised by Åkesson for being less–than–men, thereby unfit for 
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politics: governed by feelings (such as irrational hate for genuine Swedishness), 
lacking reason (and living in a world of fairy tales), and unable of having 
reasonable and balanced opinions (thus displaying extremist attitudes) (cf. SD–K 
72, 2007: 2; SD–K 84, 2009: 5; SD–K 85, 2010: 5). They were concurrently 
accused of abandoning the traditional role assigned to women within the NATION IS 
A FAMILY: devoted wives and daughters of their Swedish men and mothers of their 
men’s offspring. The women’s striving for emancipation was perceived as a direct 
threat to the masculine dominance within the folkhem. Their protection of the 
masculine Other to the detriment of their Swedish men engendered a symbolic 
denaturation of their motherly instincts, and thereby a direct threat to the future 
of Swedish family. 
6.2.4 THE SWEDISH NATIONAL FAMILY AND ITS OTHERS 
Notwithstanding the constant focus on the (re)definition of the folkhem’s rightful 
inhabitants, the figure of the Other has been a sustained presence. As such, it is 
worth turning the present investigation to unveiling the means employed by 
Åkesson of defining those falling outside the national family – both in terms of 
ethnic belonging, religious affiliation, and submission to heteronormative ideals. 
On this matter, the fact of not–being Swedish, and often relegated to the status of 
being a migrant, in Åkesson’s discourse appears to be problematic when 
intersected with a different religious affiliation (particularly the Islamic faith), and 
a different ethnicity. This borders on a thinly veiled racism, I argue, as the Others’ 
different skin colour is often regarded as a cue for not–being Swedish, though 
generally draped in the more palatable formulations indicating a specific 
geographical origin: ‘the Middle East’, ‘Africa’. In the given context, the not–being 
Swedish is completed with references to a specific cultural background, which is 
often presented as morally stained, primitive and violent, traditionally patriarchal 
and oppressive; in sum, not–being Swedish is equal to inferiority (cf. SD–K 65, 
2005: 2; SD–K 70, 2006: 10; SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3). 
The migrant Other has been continuously referred to as the single direct cause 
for the upheaval in the Swedish welfare state. For example, in 2007 Åkesson 
identified several domains negatively impacted by ‘mass immigration’: education 
– the immigrant offspring were described as intellectually inferior and ‘unable to 
keep pace with their Swedish peers’; law and order – the non–autochthonous 
immigrant population was held responsible for the ‘import’ of violent crimes into 
Sweden and their ‘significant overrepresentation in the crime statistics’; labour 
market – the immigrant Others required special employment schemes although 
they had never contributed financially to the common welfare system; and 
healthcare – the immigrant Others not only entailed an unnecessary strain on the 
healthcare services, but they were even singled out as potential bearers of such 
‘epidemic plagues as TB and HIV’ (SD–K 72, 2007b: 12). In a subsequent 
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editorial50, Åkesson decried the changes that Sweden had undergone in the past 
couple of decades and singled out the Muslim migrant population as the 
embodiment of a menacing Other (SD–K 84, 2009: 3). In my view, Åkesson’s 
insistence on the different religious affiliation of the foreign Other overlaps with 
racial boundaries that are at times camouflaged under the appellation of ‘cultural 
differences’ and which makes direct reference to an alleged ‘clash of civilizations’ 
(Huntington, 2002). This enforces the equation of Swedishness with a specific 
superior understanding of gender equality; concurrently, the Other – often seen as 
a masculine presence – becomes the representative of a homogenous group, 
characterised by a steadfastly traditionalist patriarchal attitude (cf. Bredström, 
2003; Keskinen, 2011; 2012; Mulinari, 2003). The migrant families are thereby 
considered problematic: either they are strictly traditional – in which polygamous 
patriarchy is depicted as an inherent danger for the supposedly liberated Swedish 
heteronormative family constellation – or they are absent – and as such constitute 
a source for anxiety for the natives, as the Swedish women could fall prey to the 
migrant men’s hyper–sexuality (Eriksen, 2002: 60). Such a stance becomes 
apparent in Åkesson’s intervention from 2009: 
It may be because more and more people have begun to notice – what the 
SD already did a while ago – that mass immigration and multiculturalism 
not only bring new foodstuff, but also honour killings, segregation, 
opposition, rootlessness, gang–building, rapes, robberies, and the 
questioning of Swedish traditions and symbols, unemployment, lower 
grades and knowledge levels in schools, religious fundamentalism, genital 
mutilation, oppression of women, forced marriage, increased social costs 
and reduced welfare? 
(SD–K 84, 2009: 5) 
Åkesson attempted in this context to uncover what he alleged to be the dangers 
of multiculturalism. The migrant Other did not only introduce ‘new foodstuff’ into 
the folkhem; more worryingly he – because the Other was resolutely masculinised 
besides being assimilated to a certain race under the guise of a specific religious 
belonging and cultural tradition – came accompanied by ‘honour killings’, ‘gang–
building’, ‘rapes’, and opened up the door to ‘religious fundamentalism’ – from 
which ‘genital mutilation’, ‘oppression of women’, and ‘forced marriage’ were 
understood to originate. Nonetheless, the depiction of a threatening racialised 
Other underpins the intricacies of constructing autochthonous heteronormative 
masculinities and femininities (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011: 48–49; Keskinen, 
2011: 118; 2012: 271–272). The indirect implication to the portrayal of the foreign 
50 In the eve of 2010 elections, Åkesson had the opportunity to publish an extended opinion piece 
in the Aftonbladet daily, marking the end of the SD’s boycott by mainstream media (Aftonbladet, 
19.10.2009: 22–23). The piece was then published verbatim as an extended editorial in the SD–K 
shortly thereafter. 
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Other as a hyper–sexual, hyper–violent, patriarchal masculine presence was that 
the indigenous Swedish masculinity found comfort in its negation (cf. SD–K 78, 
2008: 8; SD–K 81, 2009: 9). Native masculinity is thereby reconfirmed in its 
unquestioned heteronormative whiteness and superior position as civilized 
defender of the ‘vulnerable’ – a category wide enough to include indigenous and 
immigrant women and their children, the old, the sick, and the defenceless 
(Eduards, 2007: 69; Mulinari, 2003: 114–115). 
Additionally, there is yet another instance of describing the Other; in this case 
the Other as less–than–perfect Swedish, representing the failure to fulfil the 
heteronormative ideal of structuring the national family: the LGBTQI community. 
Non–heteronormative sexualities appear especially problematic for radical right 
populist conceptions of the folkhem, as they in fact undermine the metaphorical 
foundation of the nation by challenging the ‘natural order’ reasoning, which posits 
heteronormativity as the solely intelligible moral standard (Eriksen, 2002: 61–62; 
Lakoff, 2002: 225 –228). Unlike other members of the SD leadership, Åkesson 
has nonetheless been less vocal against non–heteronormative sexualities. In turn, 
he has narrowly defined the criteria of intelligibility of the Swedish family 
members, thereby indirectly confirming the exclusion of those less–than–perfect 
Swedes from the national family construct (cf. Rankin, 2000). A case in point, in 
the 2009 campaign issue of SD–K Åkesson underlined ‘every child’s right to a 
mother and a father’ within the protective walls of traditional ‘family life’, and 
dismissed the alternatives to such patriarchal structuring as mere ideological 
manoeuvring (SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3). Under these circumstances, same–sex 
couples’ strivings for equal marriage rights and the appeal for equal rights in the 
adoption of children were presented, I argue, as direct threats to traditional 
patriarchal morality and heteronormative monogamous families. These efforts 
were marked as threatening to the traditional folkhem, in a manner similar to 
polygamy – which I interpret here as a disguised reference to the family of the 
migrant (Muslim) Other. This solidifies the conception that the NATION IS A FAMILY 
underpinned by Christian morality and patriarchal heteronormativity. 
6.3 JIMMIE ÅKESSON INCARNATING THE COMMON SWEDISH 
MAN 
Keeping in mind the criticism of feminist scholars mentioned previously with 
regard to the lasting presence of gender inequalities in Swedish politics, the 
assiduously cultivated image among the mainstream political parties has been one 
of equal opportunities for ‘politicians’ and ‘female politicians’ alike – in which the 
general neutral denomination appears to have internalised the idea of masculine 
hegemony. Men’s natural position as active agents in politics has been further 
strengthened, according to Wendt, when their role as family fathers has 
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overlapped that of political leadership. In this regard, men’s professional 
respectability seems to be fortified by their public performance of fatherhood, 
regardless of whether this entails a serious commitment to childrearing or not. In 
comparison to that, motherhood appears to be a political handicap, women being 
expected to choose between being ‘like–men’, politically active, or retreating into 
the safety of their domestic enclosure to raise their men’s offspring (Wendt, 2012: 
101–110). 
Åkesson, as party chair, has repeatedly indicated that the SD has reached 
political ‘maturity’, thus leaving behind a period of alleged adolescent confusion 
and turbulence – perhaps with reference to its previous Nazi sympathies – 
becoming ‘a true challenger party’ (cf. SD–K 68, 2006: 2; SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–
K 81, 2009: 8–9). In turn, the Swedish political establishment has constantly been 
described as a reunion of ‘old parties’ protecting their privileges (cf. SD–K 75, 
2008: 3; SD–K 78, 2008: 3). It is worth noting that a recurring strategy in 
Åkesson’s discourse has been to fuse his political presence and that of the SD into 
a collective totality, through such expressions as ‘we, the SD’ (cf. SD–K 65, 2005: 
2; SD–K 70, 2006: 11; SD–K 73, 2007: 12; SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–K 78, 2008: 3). 
The SD appears in this context to be identified not only with the figure of the 
youthful outsider that challenges the pre–existing political hierarchy dominated 
by ‘those seven in the Riksdagen’, but also with that of an underdog that survives 
all political vicissitudes against all odds: ‘the old parties have not yet understood 
that the SD is here to stay. Everything is pointing towards further success in the 
coming elections.’ (SD–K 75, 2008: 3) 
The whole metaphorical cluster structured around the right–conservative man 
– that Åkesson has attempted to embody – gains conceptual clarity when 
considering the critique he directed against the SAP leadership, which was 
depicted in terms of a lenient and mismanaging NURTURANT PARENT. In a sense 
acknowledging the long–lasting impact that the SAP had on the construction of 
the folkhem, Göran Persson – the former SAP chair and second longest 
continuously serving Swedish PM, between 1996 and 2006 – has been described 
by Åkesson with the term landsfader (father of the country/nation – reminiscent 
of the founding myths of nation states) (SD–K 75, 2008: 3). In my view, such an 
appellation recognises Persson’s efforts to re-articulate Swedish national identity 
through rediscovering the folkhem’s social–democratic values (such as equality, 
solidarity, and redistribution), emphasising a strengthened work ethic, and 
praising frugality and economy (Andersson, 2009a: 237; 2010: 56–61) 
Åkesson nonetheless reacted negatively to Persson’s efforts to modernise and 
open up the folkhem to gender equality and multiculturalism, and reassess the 
welfare system in the context of globalisation processes (Agius, 2007: 591–593; 
Andersson, 2009a: 237–240). He has oftentimes criticised Persson for what he 
considered to be a false image of ‘traditionalism, rusticity and nostalgia for the 
folkhem’ (SD–K 72, 2007a: 12). Åkesson’s attacks against the SAP have become 
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more vehement with the election of Mona Sahlin to its helm, in the aftermath of 
the 2006 Parliamentary elections and the victory of the centre–right quadripartite 
Alliance, as detailed in the section concerning the presence of women in Swedish 
politics. I maintain that Åkesson's acceptance of a fatherly presence as the head of 
the Swedish national family fits within the patriarchal understanding of the 
NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster. Such a parental figure becomes 
nonetheless problematic once the political personalities assigned such a role act 
counter to the logic of radical right populist ideology – Persson’s preoccupation 
with reforming the folkhem, and Sahlin’s commitment to gender equality and 
multiculturalism are the failed image of parenthood, preoccupied with the 
nurturing of all those inhabiting the folkhem, and not being exclusively concerned 
with the wellbeing of those narrowly defined as belonging to the Swedish national 
family. 
The leaders of the other parties that crafted the red–green block (the MP and 
V) in the years preceding the 2010 Parliamentary elections, in turn, have been 
only seldom mentioned. The MP spokespersons, Maria Wetterstrand and Peter 
Eriksson, have been most commonly criticised for ideological inconsistency and 
political opportunism (cf. SD–K 76, 2008: 10; SD–K 78, 2008: 4; SD–K 80, 2009: 
4). According to Åkesson, the MP’s two spokespersons were willing to sacrifice 
their green ideological convictions, and even partake in an alliance with Lars Ohly, 
the ‘nostalgic communist’ and ‘Stalinist’ leader of the left–wing V for the sake of a 
promised governmental position if the red–greens would have won. He then 
commented on the MP’s refusal to cooperate with the SD concluding rhetorically: 
‘OK, now we know it! Stalinists are good, but not the friends of Sweden…’ (SD–K 
80, 2009: 4). At the same time, the MP and V leaders’ attitude towards a general 
amnesty of illegal immigrants to Sweden has been dismissed as ‘deeply 
irresponsible’ (SD–K 78, 2008: 4). 
In contrast to that, Åkesson’s masculinity appears to be generally defined in a 
negative way, through what the leaders of the red–green block apparently failed to 
be, and as such symbolically positioning the SD in relation to the said coalition of 
parties according to a masculine versus feminine heteronormative binary. More 
clearly, the metaphoric cluster defining Åkesson (and in extenso, the SD) 
embodied masculine traditionalism, underpinned by staunch criticism of 
multiculturalism and cultural relativism, a longing for ‘social cohesion’ 
understood in terms of supremacy of Swedish patriarchal norms, and reliance on a 
strict enforcement of law and order. Put simply, Åkesson’s masculinity embodied 
a different type of (political) man, representing a steadfast and morally upright 
masculinity preoccupied with the folkhem’s wellbeing: a heterosexual Swedish 
man opposing the incarnations of radical right populist demonology – ‘feminists’, 
‘advocates of multiculturalism’, ‘environmentalists’, ‘advocates of affirmative 
action’ (cf. Lakoff, 2002: 170 –173). 
The leaders of quadripartite centre–right Alliance have also been heavily 
criticised by Åkesson for their alleged symbiosis with the mainstream media, and 
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disconnection from the lives of common Swedes. However, this occurred only on 
the eve of 2010 Parliamentary elections, when the Alliance was contesting the 
elections for a second term in government. Furthermore, Åkesson did not pay 
equal attention to all party leaders; instead, he concentrated his criticism on 
Olofsson – the C chairperson – and Hägglund – the KD leader – as already 
discussed in the previous sections. At this point, it is sufficient to underline that 
Åkesson denied the aforesaid party leaders any political legitimacy, maintaining 
that Olofsson was ‘lost in the world of fairy tales’, despite her being a deputy prime 
minister and her proven political ability as the mastermind of the quadripartite 
Alliance, whilst Hägglund was dismissed for being a liar and political coward, a 
creation of the mainstream media, and never having the courage to confront 
Åkesson in a public debate (cf. SD–K 78, 2008: 4; SD–K 84, 2009: 5; SD–K 85, 
2010: 5; SD–K 86, 2010b: 6). In turn, Lars Leijonborg and Jan Björklund, the two 
FP leaders during the analysed timeframe, have not been mentioned once. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Fredrik Reinfeldt – the M leader and prime minister from 
2006 to 2010, and again for another term after the 2010 Parliamentary elections – 
has been rarely mentioned directly by Åkesson. Reinfeldt has only been 
acknowledged in his position as prime minister, condemned for his support of 
‘Islamic ritual slaughter’ and for his unflattering description of Swedishness as 
‘barbarism’ (SD–K 84, 2009: 14). 
The upright and morally conservative masculinity metaphor the SD wishes to 
embody has been further developed by Åkesson, alleging to the process of 
‘purification’ of the SD rank and file, which has been in a sense confirmed by his 
election to the position of party chair. In his view, while the other parties ‘allow 
themselves to be represented by fiddlers, violent criminals, and extremists’ he and 
the SD can ‘beat ourselves on the chest and claim that our sanitation works. We 
have nothing to be ashamed of. We are better than the others, also in this respect!’ 
(SD–K 75, 2008: 10). Furthermore, in 2009 Åkesson decried the consolidation of 
two antagonistic political blocks, and argued that this would hinder new political 
initiatives leading to an increase of disenfranchised citizens. However, he 
expressed his confidence that the 2010 Parliamentary elections would officially 
confirm the SD’s pivotal position in Swedish politics. Making use of this position 
as kingmakers, continued Åkesson, the SD would finally be able to influence the 
mainstream political agenda (SD–K 80, 2009: 4). 
Time and again, in the examined empirical material, Åkesson invested in 
himself and his party with the masculine ability to discern and pursue innovative 
paths, along with such attributes as dynamism and courage to oppose what he 
argued to be a worsening of the Swedish political climate. The courage to criticise 
the political establishment, in other words ‘to stand up to evil’ was imbued by 
Åkesson with the masculine attributes of strength, conceptualised as ‘moral fibre’ 
or as ‘a backbone to resist evil’ (Lakoff, 2002: 184–185). This involves, I maintain, 
a reference to embodied physicality, which requires a masculine overcoming of 
 
162 | Ov Cristian Norocel 
fear, and resistance to hardships. Such references to masculine steadfastness have 
further been emphasised by Åkesson’s acknowledged favourite quote. Taken from 
the film Rocky Balboa, it makes direct reference to masculine resoluteness and 
commitment to overcome obstacles, while striving for victory: ‘But it ain’t how 
hard you hit; it’s about how hard you can get hit, and keep moving forward. How 
much you can take, and keep moving forward. That’s how winning is done.’ 
(Rocky Balboa, 2006) 
Åkesson’s performative of radical right populist masculinity in the Swedish 
political context does not strictly follow the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor 
construct. Based on the analysis detailed above, I argue that in Åkesson’s writings 
the folkhem appears to be under the guardianship of a NURTURANT PARENT whom 
Åkesson implicitly opposes. However, Åkesson’s continuous emphasis on his and 
SD’s youthful (masculine) energy indicate a more elaborate relationship between 
his performative of masculinity and that assigned to his political opponents than 
the established STRICT FATHER versus NURTURANT PARENT dyad. Rather, the political 
competition appears to be taking place between unequal opponents – Åkesson 
and the SD embodying a promising young underdog, whilst the political 
establishment represents different facets of an aged parental figure that 
mismanages the folkhem. The typology of masculinity Åkesson performs in the 
context of Swedish politics seems to be subscribing to a somewhat different 
conceptual metaphor, for which I suggest the label of CONSERVATIVE SON. 
6.4 THE USE OF GENDERED CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN 
SWEDISH RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 
In the analysis of Åkesson’s (re)interpretations of the folkhem – taken to represent 
the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor in the Swedish context – I have argued 
that his discourse is underpinned by welfare chauvinism interpreted in a nostalgic 
key and a strictly conservative heteronormative stance, which thinly disguises a 
xenophobic attitude. Under these circumstances, Åkesson has used the complexity 
and ambiguity of the concept of folk understood as a national collective, on which 
the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor rests. Identifying the folkhem’s 
allegedly true inhabitants with the disenchanted citizenry among the Swedish 
ethnic majority, he claimed to embody their frustration in the face of the perceived 
imminent dissolution of Swedish society and the political establishment’s 
disconnectedness from the burden of common people. 
Indeed, the common Swedes have been depicted at the mercy of ‘those seven in 
the Riksdagen’ that pursued an aggressive multiculturalist agenda, thereby 
neglecting their initial responsibility towards Swedes by accommodating the 
presence of the Other at the expense of safeguarding national purity and solidarity 
within the folkhem. In relation to this, the SD has been presented as standard–
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bearers of ‘a Swedish–friendly politics’, which incorporates both an ethnic and a 
class aspect. From this perspective, the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor has 
been developed across time to detail an image of the folkhem’s true inhabitants in 
contrast to the figure of alterity. As such, alterity has been defined as either 
representing the not–being Swedish migrant Other, or the less–than–perfect 
Swedish members of the LGBTQI community. The Swedish national family has 
thereby been constructed along an exclusionary heteronormative logic – 
incorporating an ideal of patriarchal family structuring – in which women active 
in politics have been criticised by Åkesson for being less–than–men (misgoverned 
by feelings, and incapable of rational thinking), and failing in their expected 
position as devoted mothers of Swedish offspring. In this context, Swedish women 
in general have been assigned a compulsory heteronormative sexuality and 
domesticity, being relegated to a position of sexual objects to reward the 
heterosexual competition among Swedish men, and being treated as devoted 
mothers within the folkhem’s protective confines. Their striving for emancipation 
from the tutelage of Swedish men has been in turn portrayed as potentially 
dangerous, exposing them to the hyper–sexuality of the masculine migrant Other. 
Under these circumstances, Åkesson’s claims that both himself and the SD 
have reached ‘maturity’, his demarcation from the ‘aged’ political establishment, 
and his emphasis on political dynamism indicate, in my view, the elaboration of a 
metaphorical construct centred on an ideal of masculinity underpinned by 
combative political participation, youthfulness, and preoccupation with an 
idealised past. This metaphorical cluster, which I label the CONSERVATIVE SON, has 
thereby been employed to portray Åkesson and his party in masculine terms, such 
as steadfast and protective, energetic and robust, in short, a challenger in the 2010 
Parliamentary elections; however it departs significantly from that of the STRICT 
FATHER employed by other European radical right populist parties and understood 
to surmount the national family construct. In sum, the analysis has revealed that 
the demand for heteronormative hegemonic structuring rested on the idea of 
nuclear coupling as an explanation for the reproduction of life and Swedish 
culture and values, which was underpinned by the deeply entrenched fear of 
strangers and migrant Others (xenophobia), coupled with the fear of 
miscegenation (which includes any illegitimate couplings) and the fear of the 
sexually diverse Others (homophobia). 
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7 THE NATIONAL FAMILY SHELTERED UNDER THE 
PROTECTIVE ROOF OF THE PEOPLE’S HOME 
‘The Family’, painted by Wolfgang Willrich, has survived to these days only as a 
print of the original work. The solution for the soul–searching quest of a people in 
times of crisis, which Willrich depicted in that work, was ideologically grounded in 
the belief in a return to an idyllic past of the national construct along the 
traditional family lines – fertile, uncorrupted, and pure – under the careful 
tutelage of a man/father/leader. Under these circumstances, the people’s family 
home appeared to offer a sanctuary from the vicissitudes of its exposed 
surroundings. The conceptual structure described above seems to have fared 
better than the painting itself. At present, some five years after the onset of the 
2008 ‘global financial meltdown’ – a crisis so severe it is often compared to the 
1930s ‘Great Depression’ that swept across Europe and saw the emergence of 
national socialist ideology in mainstream politics – one witnesses a similar 
process of political soul–searching (Calhoun, 2011: 9–12; Norocel, 2009: 237–
240). Among the diverse options put forward by various parties, is the return to 
the safety and certainty afforded by the narrowly defined traditional family 
construct. The normative position that prescribes family life as to be consumed 
within a (legally sanctioned) monogamous union between a man and a woman 
that has led to the procreation of a numerous offspring, has apparently been 
welcomed by growing numbers of disenchanted citizens around Europe. This is 
seen in the increasing visibility, acceptance, and even promotion of radical right 
populist ideology in the form of rising electoral support for parties espousing such 
an ideology across Europe. 
Under these circumstances, the present investigation has aimed to answer 
several interrelated research questions. The most important research question 
concerned how does radical right populist ideology work through discourse to give 
specific expression to the hierarchical gender binary? Aware that the NATION IS A 
FAMILY conceptual metaphor facilitates the appropriation of the heteronormative 
family construct to that of the people in radical right populist discourses, the 
second research question asked how do leaders of radical right populist parties in 
Romania, and in Sweden use the aforementioned conceptual metaphor to 
construe the hierarchical gender binary, and with what effects? Concentrating 
then more closely on the successive discursive articulations of the selected 
conceptual metaphor, the final research question asked how do the two party 
leaders construe their masculinity performatives with the help of conceptual 
metaphors – of interest here being the place of the STRICT FATHER conceptual 
metaphor in the wider NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster. 
This concluding chapter opens with a reflexive section that delves into the 
specificities of feminist scholarship on radical right populism, and discusses the 
opportunities offered by a genealogical approach to the critical analysis of 
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conceptual metaphors from a feminist perspective. It addresses the opportunities, 
challenges, and shortcomings that such a methodology has afforded. It has been 
structured to reflect, on the one hand, the inherent logic that has guided the 
research questions, presented above, but in a somewhat reversed order. Put 
differently, the chapter first synthesises the answers to the more specific research 
questions, undertaken in the two cases. Taking then a step towards a more 
theoretical level, the answers to the more general research question are presented, 
and connected to the wider scholarship of radical right populism. 
On the other hand, the structure has been designed to mirror the internal logic 
of radical right populist ideology, which constructs with the help of discourse a 
concept of reference – the monolithic people – according to a heteronormative 
logic of family relations. The acknowledged ambition has been, in other words, to 
bring gender into the study of radical right populist ideology. As such, the key 
findings from the analysis of the Romanian case are corroborated with those from 
the analysis of the Swedish case in order to put forward a synthetic model for the 
critical evaluation of the researched conceptual structures. The section thereby 
focuses on the ideological depiction of the national family as an endangered entity, 
which productively enables the consolidation of support around a collective inner 
force – religious identity. Within the family construct, I detail in the subsequent 
sections the specific positions to which women and other dependants alike are 
relegated to, and show the role of Others in crafting a collective identity of the 
people as one national family. 
The following section then discusses the centrality of certain masculinity 
performatives (in their various guises, either as a strict father figure, or a youthful 
challenger) in that construct. These masculinity performatives detail the 
corresponding part of the gender dyad, which completes the prescribed femininity 
performatives presented earlier – the hierarchical gender binary that is 
ideologically sanctioned as desirable within radical right populist ideology. More 
clearly, I show the various positions the political man may take in the national 
family context, which are supported by rigidly patriarchal interpretations of the 
national construct. I acknowledge nevertheless the particularities that accompany 
the investigated metaphorical cluster when comparing the ideological 
manifestations through the discourse of the chosen radical right populist parties. 
In the final section of the present chapter, I take a more theoretical perspective on 
the matter of gendered conceptual metaphors. I thereby sketch out possible 
avenues of extending research that pertain to the structuring of the national 
construct along traditional family lines. 
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7.1 THE GENEALOGY OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS: FOR A 
FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP OF RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST 
IDEOLOGY 
Importantly, the present study departs from the highly problematic theorising of 
radical right populism, which takes no notice of the importance of gender in 
constructing the ideological apparatus that underpins radical right populist 
manifestations. Questioning the validity of classifying radical right populist 
parties into a specific ‘party family’ in a manner devoid of any awareness of gender 
(cf. Ignazi, 2003; Mair & Mudde, 1998; Mudde, 2000, 2007; Rydgren 2005), I 
have called to attention the privileged position the family is afforded in radical 
right populist discourses, as both a conceptual construct and as a political 
institution (cf. Butler, 1990, 2004; Jackson, 2006; Rich, 1980; Tuori, 2009). As 
such, I suggest a contemporary syncretic feminist approach that confronts 
ideological conceptions at the intersection of gender, ethnicity/‘race’, social class, 
and sexuality. In this light, my contribution to the radical right populist 
scholarship is to show the exclusionary process at work in crafting the 
homogeneous people community – the keystone of radical right populist ideology 
– work undertaken on and through the bodies of the people’s women, which 
become battlefields for the preservation of the collective purity, by their guardian 
men. 
In so doing, equipped with the theoretical tools provided by feminist 
scholarship, I have analysed the people concept at the intersection of gender, 
class, ethnicity/‘race’, religion, and sexuality. My starting point has been that the 
connection between gender, ideology, and language, as manifest at the level of 
discourse, that may be examined through the conceptual metaphors inferred from 
the analysis of selected empirical material. Equally significant has been the 
disentangling of conceptual metaphor from mere metaphorical expressions, and 
the former’s discursive articulations manifest in the form of metaphorical 
clusters, which represent cohesive system of metaphorical concepts. In addition, 
the genealogical perspective I have employed shows conceptual metaphors and 
their adjoining clusters as contingent, emergent, and open to (re)interpretation 
(cf. Cameron et al, 2009: 67). 
First, it is worth noting that by posing the research questions to the empirical 
material, I have chosen to take a rather well–trodden approach in conceptual 
metaphor theory, enunciating the conceptual metaphors to be examined in the 
research questions. I have opted for such an approach instead of a more general 
inventorying of all possible conceptual metaphors, and their possible discursive 
manifestations through metaphorical expressions, because the present project has 
been from the inception preoccupied with the interplay between gender, ideology, 
and discourse. In the given context, the dual position occupied by the family 
construct, both for its means to sanction the power relations at work in the 
hierarchical gender binary, and its ability to function as a mobilising concept for 
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such an abstract community as the people of radical right populist ideology, has 
elicited itself as a legitimate subject for this scholarly undertaking. With these 
aspects in mind, I have indicated that the analysis is to be closely structured 
according to a top–down logic of investigation, serving as a deductive chain of 
arguments (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Steen, 2007). 
In my opinion, a bottom–up logic of investigation, that would initiate the study 
of gathered empirical material presumptively ignorant of it containing certain 
conceptual metaphors, while being rewarding for mapping out all conceptual 
metaphors that may be present in the empirical material, would have removed the 
focus from the matter at stake, as described above. Even more so, I maintain that 
such an approach would have prevented the analysis from unbinding itself from 
too narrow a reading of the cues presented by metaphorical expressions at the 
lexical level – lexical artefacts – and engage in a productive investigation of the 
manifestation of conceptual metaphors at the discursive level – as presented in 
Figure 2 in chapter four. In this, I follow in the footsteps of scholars of critical 
conceptual metaphor that have argued for a more nuanced understanding of 
conceptual metaphors in discourse, in the sense that such conceptual structures 
may be expressed also indirectly – not only explicitly in established lexical 
formations – emerging from the specific topic that the analysed discourse is 
embedded in (Cameron et al, 2009: 71; Hart, 2010: 129; Howe, 2006: 64; Lazar, 
2009: 211–212; Steen, 2007: 270). More clearly, my contribution to critical 
metaphor theory has been to analyse the manifestations of conceptual structures 
not only at the lexical level – but also on a more abstract plane, at the level of 
discourse – and thereby monitor the ideological manifestations in the interplay 
between conceptual structures, lexical artefacts, and discursive constructions. 
Second, in designing the research method – which I presented at length in 
chapter four – I have been able to monitor closely the genealogy of chosen 
conceptual metaphors. Developing the genealogical approach I have resolved the 
challenges that scholars of conceptual metaphors usually have been confronted 
with, namely crafting an appropriate methodology to avoid circular 
argumentation. I have thereby aimed to study the genealogical development of 
various manifestations of radical right populist ideology, with a specific analytical 
interest in the discursive manifestations of ideology among radical right populist 
parties in two countries, Romania and Sweden. At a first sight, the two countries 
appeared to have followed a different historical, socio–economic and political 
path. The family and national community ideals in these contexts seemed, on the 
surface, to have taken different interpretations of the hierarchical gender binary. 
In the analysis, I have treated language as a means for the circulation of ideology 
within a specific political setting, acknowledging that language is the fundamental 
environment for the formation of gendered political identities, and enforcing 
certain ideological representations of men and women as reasonable ‘natural 
truths’ (cf. Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 492; Cameron, 2006: 148; Lazar, 2005: 11–14). 
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The two principal metaphorical concepts – the NATION IS A FAMILY and the STRICT 
FATHER – need to be understood precisely this way – articulating the metaphorical 
cluster that provides ideological consistency to the examined radical right populist 
discourses. From a feminist perspective, the metaphorical cluster thus indicated 
seems to engender a containment within a compulsory patriarchal 
heteronormativity of both women and men, relegating women to a position of 
normative motherhood and men as guardians of the ‘natural order’ and family 
guardians. 
Consequently, the present study did not aim to cement a specific normative 
approach to the analysis of ideology and its manifestations across Europe. At 
most, it may be considered an examination of certain political contexts, whereby 
emphasis has been put on showing the ideological underpinnings that conceptual 
metaphors and adjoining metaphorical clusters afford. As such the endeavour has 
been to expand the study of the conceptual structures under scrutiny from a 
feminist perspective, detailing the ideological construction of gendered identities 
with the help of conceptual metaphors in two specific contexts – radical right 
populist manifestations in Romania and Sweden. 
7.2 THE NATIONAL HOME UNDER SIEGE: THE NATIONAL 
FAMILY ENDANGERED 
The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis of the empirical materials in 
the two cases – as detailed in chapter five section 5.2, and chapter six section 6.2 – 
is that the two party leaders have discursively utilised the ambiguity pertaining to 
the ideological positioning of radical right populism on the left–right political 
continuum in order to achieve a position of parliamentary representation in the 
two countries. On this matter, key has been the genealogical usage of the inherent 
equivocalness of the people construct afforded by the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual 
metaphor and adjoining metaphorical cluster. A first move has been to 
discursively circumscribe the real people – those rightfully entitled to inhabit the 
family home – to overlap with the disenchanted mass of common citizens to form 
a monolithic entity, thereby individualising the political establishment as separate 
from the people’s body, remote, and (even) outright parasitical. It is in this context 
of antagonism, I argue, that one needs to understand the people’s identification 
with the working class – as the epitome of a disadvantaged and exploited position. 
In fact, superimposing the people onto the proletariat, radical right populism does 
not regard class as an inherently antagonistic conception. It does not promise 
class emancipation (by means of, for instance, continuous education, just 
distribution, promotion of equality and equity, and collective decision making). 
Rather, it simply conceives of class as a means of stratification, and relegates the 
people to a situation of vulnerability and unintelligibility – unable to transcend 
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their status, and incapable of articulating their grievances politically. 
Consequently, the radical right populist parties emerge as the people’s true 
representatives, and their voice in the political arena. A second move has been to 
identify the nationalist manifestations of the ethnic majority – be it Romanian, or 
Swedish – as inherently benign, and integrate them into a genealogy of traditions, 
and beliefs that crystallised the solidarity of national family members along 
ethnic–cultural lines. 
In this vein, the common people have been depicted in a position of dangerous 
vulnerability, at the mercy of the aforementioned political establishment. 
Concretely, in the Romanian case, it seems that the PRM leader has exploited the 
growingly negative perception among Romanian voters of democratic 
parliamentary politics, describing mainstream political parties and their 
representatives as a corrupt clique building political alliances against the ‘laws of 
nature’ – overriding all possible ideological constraints, and as a result 
transforming parliamentary democracy into nothing less than a crime syndicate 
(RRM 521, 2000: 14; RRM 741, 2004: 13). Exploiting the specificity of Romanian 
politics as a war–like competition among various political clans, Tudor’s own 
political force has been depicted as a disciplined army under his careful leadership 
prepared to make the voice of Romanian people heard in the Parliament (RRM 
754, 2004: 12–13). 
In the Swedish case, it appears that Åkesson has accused the political elites – 
‘those seven in the Riksdagen’ (SD–K 70, 2006: 1) – of pursuing an aggressive 
multiculturalist agenda, and as such neglecting their primary responsibility to 
safeguard national purity, and solidarity under the folkhem’s protective roof. In 
contrast to the mainstream political forces, which have formed two opposing 
political blocks; coalescing the political parties on the left and right sides of the 
political spectrum – Åkesson has opted to present the SD as the righteous legion 
defending ‘Swedish–friendly politics’, thereby transcending the left–right divide 
under the imperative of safeguarding Swedish national interest (cf. SD–K 65, 
2005: 2; SD–K 66, 2005: 2; SD–K 74, 2007: 1; SD–K 81, 2009: 11). 
While somewhat different in the depiction of their political opponents – the 
vilified detached, and irresponsive establishment – the discourses of radical right 
populist leaders in Romania and Sweden, in my opinion, seem to consecrate a 
unitary view of the people (and their national home): a monolithic citizenry 
disillusioned with the political establishment and in need of the political 
guardianship only radical right populism can afford. The depiction of the national 
family incorporates the image of a silent majority, which, in my view, is invested 
with feminine passivity and defencelessness, thereby relegating the 
complementary militant masculinity to the radical right populist leader and his 
party, which appear as the majority’s only cogent and engaged component – an 
imperative for the survival of the national community. 
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7.2.1 THE RELIGION OF THE NATIONAL FAMILY: BETWEEN INNER FORCE 
AND EXCLUSIONARY TOOL 
On closer examination, it appears that the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster 
rests on appeals to a common religious identity, which develop genealogically and 
are adapted to the particular manifestations of radical right populist ideology in 
each researched case. The claim for one unifying religious identity for all members 
of the national family strengthens, I argue, the radical right populist 
understanding of the people as a solid monolith. It also serves as a key principle of 
distinction between those rightfully belonging to the national family community, 
and those who do not qualify as part of it. 
In the Romanian radical right populist discourse – as analysed at length in 
section 5.2.1 – Orthodox Christianity seems to be collapsed into Romanian 
identity, and thereby appears as a birthright of the Romanian people. Even more 
so, Christianity seems inscribed into the genetic heritage of the Romanian 
national family, enabling the distinction between Romanian people and their 
Others (cf. RRM 528, 2000: 14; RRM 736, 2004: 13). This allows Tudor, I argue, 
to naturalise a hierarchy of worthiness, in which religious identity is key. In 
contrast to the Romanian people – whom are considered to be born Christian 
Orthodox, hence superior – the Hungarian minority, or the Romani (Rroma) 
minority for that matter, trace their religious identity to a historical moment of 
baptism into the Christian faith – and are thereby inferior. This becomes even 
more clearly apparent when the Christianity of the Romanian national family is 
employed by Tudor as a principle for exclusion of those of Jewish or Islamic faith 
that are then relegated to a position of external Others (RRM 982, 2009: 13). In 
my view, such appeals to an exclusive religious identity emphasise the radical 
right populist preoccupation with the danger of the degeneration that the national 
fabric may suffer in the case of opening up the national family to different 
religious (or cultural) influences. Concomitantly, the religious identity of the 
Romanian people allowed for the reification of the national family as a 
heteronormative construct that orbits around a sacerdotal performative of 
masculinity, in the sense that the pious submission of Romanian people to the 
religious and moral domination of the national Orthodox Church seems to 
incorporate the radical right populist leader as well (cf. RRM 528, 2000: 14; RRM 
737, 2004: 12). 
In contrast, the Swedish case appears to be an example of religious identity 
without explicit religiosity – as detailed in section 6.2.1. In this regard, secular 
modernity rests on a more or less implicit reference to the commonly shared 
Christian heritage – here, Lutheran Christianity (SD–K 64, 2005: 2). This 
becomes most obvious when parliamentary democracy and secular modernity are 
posited by Åkesson in direct opposition to the religious denomination of the 
migrant Other, oftentimes understood to refer to the non–Christian faith (in this 
case Islam) (cf. Spinner–Halev, 2005: 44–46; Storm, 2011: 76). Consequently, it 
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affords a position of emancipated religious identity for the Swedish ethnic 
majority, in strong opposition to the alleged conservative religiousness of the 
migrant Other – thereby collapsing oppressive patriarchal traditions into the faith 
of the migrant Other (SD–K 69, 2006: 5). Bringing the alleged particularities of 
patriarchal structures that underpin the Islamic faith under scrutiny, focus is 
removed from interrogating the Swedish national family constructed by the 
radical right populist discourse in Sweden. Such a move, I argue further, appears 
to obscure the conservative heteronormative understanding of the Swedish 
national family and the use of religious identity in this context to confirm it as 
natural in the Swedish folkhem (cf. SD–K 85, 2010: 3; SD–K 86, 2010: 3). 
I conclude this section by underlining that, in the discursive usage of the 
NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster, Christianity – even when sublimated into 
state–brokered secularism to entail specific traditions and national customs – has 
served a dual function, both as a binding force for the homogenous people, and a 
means to separate the true people from the (migrant) Other. When referred to as a 
unifying force, I argue further, Christian religious identity has been used 
instrumentally to underline the claims of radical right populist parties to be solidly 
anchored in the political life of the national family, and to embody the guardians 
of the people’s ancestral traditions, in a way which allowed these parties to depict 
their presence in mainstream politics as uncontroversial. When serving as a 
division line, the religious identity of the ethnic majority has then been employed 
to underline the people as separate from, and superior to the Other. 
7.2.2 THE NATIONAL FAMILY AND ITS DEPENDANTS: DRAWING DIVISION 
LINES AMONG THOSE IN NEED 
Another conceptual dimension of the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster 
pertains to the depiction of the national family members in a position of 
defencelessness. As noted above, the people are understood to be situated in a 
position of disadvantage and exploitation at the hands of the political and 
economic establishment, and malevolent Others. This notwithstanding, there are 
some specific categories described in the analysed discourses in positions of 
extreme vulnerability: the people’s women – understood as valuable reproductive 
vessels for the people’s offspring – and the national family’s children, and the 
elderly. What the people as a whole have in common, as I have already mentioned, 
is that they are portrayed as dependent on the benevolence and willingness of the 
radical right populist leader to translate the needs arising from their position of 
precariousness into political action. 
In the Romanian case – as discussed in section 5.2.2 – the focus on Tudor’s 
visits to hospitals, retirement homes, orphanages, and canteens for the poor 
across the country has emphasised him in the role of ‘national hero’ and cemented 
the depiction of the national family in a situation of social and economic 
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vulnerability (cf. RRM 521, 2000: 14; RRM 529, 2000: 14; RRM 731, 2004: 12). 
Under these circumstances, his role has been one of a careful listener to the needs 
of those members of the national family in need, and of generous financial 
benefactor to those welfare institutions, but not of actual involvement in the 
caretaking process itself. This confirmed Tudor and the PRM to the position of 
masculine leadership and family breadwinners, thereby relegating women to a 
position of normative motherhood – natural caregivers of the national family’s 
dependants (cf. Mosse, 1997; Petö, 2006; 2010; Taylor, 1997). Another aspect 
concerns the radical right populist preoccupation with the purity of people’s 
offspring. In this case, women are depicted as precious carriers of the future 
generations of the national family (RRM 524, 2000: 14). Women appear as 
passive family members that require special protection from the unrestrained 
sexuality of a menacing Other, that may either rape the people’s women, or even 
use women’s reproductive ability for their own roguish ends (RRM 527, 2000: 15). 
Important in this context, I maintain, is the particularly bleak picture of 
Romanian society – a toxic wasteland, a brothel, and a place of immense poverty 
at the hands of the corrupt elites – in a sense strengthening the radical right 
populist appeal to restore people’s dignity and sovereignty – electing the PRM 
leader as president (cf. RRM 534, 2000: 14; RRM 754, 2004: 12–13). 
Somewhat different to the Romanian case, in which the working class 
identification of the national family is referred to obliquely, in the Swedish case 
the reference about the people belonging to the proletariat appears to be more 
clearly enunciated – as shown in section 6.2.2. However, Åkesson’s discourse 
seems to articulate a specific understanding of the people inhabiting the folkhem. 
At the centre lies the figure of male breadwinners active in traditionally male–
dominated branches of economy, such as heavy industry, while the ambition of 
restoring the folkhem’s social cohesion demotes women to a position of near–
invisibility in branches of economy generally associated with their natural 
attributes of caregiving and rearing of the national family (cf. SD–K 80, 2009: 1, 
5; SD–K 75, 2008: 4). Despite these differences, Åkesson’s discourse appears to 
share with that of his Romanian counterpart the preoccupation with the people’s 
women and their ability to mother the future generations of the national family. 
The issue of discrimination of, and hostility towards the ethnic majority in Sweden 
is reiterated in a heteronormative gendered key: Swedish women are depicted as 
victims of rape at the hands of hyper–sexual migrant (male) Others. The aim, in 
my view, is both to question Swedish women’s sexual emancipation from the 
patriarchal tutelage of Swedish men, and to emphasise the inability of migrant 
male Others to accommodate to the ‘Swedish values’ of gender equality, and break 
free from the patriarchal mentality of their native culture (cf. SD–K 78, 2008: 8; 
SD–K 81, 2009: 9; SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3). 
Summing up, I argue that in the two countries the radical right populist 
discourses define their people as belonging to the proletariat – though in the 
Romanian case such references are often indirectly articulated. What the two 
 
OUR PEOPLE – A TIGHT–KNIT FAMILY | 173 
 
cases have in common, however, is the depiction of their respective national 
families in positions of vulnerability at the hands of a remote and detached elite – 
in the Romanian case engaged in economic corruption, while in the Swedish one 
pushing for a globalisation–friendly, and a multiculturalist agenda. More clearly, 
the people – as portrayed in the radical right populist discourses in the two 
countries – embody precisely that part of the proletariat that appears most 
precariously exposed to the contemporary processes of unrestrained globalisation 
of capital – accompanied by deindustrialisation, mass unemployment, capital 
flight, and even corruption (cf. Banks & Gingrich, 2006; Meret & Siim, 2013). The 
two national families are unveiled as deeply gendered constructions, resting on 
idealised images of local heteronormative patriarchal models: men as idealised 
working class breadwinners, whilst women are relegated to position of normative 
motherhood, or reduced to merely decorative positions of sexual objects for the 
masculine heterosexual competition and reward for the people’s men and their 
(male) Others. 
7.2.3 WOMEN, POLITICS, AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE NATIONAL 
FAMILY: EMANCIPATION AND EQUALITY AS FACETS OF ALIENATION 
The relegation of women to a subordinate position of not much more than simple 
reproductive entities within the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster gains 
conceptual clarity when examining how women active in politics are described in 
the selected radical right populist discourses. In feminist scholarship, the women’s 
presence in politics marks their transcendence of the objectified position as the 
people’s women and confirmation of their individualised subjectivity as political 
actors. Their presence in politics appears to be highly problematic and is often 
described in negative terms in the analysed discourses, showing the central role 
that the hierarchical gender binary is afforded in radical right populist ideology. 
Similar to other extensions of the analysed metaphorical cluster, the radical 
right populist discourse in Romania seems to be sensibly more vehement on the 
issue of women’s political participation – analysed in detail in section 5.2.3. On 
this matter, I argue, Tudor has taken advantage of the specificities of Romanian 
politics, which are structured according to a logic of political confrontation among 
political families under the uncontested authority of father–like leaders. In the 
few instances when women’s presence in politics is acknowledged by the 
Romanian radical right populist discourse, they appear to have infringed on the 
heteronormative rules of intelligibility – impinging on the role that was naturally 
theirs in the national family – and encroaching upon the exclusive domain of 
masculine competition, represented by politics. Tudor has been unambiguous 
about the fate that awaits such women: either to become men, or to expect public 
execution. In both cases, I claim further, the hierarchical gender binary is restored 
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by threatening women’s very physical existence, and denying them a voice in the 
life of the Romanian national family (cf. RRM 534, 2000: 15; RRM 536, 2000: 15). 
In turn, I maintain, the radical right populist discourse in Sweden does not 
appear to diverge significantly from the one in Romania, but only in a matter of 
nuance. This has to do with the acceptance, at least formally, of a women–friendly 
welfare state, as discussed at length in section 6.2.3. This aside, women’s presence 
in politics appears to be a deeply problematic issue in the radical right populist 
discourse, especially when women attain key positions in the internal hierarchies 
of various parties across the Swedish political spectrum. A case in point, having a 
woman at the helm of Swedish social–democracy and leading the red–green 
opposition block has been portrayed as problematic by Åkesson, particularly for 
her assumed efforts to create a more inclusive and diverse national family 
construct. The combination of the two – being woman in one of the most 
influential positions in Swedish politics, and promoting a multiculturalist vision of 
the folkhem – has been considered a source of imminent moral dissolution (SD–K 
72, 2007: 2). But Åkesson has dismissed women in politics in general for not being 
able to reign in their feelings– particularly what he deemed to be hatred towards 
the national family’s cherished values; for being irrational – not being able to 
discern fantasy from reality; and as generally incapable of reasonable and 
balanced opinions – espousing extremist attitudes. As such, women have not been 
requested to morph into men so as to be allowed into politics, neither have they 
been threatened with being physically exterminated. These notwithstanding, it 
seems that women have discursively been contained to a position of less–than–
men in Swedish politics (cf. SD–K 84, 2009: 5; SD–K 85, 2010: 5). 
In conclusion, being a woman and a politician seems to go against the radical 
right populist ideology. Being individualised subjects, women active in politics 
transgress the logic of the hierarchical gender binary that relegates women – as 
discussed in the previous section – to the position of patriarchal dependency to 
their male guardians in the context of the national family. It appears that the 
NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster does not accommodate women as subjects, 
their striving for emancipation being described in terms of a threat to the 
dominance of men in the public sphere, and the denaturation of their motherly 
instincts, thereby embodying an explicit danger to the very survival of the people. 
7.2.4 THE NATIONAL FAMILY FACING ITS OTHERS: THE OTHERS AMONG 
US AND THEM AS COLLECTIVE OTHERS 
The genealogical development of the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster is 
accompanied by a parallel albeit antagonistic process, which involves the 
continuous boundary–drawing of the intelligible – circumscribing the national 
hierarchical gender binary – and that which falls outside its limits – (re)defining 
the national family’s Others. This does not occur, I maintain, only by laboriously 
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listing those external Others – be they ethnic minorities with a long history within 
the people’s envisioned homeland, or migrant communities settled only recently 
in the people’s home – that are excluded from the national family on ethnocentric 
nativist grounds (Betz & Meret, 2009: 318; Canovan, 2002: 34; Mudde, 2004: 
546). It also entails indexing the inner Other, particularly the non–
heteronormative Other that posits a danger – similarly to the people’s women who 
become individualised subjects – to the existence and perpetuation of the 
hierarchical gender binary that underpins the national family construct (cf. Kulpa, 
2011; Rankin, 2000). 
In the Romanian radical right populist discourse, the figure of the Other is 
contoured most clearly when Tudor describes what he considers the main 
challengers to Romanian people’s sovereignty in their own homeland. This has 
been analysed in detail in section 5.2.4. Among these outer Others, the Hungarian 
minority is given a rather ambiguous masculine performative: financially potent 
and committed irredentist saboteurs of Romanian statehood; secretly plotting 
whilst complaining at international forums (cf. RRM 523, 2000: 14; RRM 525, 
2000: 15; RRM 526, 2000: 14). In turn, the Romani minority does not appear to 
enjoy the same level of respect, being disparagingly labelled as ‘Ţigani’; it is 
however much feared for what Tudor considers its alarming fertility and this 
constitutes a threat to the position of Romanians as the ethnic majority in their 
homeland. In fact, Romani men appear unidimensionally reduced in their 
masculinity performative to their alleged hyper–sexuality. In relation to this, the 
description of Romani women – promiscuous, overly fertile, yet void of maternal 
instincts – seems to be a counterpoint to the depiction of the people’s women and 
their place within the national family; in (legally sanctioned) monogamous 
heterosexual unions with Romanian men, and devoted mothers to the nation’s 
offspring (cf. RRM 523, 2000: 14; RRM 529, 2000: 15; RRM 731, 2004: 12). The 
list of foreign Others is completed with the figure of the mythical Jew, who is also 
relegated to a position of an inferior masculinity performative – physically 
deformed albeit economically successful, but morally corrupt – echoing the 
interwar nationalist anti–Semitism (RRM 524, 2000: 14). With regard to the 
description of the internal Other, the collapse of Orthodox Christianity into 
Romanian identity circumscribes the people to a heteronormative family construct 
that vehemently rejects any accommodation efforts towards the non–
heteronormative Other. The portrayal of internal Other – a masculine 
performative underpinned by degeneration, depravity, and dejection – serves, in 
this context, to legitimise the rules of heterosexual reproduction and patriarchal 
family structuring that govern Romanian national family (cf. RRM 521, 2000: 14; 
RRM 984, 2009: 13). 
In the Swedish radical right populist discourse, in a similar fashion, the 
depiction of the Other seems to be related to ideas of damage, danger, and 
pollution – this is mainly discussed in section 6.2.4. More concretely, the 
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collective social democratic project, undertaken by the Swedish ethnic majority, 
with substantial aid provided by labourers from diverse ethnic backgrounds – to 
construct a welfare society – appears reinterpreted in a welfare chauvinistic key: 
the folkhem belongs exclusively to the Swedish people (cf. SD–K 65, 2005: 2; SD–
K Kampanj, 2009: 3). The immigrant Other is thereby depicted as an intrusive 
parasitical presence in the national home. In this regard, Åkesson seems to hold 
the non–autochthonous migrant Other responsible for the deterioration and 
disappearance of the welfare state, with special reference to the increased amount 
of violent crimes, deterioration of the labour market, and unnecessary strain on 
healthcare services. What I consider specific to the Swedish case is that the Other’s 
not–being–part of the national family is tacitly collapsed into a specific religious 
affiliation (particularly, the Islamic faith), while the Other’s skin colour is 
employed as a primary cue for such process of exclusion, often disguised under 
apparently innocent references to a specific geographic origin. In a similar vein to 
the radical right populist manifestations in Romania, in Sweden the figure of the 
foreign Other appears as a menacing masculine presence, accompanied by honour 
killings, forced marriages, and oppression of women (cf. SD–K 65, 2005: 2; SD–K 
70, 2006: 10; SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3). The outside Other’s masculinity 
performative is thereby depicted as a hyper–sexual, hyper–violent, and staunchly 
patriarchal presence, in a sense warranting the Swedish national family’s reliance 
on the masculine guardianship afforded by the radical right populist party and its 
leader (cf. SD–K 78, 2008: 8; SD–K 81, 2009: 9). With regard to the non–
heteronormative performative of the internal Other, it is deemed to be 
problematic by Swedish radical right populism, for its potential to undermine the 
position of the moral standard that heteronormativity enjoys in the folkhem. What 
sets the Swedish case apart from the Romanian one, however, is the depiction of 
the internal Other. Indeed, the non–heteronormative Other is not dismissed 
outright as alien to the folkhem; rather, the insistence on children’s right to be 
born in monogamous heterosexual families, and appeals to traditional family life, 
indicate the tacit relegation of non–heteronormative Others as less–than–perfect, 
allowing their exclusion from among the ‘real’ people (SD–K Kampanj, 2009: 3). 
To sum up, in the process of defining and reifying its fundamental concept – 
the people – radical right populist ideology engages in explicating discursively 
who are those who do not meet the criteria of membership in the national family. 
In a sense, I argue, the hierarchical gender binary that underpins the people 
conception rests on the constant expounding of the Other. Another important 
conclusion is that the people’s Others seem to be invested with a decidedly 
masculine performative. As such, the competition for people’s future – understood 
in radical right populist discourses to entail the unhindered access to the national 
family’s women and their wombs – and for the fate of their home(land) involves 
the confrontation between the menacing male Others and the people’s male 
defenders: the radical right populist party and its leader. However, the quality of 
not–being part of the people assigns these (male) Others to various positions of 
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inferiority in radical right populist ideology. The national family is also faced with 
the risk of being dismantled from within by those who challenge the hierarchical 
gender binary – the non–heteronormative Other. Noteworthy in this context is – 
yet again – the particular focus on male homosexuality, which appears to be 
particularly problematic to radical right populism. Indeed, the homosexual male 
Other posits a direct threat to the heterosexual masculinity of the people – 
corrupting it into homosexuality – and to the national hierarchical gender binary 
– refusing to reproduce the nation, and in extremis, demanding an equal 
treatment with the other family members of the nation. 
7.3 THE PLACE OF THE (POLITICAL) MAN IN THE NATIONAL 
FAMILY: A STRICT FATHER FIGURE AND/OR A YOUTHFUL 
CHALLENGER? 
The genealogical development of the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster – as 
evidenced in the analysis of radical right populist discourses in chapter five and 
chapter six – elaborates, hypostatises, and maintains a rigid hierarchical gender 
binary. The different standings to which various members of the national family 
have been relegated – be they the ‘real’ people, or their women, and their offspring 
– within this hierarchical conceptual structure appear to gravitate around the 
figure of the (political) man. Under these conditions, I maintain, the aforesaid 
conceptual cluster finds its apex in the radical right populist (political) man. This 
is made intelligible through the masculinity performative that is discursively 
constructed to reflect the power position he is afforded in radical right populist 
ideology. 
The main conclusion that comes from the analysis of the radical right populist 
discourse in Romania – as presented in section 5.3 – is that the NATION IS A FAMILY 
metaphorical cluster appears to be crowned by the STRICT FATHER conceptual 
metaphor, and the masculinity performative it enables (cf. Miller, 2003). Notably, 
Tudor has consecrated his presence in Romanian politics as ‘the Tribune’ – 
utilising the supposed Latin descent of the Romanian people, to claim a 
democratic genealogy, and to transfer upon his persona the alleged masculine 
righteousness of these proclaimed political ancestors. The posture of people’s 
tribune has allowed Tudor to position himself as their champion capable of 
articulating popular demands in the language of party politics. In other words, 
while the people are depicted as a vulnerable silent majority, hence invested with 
feminine passivity and defencelessness, as previously mentioned, Tudor seems to 
embody the STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor: the national family’s rational, 
concerned, and engaged male guardian (cf. RRM 524, 2000: 1; RRM 743, 2004: 
12). In this manner, Tudor appears to naturalise his claims to be included in the 
panoply of great national forefathers, whose figures have often served to 
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(re)construct the Romanian national family (cf. Leustean, 2007; Livezeanu, 
2000). 
From this position of moral superiority, Tudor has virulently attacked his 
political opponents, often unflatteringly labelled as ‘profiteers’, ‘barons’, and even 
‘Taliban’, for their indifferent detachment from the people’s burden (cf. RRM 525, 
2000: 14; RRM 735, 2004: 13; RRM 743, 2004: 12). Consequently, his adversaries 
appear to represent a morally bankrupt, politically extreme, and backwardly 
exploitive masculinity performative. In the same vein, some of them are 
considered disqualified from the electoral competition, and dismissingly relegated 
to a position of inferiority for their alleged non–masculine, or outright non–
heteronormative masculinity performatives, or for their inability to rise from their 
brutish condition to the demands of civility for leading the national family (cf. 
RRM 524, 2000: 15; RRM 530, 2000: 14; RRM 742, 2004: 12; RRM 745, 2004: 
13; RRM 976, 2009: 12). In contrast to these masculinity performatives, sine qua 
non non–dominant, Tudor appears to represent the warrior–leader, voice of the 
divine will, and rallying force for popular energy in the battle against injustice. 
Tudor’s masculinity performative thereby seems to incarnate the radical right 
populist rightful leadership, embodying the providential pater familias whose 
messianic task is to lead ‘his’ people/family into a new moral order. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the context of radical right populist understanding 
of the hierarchical gender binary, Åkesson’s masculinity performative, unlike his 
Romanian counterpart, does not seem to follow the STRICT FATHER conceptual 
metaphor – as discussed in section 6.3. Concomitantly, his masculinity 
performative appears rather compellingly articulated in opposition to the 
NURTURANT PARENT conceptual metaphor – reflective, in my view, of Åkesson’s solid 
anchoring in radical right populist ideology. At a first glance, it appears that he 
embraces the idea of a parental presence entrusted the fate of Swedish national 
family in its folkhem. At a closer inspection, however, whenever the aforesaid 
parental presence engenders a destabilising presence for the constitutive 
hierarchical gender binary of radical right populist ideology – understood in terms 
of efforts to reforming the folkhem, or assumed commitment to gender equality – 
it is vehemently dismissed as a failed instance of proper parenthood (cf. SD–K 72, 
2007a: 12; SD–K 75, 2008: 3). 
With this in mind, I maintain, it seems that the political competition unfolds 
between unequal opponents. On the one hand, there are the established political 
parties – discursively depicted as aged parental figures – which Åkesson accuses 
of mismanaging the national family’s welfare (cf. SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–K 78, 
2008: 3). On the other hand, the masculinity performative of the radical right 
populist leader embodies a youthful and dynamic underdog, which has a 
conceptual consistency of its own (cf. SD–K 65, 2005: 2; SD–K 70, 2006: 11; SD–
K 73, 2007: 12; SD–K 75, 2008: 3; SD–K 78, 2008: 3). The conceptual metaphor 
thus identified in the Swedish radical right populist discourse I have labelled the 
CONSERVATIVE SON. The suggested appellation mirrors, in my view, the contingent 
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aspect of radical right populist ideology, which manifests discursively in a 
different manner in Sweden than in Romania. This new conceptual metaphor does 
not have an emancipatory potential, I may add. Rather, it confirms the importance 
of the hierarchical gender binary in articulating the radical right populist 
discourse in Sweden. 
In conclusion, the leaders of the two radical right populist parties, whose 
discourses I have analysed in the present study, despite their different means of 
achieving it, embody a masculinity performative that unmistakably occupies the 
point of origin, foundation, and summit within the hierarchical gender binary that 
underpins the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster. In so doing, it confirms the 
contingent nature of the discursive manifestations of radical right populist 
ideology. In addition, it shows the inherent flexibility of radical right populist 
ideology, and its ability to indicate the (political) man as the cornerstone of 
hierarchical gender binary, either confirmed in a position of pater familias, or as a 
youthful contender of an existing family order. Both of them rest, in my view, on 
the portrayal of radical right populist leaders as trustworthy guardians of the 
people, whom thereby reconstitute the symbolic heteronormative dyad: the 
(political) man – leader of the national family – and the people – vulnerable and 
entrusting their salvation in the hands of such a man. 
7.4 THE IDEOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY OF GENDERED 
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS: A FEW CONCLUDING REMARKS 
AND NEW AVENUES OF RESEARCH 
At a more theoretical level, there are several conclusions that concern the 
ideological productivity of gendered conceptual metaphors that come forth in the 
present study. First, I maintain that the interaction between radical right populist 
ideology, discourse, and language in giving expression to the hierarchical gender 
binary manifests great complexity, displaying the dynamic ability to continuously 
develop over time, accommodating novel conceptual articulations, and 
manifestations of the ideological tenets into discourse with the aid of conceptual 
structures. In this regard, I argue that the discursive manifestations of conceptual 
metaphor – and its corresponding metaphorical cluster – becomes sublimated, 
and transformed into an invisible envelope of ideology (Holborow, 2007: 53–54). 
This needs however to be understood in the wider context of hegemonic 
manifestation of neoliberal capitalism, which is present in different guises across 
Europe. Indeed, Romania has followed a trajectory similar to the other countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe, characterised by the formal adoption of principles 
of representative democracy, and uncritical embrace of neoliberal market 
capitalism (cf. Gallagher, 2005; Miroiu, 2010; Pasti, 2003; Soare, 2010). In turn, 
Sweden has witnessed from 1990s onwards the full impact of ‘the shift to the 
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right’, and the rise to prominence of conservatism in neoliberal clothes (cf. Agius, 
2007; Andersson, 2009a; Boréus, 1994). The models for these developments have 
been the Reagan administration, in the United States, and the Thatcher 
government in the United Kingdom. For these political forces the imperative of 
‘rolling back the state’ has been accompanied by that of ‘falling back’ onto ‘the 
family unit’. The heteronormative family has been depicted as the ideal setting to 
ensure the reproduction of a disciplined working force, to stimulate and regulate 
consumerist identifications, and to provide for childcare and social security, under 
the guise of a much acclaimed return to the traditional family values. The 
neoliberal conservative appraisal of traditional family values rests on the 
conviction about the existence of fixed, ‘natural’ gender binary (women and men); 
this, in turn, entails the innate difference and absolute complementarity between 
women and men that consequently posits the heteronormative family as the locus 
for their perfect union; and, finally, the idealisation of heterosexual domestic 
construct from around the middle of the twentieth century (Lancaster, 2006: 117). 
With this in mind, a second conclusion the present study suggests is that the 
discursive expression of the hierarchical gender binary operated by radical right 
populist ideology seems to conceptualise the aforementioned heteronormative 
family ideal in its most staunchly conservative form. On this matter, the 
genealogical perspective has played a key role in showing the internal flexibility of 
the metaphorical cluster centred on the NATION IS A FAMILY to continuously 
incorporate different conceptual aspects – such as claims of working class 
identification, membership in the ethnic majority (and dominant religious 
denomination), traditional gender performatives, and a subscription to 
heteronormative sexuality. More clearly, from a radical right populist perspective, 
the heteronormative family is conceptually extended to incorporate the people 
monolith, thereby crafting a national family totality over time. As such, the 
constitutive unit of reference – the people – seem to belong to the working class, 
but most importantly to narrowly overlap the ethnic majority population of the 
country in question. Nevertheless, class solidarity appears a rather hollow echo; in 
turn, emphasis is placed upon safeguarding the national family’s purity. This is 
understood both as an express prohibition for the people’s women to intermarry 
and bear the offspring of Other men outside the ethnic majority, and the 
imperative for the ethnic majority men to defend their women and ensure the 
survival of the nation through the procreation of numerous offspring. Within the 
people’s national family, there is barely any place left for non–heteronormative 
femininity performatives that are not centred on bearing the nation’s progenies – 
understood both in symbolic, and physical terms – nor for non–heteronormative 
masculinity performatives; these are relegated to a position of internal dangers. 
The major threat however seems to be represented by the migrant (heterosexual) 
male Other. 
A third conclusion that arises from this study is that the different manners in 
which the radical right populist ideology works through discourse to give 
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expression to the hierarchical gender binary express a difference of degree, not of 
kind. More clearly, the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor maintains its 
centrality in confirming the hierarchical gender binary as a key principle of radical 
right populist ideology, irrespective of its localised manifestations – either on the 
Romanian national political scene, or in Swedish mainstream politics. What seems 
to differ, however, concerns the position and role of the masculinity performative. 
In this framework, the common people appear to be ascribed feminine passivity 
and defencelessness, and, as such, emphasise the complementary dynamic 
masculinity of the radical right populist party (and its leader). In other words, the 
aforesaid masculinity performative, while articulated differently in the various 
depictions of the party leader in the context of radical right populist ideology – the 
STRICT FATHER conceptual metaphor and what I have labelled the CONSERVATIVE SON 
– appears nonetheless confirmed in its centrality to the construction of the 
national family. Summing up, I consider that the similarity in kind of the 
hierarchical gender binary shown in the two cases is not surprising. Rather, I 
consider this a confirmation of the argument that conceptual metaphors play a 
cardinal role in making ideology intelligible at the level of political discourse. It 
also underlines the deeply traditional understanding attached to the national 
family metaphorical construct in radical right populist ideology, despite the 
ostensibly emancipatory tones that may be seen at first glance. 
These conclusions indicate, in my view, three main avenues for further 
research on the topic. A first opportunity would be to map out the usage of the 
NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor among various discursive manifestations 
of ideological cleavage among the main parliamentary parties in specific national 
contexts. Therefore, the ambition would be to explore the specificity of chosen 
national political setting and its impact on the manifestations of various ideologies 
with regard to the construction and reification of hierarchical gender binaries. An 
example readily at hand would be a detailed analysis of the Romanian or Swedish 
national politics and a detailed examination of the discursive construction, 
reification, or possible contestation of the hierarchical gender binary within the 
major ideologies manifest in national politics in the selected countries. 
A second path for further research could be exploring the gendered aspect of 
the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphorical cluster in radical right populist discourses, 
with special attention being paid to those instances in which the chosen radical 
right populist party has been chaired by a woman – for example, the FN under the 
leadership of Marine Le Pen, the DF under the chairmanship of Pia Kjærsgaard, or 
the FrP with Siv Jensen at its helm. The aim of such studies would be to 
interrogate the centrality of masculinity performatives in radical right populist 
ideology, and examine the possible tension between the positions afforded to 
those women chairing these parties – as autonomous political subjects, in 
positions of parity with their (male) political opponents – and their ascribed place 
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within the hierarchical gender binary – as women submitting to the task of 
reproducing the national family construct. 
A third line of approach could be to widen the comparative aspect of present 
study to account for the various different radical right populist ideologies across 
Europe. A better understanding of the Swedish case study could be afforded by 
anchoring it in the wider Nordic context – in a comparative study, together with 
the DF in Denmark, the PS/SF in Finland, and the FrP in Norway. The focus 
would necessarily be on the translations into the radical right populist ideologies, 
in the respective national settings, of the gender equality ideals these countries 
have long claimed to embody. More precisely, it would be worth investigating the 
potential tensions at the level of discourse between the construction and 
reification of a hierarchical gender binary, and claims to gender equality among 
the ethnic majorities in these countries. In turn, the Romanian case study could 
benefit from a solid grounding in the wider Central and Eastern European context 
– comparing it, for example, with the Bulgarian Ataka, and/or the Hungarian 
Jobbik. Such a study might perhaps bring forth a more nuanced picture of the 
denunciation of previous gender equality efforts, and rapid reinstatement of a 
deeply conservative hierarchical gender binary, against the background of the 
collapse of authoritarian regimes, fall of planned economies, and uncritical 
embrace of neoliberal capitalism across the region. 
The three avenues for further research I have sketched above are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, they could also be explored in a concerted manner, such as for 
instance, in a Europe–wide research project. The project could then engage in an 
exhaustive mapping of the radical right populist ideology, and the challenge its 
various manifestations may posit to parliamentary democracy, gender equality 
efforts, and community–building projects for more tolerant societies, in which 
majority and minority populations may live side by side. 
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